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This study examines the politics and policies of reproductive agency 
through a redescription of the following three Finnish policy documents dealing 
with the questions of the declining birth rate and population growth: the Gov-
ernment report on the future called ‘Finland for people of all ages’ (2004), Business 
and Policy Forum EVA report ‘Condemned to Diminish?’ (Tuomitut vähenemään?) 
(2003), and the Family Federation’s ‘Population Policy Program’ (2004). The rede-
scription  is  done  with  the  help  of  the  notion  of  reproductive  agency,  which  
draws on Drucilla Cornell’s concepts of the imaginary domain and bodily integ-
rity. The imaginary domain is the moral and psychic space people need in order 
to form their personality, which is created and recreated in constant identifica-
tory processes. The aim of the processes is imaginary coherence and as the per-
sonality is embodied, forming one’s imaginary coherence always includes at-
tempts for bodily integrity. The formation of the embodied being also entails 
attempts to arrive at an understanding of one’s procreative capacities.  
In addition to Cornell, I draw on Judith Butler’s thinking and com-
prehend gender performatively as doing, and in relation to that agency as part 
of the performative process of one’s personality. Reiterability of the self facili-
tates the reconfiguring of one’s embodied personality, but discourse, culture and 
society condition the reiterations. Reproductive agency is understood in this 
study as the possibilities to live differently the hegemonic forms of procreative 
life.  
I  deal  with  three  redescriptive  themes:  the  family,  economics  and  
gender. The family is a central element in policy documents concerning the rais-
ing of  the birth rate in that  it  is  considered the main location of  reproduction.  
With regard to reproductive agency, the documents include problematic concep-
tions of the family. It is defined as a heterosexual, monogamous, conjugal rela-
tionship,  which  affects  reproductive  agency  in  that  these  notions  do  not  allow  
for different modes of family life. The second prominent aspect, economics, fea-
tures on two levels: the macroeconomic level of GDP, employment and competi-
tiveness, and the level of family policies and concern about family finances. 
Macroeconomic-level argumentation is problematic in the context of reproduc-
tive agency because it implies that procreation is a duty of citizens, and thus has 
effects on values attached to reproductive potential. On the other hand, family 
policies may advance reproductive agency in supporting families financially. 
However, such policies also define how the family is understood, thereby affect-
ing reproductive agency. The third theme, gender, intersects with many issues 
in  the  policy  documents.  All  three  texts  consider  the  roles  of  men and  women 
differently: women are primarily responsible for the family, and both men’s and 
women’s reproductive agency is affected in that the roles in the procreative 
process are predefined. EVA and the Family Federation see women as the main 
target of population policies, and consider it legitimate to try to change women’s 
reproductive decisions.  
Implicit in the notion of reproductive agency is the idea that it 
should be possible to overcome and live differently the sex difference, but the 
three documents do not open up opportunities for that. The notion of reproduc-
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tive agency makes it also possible to question the legitimacy of population poli-
cies in general. It offers new perspectives on the vocabularies used in the three 
policy texts that are already in the political field, providing insights into the val-
ues  and  logics  that  support  the  concepts.  Redescription  through  the  notion  of  
reproductive agency reveals how the texts do not fully respect people’s freedom 





The process of writing a dissertation is a long one and full of varying phases and 
emotions. It is clear that this type of endeavour cannot be taken alone and there 
have been many people who have helped and supported me during these years. 
First  of  all,  I  want  to  thank  my supervisor  professor  Tuija  Pulkkinen,  who  su-
pervised me already at the Master’s stage and after that encouraged me to pur-
sue doctorate. Her help and support has been various all throughout the years. 
She has offered advice on the content of my work and has commented and dis-
cussed my work right from the beginning. She has also provided me her exper-
tise  and  access  to  academic  networks.  With  her  help  I  have  also  been  able  to  
spend time abroad, which has broadened my viewpoints both academically and 
personally. In addition, she has created an environment that has enabled vari-
ous forms of support and inspiration. Thank you for everything! 
 One  element  of  the  supportive  environment  has  been  the  doctoral  
student group that has its beginning at the University of Jyväskylä Women’s 
Studies. Most of its members have been connected to my project right from the 
start. I want to thank Anna Elomäki, Jacek Kornak and Eeva Urrio for their 
support and friendship. They have offered me insightful and encouraging com-
ments on my work and with them I have also been able to share the life experi-
ence of being a doctoral student. I also want to thank Jaana Pirskanen, who was 
in  the  group  in  the  early  years  and  the  newer  members  Heini  Kinnunen  and  
Soili Petäjäniemi-Brown.  
 I have been lucky to be a part of an academic community, in which 
people at different stages of their careers have offered me their knowledge, both 
substantive related to my work and about the academic life in general. The Poli-
tics of Philosophy and Gender group (PPhiG, a part of the Academy of Finland 
Centre  of  Excellence  ‘Political  Through  and  Conceptual  Change’)  has  been  a  
stimulating  community  and  I  want  to  thank  its  members  Tuula  Juvonen,  Anu 
Koivunen, Johanna Oksala, Antu Sorainen, Laura Werner and Julia Honkasalo. 
A  special  thank  you  goes  to  the  PPhiG co-ordinator  Tuija  Modinos  for  sorting  
out all kinds of practical and some impractical matters. For the past couple of 
vi 
 
years,  I  have  also  been  a  member  in  the  community  of  Gender  Studies  at  the  
University of Helsinki. I want to thank all the Gender Studies staff; it has been 
an inspiring environment to finish my dissertation. 
 Throughout  the  years  of  my  studies,  I  have  presented  my work  in  
various  places  and  situations  and  I  want  to  thank  all  the  people  with  whom  I  
have discussed and who have given me food for thought, I can’t probably even 
remember  you  all.  I  want  to  thank  professor  Kari  Palonen  for  encouragement  
and interest in my work. Thank you to Jaana Vuori, who took time to read the 
manuscript and discuss it. I also want to thank my pre-examiners Penelope 
Deutscher and Elina Oinas for comments that improved the dissertation in the 
final stages. Thank you to Eemil Aaltonen Foundation (Emil Aaltosen säätiö) for 
the grants that gave me three years of uninterrupted funding and thus financial 
possibilities to pursue my research and PPhiG that has funded the final stages of 
my doctoral studies.  
 Although writing a dissertation is a project that tends to take over 
your life, it is not all there is and I want to thank my friends and family for giv-
ing me something else to think about and for possibilities to vent. I want to 
thank Anne for peer support and for friendship. We made it! Katri, Leena and 
Anna, thank you for all the movie nights. Heidi, the travelling and just hanging 
out have been welcome breaks from the work. Thanks Susanna for all the nights 
out. Thank you to Aga, John and Marcus for making London feel like home, I 
have been able to finish this project here. Finally, I want to thank my parents, 
Riitta and Heino, who have always supported me and have never questioned my 
ability to make my own choices. 
 




Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ iii 
 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... v 
 
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................... vii 
 
List of abbreviations .................................................................................................... ix 
 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 
 
2 Formulating reproductive agency ...................................................................... 13 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 13 
2.2. The concept of the person ........................................................................................ 15 
2.3 The imaginary domain ............................................................................................... 17 
2.3.1 Identification processes ...................................................................................... 18 
2.3.2 The imaginary domain and freedom ................................................................. 21 
2.3.3 The imaginary domain, law and the state ......................................................... 26 
2.3.4 Limitations on the representation of the imaginary domain .......................... 29 
2.4 Bodily integrity ........................................................................................................... 31 
2.4.1 The embodied self................................................................................................ 31 
2.4.2 Temporal and imaginary aspects of bodily integrity ........................................ 33 
2.5 The imaginary domain as an evaluative tool............................................................ 38 
2.6 Agency in Cornell’s and Butler’s thought ................................................................. 44 
2.6.1 Cornell on agency ................................................................................................ 44 
2.6.2 Butler, performativity and the relationship between materiality, 
language and agency .................................................................................................... 46 
2.7 Reproductive agency .................................................................................................. 55 
 
3 The policy documents described ......................................................................... 61 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 61 
3.2 Background ................................................................................................................. 63 
3.2.1 On the history of Finnish population policies ................................................... 63 
3.2.2 The debate on the declining birth rate and the need for a population 
policy in the 21st century .............................................................................................. 65 
3.3 Policy document 1: Condemned to Diminish? – Finns and the Difficult Art of 
Procreation (EVA) ............................................................................................................ 68 
3.4 Policy document 2: The Population Policy Programme of the Family 
Federation of Finland (FF) .............................................................................................. 72 
3.5 Policy document 3: Finland for people of all ages: Government report on the 
future: demographic trends, population policy, and preparation for changes in 
the age structure (GOV) ................................................................................................... 77 
 
4 Thematic description and redescription I: the family................................. 83 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 83 
viii 
 
4.2 Expansion of the redescriptive tool: the family and the imaginary domain ......... 84 
4.3 Thematic description I ............................................................................................... 91 
4.3.1 The opaque family ............................................................................................... 92 
4.3.2 A cautious dissection of the concept of the family ........................................... 94 
4.3.3 Commonalities in the concept of the family ..................................................... 98 
4.4 Thematic redescription I ........................................................................................... 99 
4.4.1 The family as a single, opaque unit.................................................................. 100 
4.4.2 Individual family values ................................................................................... 105 
4.4.3 Defining the family ........................................................................................... 108 
4.4.4 Eroding the concept of the family .................................................................... 112 
4.4.5 Kinship and family ............................................................................................. 114 
4.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 117 
 
5 Thematic description and redescription II: Economics ............................ 121 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 121 
5.2 Expansion of the redescriptive tool: conditions for the imaginary domain .........122 
5.3 Thematic description II ........................................................................................... 126 
5.3.1 Demographics and economic development .................................................... 126 
5.3.2 Family policies and the economic conditions for having children ............... 130 
5.4 Thematic redescription II ........................................................................................ 135 
5.4.1 Macroeconomics: people as power ................................................................... 135 
5.4.2 Having children as a financial decision: normativity of reproduction and 
rational calculations ....................................................................................................139 
5.4.3 A counter-discourse to economics: a return to family values ....................... 146 
5.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 149 
 
6 Thematic description and redescription III: Gender ................................. 151 
6.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 151 
6.2 Expansion of the redescriptive tool: sex, gender and reproductive agency ......... 152 
6.3 Thematic description III ......................................................................................... 160 
6.3.1 Women and the labour market ......................................................................... 161 
6.3.2 From gender neutrality to gendered problems ...............................................163 
6.4 Thematic redescription III ...................................................................................... 166 
6.4.1 Gendered structures and attempts at gender neutrality ................................ 166 
6.4.2 Questions of inequality .....................................................................................170 
6.4.3 Women as the object of policies ....................................................................... 176 
6.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 180 
 
7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 183 
 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 199 
Primary sources.............................................................................................................. 199 




List of abbreviations 
 
 
EVA Wallenius, Timo (2003) Tuomitut vähenemään? Suomalaiset ja 
lisääntymisen vaikea taito [Condemned to Diminish? Finns and 
the difficult art of procreation]. Helsinki: Taloustieto Oy, EVA.  
 
FF Väestöliitto (2004a) Väestöliiton väestöpoliittinen ohjelma [The 
Population Policy Program of the Family Federation]. Helsinki: 
Väestöliitto. Available online at http://vaestoliitto-fi-
bin.directo.fi/@Bin/de9704000e31ccf8eb58aa88cdee6489/128012
5330/application/pdf/263803/vpohjelma_lopullinenpdf.pdf. Ac-
cessed on March, 17 2011. 
 
GOV  Prime Minister’s Office (2004) Finland for people of all ages: Gov-
ernment report on the future: demographic trends, population 
policy, and preparation for changes in the age structure. Helsinki: 
Prime Minister’s Office: Publications 34/2004.  
 
GOV/FIN Valtioneuvosto (2004): Hyvä yhteiskunta kaikenikäisille. 
Valtioneuvoston tulevaisuusselonteko väestökehityksestä, 
väestöpolitiikasta ja ikärakenteen muutokseen varautumisesta. 








Väestön ikääntymiseksi kutsuttu ilmiö mainitaan kaikissa 
yhteyksissä yhdeksi suurimmista maamme tulevaisuuden 
haasteista. Väestöennusteiden mukaan Suomen väestö kääntyy 
vähitellen laskuun. Sitäkin tärkeämpää - ja selvästi varmempaa - 
on, että ikäryhmien suuruussuhteet muuttuvat tulevaisuudessa 
merkittävästi. Muutos on ollut käynnissä jo pitkään, mutta se 
tulee erityisen näkyväksi jo muutamien vuosien päästä suurten 
ikäluokkien saavuttaessa eläkeiän. Tilastokeskuksen 
väestöennusteen mukaan 65 vuotta täyttäneiden määrä kasvaa 
yli  600  000  hengellä  vuoteen  2030  mennessä.  Samalla  lasten  ja  
työikäisten määrä vähenee yhteensä noin 400 000 hengellä. Näin 
voimakas väestön ikärakenteen muutos vaikuttaa 
talouskehitykseen ja työllisyyteen. Sillä on mittavia 
julkistaloudellisia seurauksia, ja se muuttaa hyvinvointipolitiikan 
painopisteitä. (Eduskunta 2004) 
 
[A phenomenon called the aging population is referred everywhere 
as a major future challenge facing our nation. According to demo-
graphic prognoses, the population of Finland will slowly start to de-
crease.  Even  more  important  –  and  clearly  more  certain  –  is  that  
the ratio of age groups will change significantly. It has been chang-
ing for a long time, but it will become more visible already in a few 
years when the baby-boomers reach retirement age. According to 
the demographic prediction of Statistics Finland, the number of 
people  reaching  the  age  of  65  will  increase  by  over  600,000  by  
2030,  whereas  the  number  of  children  and  people  of  working  age  
will decrease by about 400,000 in total. Such a forceful change in 
the age structure will affect economic development and employ-
ment, have considerable effects on public finances, and it will 




In 2004 the Finnish Government published a report on the demographic chal-
lenges facing the Finnish nation. The report was discussed in Parliament in No-
vember  of  the  same year.  The  Finnish  Prime Minister  at  the  time,  Matti  Van-
hanen, noted in his opening statement that the population question was one of 
the most serious challenges facing Finland (Eduskunta 2004). Although popula-
tion growth, or the lack of it, had been the subject of political debate of varying 
intensity for decades, there was a revival of interest in demographic develop-
ments during the early years of the 21st century. Interest in demographics arose 
when Finland witnessed a sharp decline in population growth a hundred years 
ago  prompting  both  discussion  and  policy  measures.  In  the  early  21st century, 
demographics is once again the subject of debate. In this study I concentrate at 
one specific point of the population-policy discourses, describing and redescrib-
ing three selected policy documents that contributed to the debate on the need 
for a Finnish population policy in the early years of the 21st century. I redesrcibe 
the documents from the perspective of reproductive agency, which is a concept I 
develop based on Drucilla Cornell’s thinking. 
The three documents concerned, which relate to the policy discus-
sions in 2003-2004, are the Government report on preparing for demographic 
change, and two reports, one by the business-friendly think-tank Business and 
Policy Forum EVA and the other by The Family Federation, an NGO focusing on 
family issues. The purpose of my study is to shed light on the values and mean-
ings that  lie  behind the concepts and vocabularies used in the documents,  and 
by extension in the discussions in which the population and population policies 
are intertwined with issues such as family, economics and gender. For my study, 
the central theme of the policy documents is the idea that the Finnish birth rate 
needs to be raised. Although debates about the population and population pol-
icy deal with various issues, such as immigration and regional development, my 
study of the three policy texts concentrates on analyses and policy proposals 
regarding  the  birth  rate,  i.e.  why  it  has  been  decreasing  and  what  could  and  
should be done about it. My interest is in the conditions that affect reproductive 
choices, and in the politics and policies that, directly or indirectly, target repro-
ductive agency.  
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The  scope  of  my  study  is  limited  to  the  three  above-mentioned  
documents as this enables detailed analysis of the texts. I could have examined 
Finnish  debates  on  population  policy  in  general,  or  historical  and  current  dis-
cursive constructions regarding population or demographic challenges, which 
would clarify the development of the discourses and the connections between 
the population-policy debate and other political issues. My focus is elsewhere, 
however. By concentrating on the three texts I am able to dig more deeply into 
the, often unannounced, principles and significations of the vocabularies that 
the  texts  use  and  include.  The  originators  of  the  texts  are  operators  who  care  
about the development of the Finnish population, but they represent very differ-
ent interests and have various perspectives on the population questions con-
cerned. Consequently, the logics and values inherent in these documents are 
diverse. Thus I am able to provide different points of view about the discussion 
conducted in the documents on the need for a Finnish population policy.  
The three documents differ not only in terms of the interests of the 
organisations publishing them, but also in the production processes. Neverthe-
less, all the texts are public documents that are at least partly directed at the 
general public, and were published at around the same time as part of a public 
debate. They were meant to contribute to a specific discussion at a specific time, 
and I consider them very much part of the same discussion. The three texts are 
similar in their effort to affect the Finnish population policy and to offer con-
crete proposals. It would be possible to conduct a historical examination of their 
position in Finnish population-policy discourses, but in addition to being a part 
of the on-going debate, they put forward separate arguments about population 
policies,  and  about  the  politics  and  policies  related  to  the  birth  rate.  The  fact  
that they were meant as coherent policy proposals makes it possible to examine 
them  as  independent  texts,  set  apart  from  other  public  discussions  that  were  
going on at the time of their publication.  
In examining the texts, I adopt the concept of reproductive agency, 
which is used more generally, for example, in contexts concerning women’s abil-
ity to decide or control their reproduction. I use the concept in a very specific 
sense, however, basing my interpretation of the notion on Drucilla Cornell’s 
thinking. Cornell’s notions of ‘the imaginary domain’ and ‘bodily integrity’ offer 
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me  conceptual  resources,  on  which  I  draw  when  formulating  the  tools  for  my  
analysis. Her conception of the personality or the self as processual and unfin-
ished has led her to formulate a notion of the imaginary domain, which refers to 
a psychic and moral space in which people are able to sort through the different 
identifications comprising their personality. Cornell holds dear the idea of free-
dom to form one’s personality. Freedom is always ideal, meaning that it cannot 
be achieved once and for all; it is always in the making and dependent on others, 
but still a value that should be respected. The personality is formed in identifica-
tory processes that aim at a sense of coherence. The sense of the coherent self is 
embodied, and how people see themselves always includes a bodily aspect. Cor-
nell calls the sense of embodied coherence bodily integrity, which is something 
that people aim for, even though they never achieve it. However, people need a 
sense  of  bodily  integrity  in  order  to  be  able  to  operate  as  embodied  personali-
ties. The notion of the embodied personality is the starting point for my notion 
of reproductive agency, which I then use as a tool in the analyses. I examine the 
complex conceptions connected to the notion of embodied personality more 
closely in the second chapter, in which I elucidate in detail the connections be-
tween the concepts of the imaginary domain, bodily integrity and freedom.  
I have also been inspired in my study by the ideas of Judith Butler. 
Her conception of gender performativity, and connected to that how she under-
stands materiality and the relationship between materiality, language and 
agency, are particularly relevant. I strongly believe that gender is performatively 
produced, in other words it is not prediscursive or presocial, but something that 
has to be produced and reproduced. As identity is iterative, it also enables reit-
erating differently and this, in turn, enables agency. The idea of agency as an 
element of a reiterative process means that because it is possible to repeat iden-
tity differently, change is possible. Changing things requires rethinking and re-
imagining, and I connect the imaginary domain to Butler’s idea of performativ-
ity and agency as a place for thinking about personality or identity differently, 
and as such as an instrument for agency. I elaborate on this combining of But-
ler’s and Cornell’s thinking about agency, freedom and performativity in the 
second chapter.  
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According to both Butler and Cornell, the self is embodied, and one 
element of the performative process of the self is to give meanings and values to 
material features of the personality. Cornell’s notion of bodily integrity is closely 
related to the imaginary domain as an aspect of the process of the personality. 
In  this  study,  I  consider  reproduction  to  be  an  intimate  part  of  how  one  con-
ceives of bodily integrity. Sexuality, and deciding about procreation as an aspect 
of it, is essential in the formation of the self. Reproduction and the ability to de-
cide about parenthood are fundamental in how one sees one’s personality. In-
fluenced  by  Cornell’s  and,  to  some  extent,  Butler’s  thinking,  I  thus  formulate  
reproductive agency as the possibilities for different iterations connected to re-
production, creating opportunities to live procreation in various ways as defined 
by the person her- or himself.  
The notion of reproductive agency provides me with an analytical 
tool in my study of the three selected documents. It would, of course, be possible 
to  examine  population-policy  debates  from  other  perspectives:  ‘reproductive  
rights’ and concentration on ‘bodily control’, for example, have been applied in 
analyses of procreation. I have developed the concept of reproductive agency as 
my tool, because it facilitates thinking about politics and policies targeting pro-
creation in ways that combine very personal decisions with the politics and poli-
cies that aim to affect notions and practices of procreation. Studying the docu-
ments from the perspective of reproductive agency is revealing in terms of the 
construction of the embodied personality. As a tool it facilitates examination of 
how the  conditions  for  the  process  of  personality  formation  are  constituted  in  
the three policy proposals. The proposals cannot, of course, be totalising in their 
effects, but they do reflect the conditions in which people live, and the values 
and meanings that are already out there. Thus the policy documents have a dual 
role: they reflect the existing discourse about procreation, and they affect the 
conditions in which people live, and that constitute the embodied subjectivity.  
Understanding embodied subjectivity as open-ended avoids having 
to think about the body as something external that should or could be totally 
controlled.  There  can  be  no  separation  of  the  body  and  the  mind,  as  they  are  
always present as different aspects of an embodied being. When seen as a proc-
ess of which embodiment is one aspect, the self always incorporates our imagin-
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ings of  bodily coherence.  Inherent in this  notion of  bodily coherence as imagi-
nary  is  the  view  that  how  one  experiences  and  understands  one’s  body  is  not  
unmediated: bodily experiences are created in an imaginary process aiming at 
integrity and affected by culture and society. In other words, there is no neutral, 
biological  or  pre-discursive  body  that  is  free  of  social  and  cultural  influences.  
The  idea  that  the  body  is  produced  and  re-produced  through  imaginary  proc-
esses draws attention to the fact that there is no one monolithic and unified ex-
perience  of  the  body:  people  do  not  experience  their  bodies  in  the  same  way,  
and no individual experiences her body in the same way over time. People live 
and sense their embodied selves in diverse ways at different times and in differ-
ent situations.  
Experiences and notions of the bodily being are open to cultural 
and  social  influences,  and  the  process  of  the  embodied  personality  also  has  a  
public and a political aspect. I draw attention here to the relationship between 
the formation of the personality and the political sphere: how does the political 
create  and  recreate,  enable  and  disable  the  free  formation  of  the  self?  Current  
policies and politics, and those in the making, affect the imaginary processes 
through  which  personalities  are  formed.  My  notion  of  reproductive  agency,  
which draws on Cornell and Butler, does not neglect the role of politics and poli-
cies in the process of  creating and recreating the conditions,  in which the per-
sonality is formed, nor does it take for granted any understanding of the body or 
the embodied being. 
I  use  the  notion  of  reproductive  agency  as  a  tool  in  my redescrip-
tions of the selected policy texts. Redescription is often understood in the study 
of rhetoric as a form of conceptual change, which can give new meanings to con-
cepts (see, e.g., Palonen 1999 and Skinner 1999). In this study it means describ-
ing the texts again through a specific conceptual lens, in this case the notion of 
reproductive agency, and thereby focusing attention on issues and aspects that 
relate to the formation of the procreative personality. In my reading of the texts 
I aim to find out how they take account of reproductive agency. The point is to 
analyse the extent to which different aspects of reproductive agency, such as 
being able to define your own values connected to the procreative process, are 
present, visible and taken into consideration in the texts.   
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Texts about population and reproductive issues often use concepts 
and vocabularies that are taken for granted, or that seem natural and unques-
tionable. The self-evident nature of the concepts and themes can be questioned 
through  examination  of  the  texts  from  a  perspective  that  fosters  new  ways  of  
looking at and reading them, and takes into account viewpoints that would not 
necessarily be visible otherwise. In addition to drawing attention to issues that 
would otherwise seem natural, redescription also facilitates the systematisation 
of the analysis process. The meanings and values of the concepts and the words 
used in the documents cannot be analysed in a mechanical  manner,  and rede-
scribing the texts through the concept of reproductive agency directs the process 
in giving a specific viewpoint and conceptual framework. The use of the concept 
also means, of course, that attention is given to certain issues, whereas if an-
other conceptual framework had been used, attention would have focused on 
other themes. Concepts and vocabularies are not taken for granted. As Kari Pa-
lonen notes, concepts supply strategic instruments for political action, and 
‘shape the horizon of the political possibilities in the situation’: they may also be 
used as a means of rethinking the horizon of possible politics (Palonen 1999, 
47). Redescription of the policy texts through the notion of reproductive agency 
shows that there is no right or core meaning in the concepts used in the docu-
ments, the concepts are contingent and amenable to change.   
It is not my purpose in the redescriptions to give an overarching 
analysis of Finnish population-policy debates in recent decades, or even in the 
21st century. Therefore, I do not analyse the visibility or importance of the policy 
documents in the Finnish political field in general, although it is clear that all 
three texts did receive at least some publicity at the time of their publication. It 
would also be possible to conduct a policy analysis of how the proposals 
emerged, how they have been implemented, and the consequences they have 
had. I concentrate on other issues, such as the conditions they impose on pro-
creative personality processes. The selected policy documents make proposals, 
in other words the policies in question may not have been implemented, but this 
does not necessarily mean that they are meaningless. Their purpose was to in-
fluence Governmental policies and politics, and as such they say something 
about the values and goals of these specific operators with regard to Finnish so-
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ciety. These values and goals are scrutinised in detail through redescription, 
which  brings  to  light  the  unannounced  logic,  values  and  world-views  that  are  
embedded in the wording of the documents. The power and usefulness of rede-
scription is that it gives distance from the obvious and established linguistic us-
age in the three documents, encouraging different modes of thought and alter-
native interpretations while not distracting attention from the texts themselves. 
This work is constructed on the alternation of description and rede-
scription. The descriptions adopt the language used in the documents. Chapter 
3 comprises the first description, which gives an overall picture of the three pol-
icy  documents.  Chapters  4,  5  and  6  concentrate  on  description  and  redescrip-
tion with regard to specific themes included in the texts. Each of these chapters 
begins  with  a  description  of  a  theme,  followed  by  a  redescription  of  the  same  
issue. The description reveals how the particular theme is dealt with in the dif-
ferent texts, whereas the redescription does not necessarily focus on the same 
things, and teases out issues that reveal the lack of neutrality and innocence in 
the vocabularies and concepts used. All of the policy texts posit certain kinds of 
principles and world-views, which often seem somehow inevitable. Redescrip-
tion makes it possible to envision new options, and thus casts doubt on the 
seeming naturalness of the linguistic and conceptual choices made in the texts. 
It does not take the language of the documents for granted, however: in my view 
the concepts are contingent, elements of texts that can be understood in differ-
ent ways. 
The three selected documents essentially deal with the politics and 
policies  of  reproduction,  which  has  been  and  remains  a  hot  feminist  topic.  
Moreover, population policy is clearly connected to feminist interests. There are 
no easy answers to questions concerning reproductive politics and polices, 
which are issues on which people are forced to take a personal stand, and are 
also of political and social relevance. The question of reproduction touches upon 
some of  the  most  basic  concerns  of  women,  and  how it  is  dealt  with  reveals  a  
great deal about how women’s role in society and culture is understood. Appli-
cation of the notion of reproductive agency to the selected policy documents 
makes it possible to analyse various aspects of the concepts and vocabularies 
used, and draws attention not just to women, but also to the politics of repro-
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duction in relation to gender and the gendered roles that are assigned to people 
regardless of what they themselves think.  
 
The structure of the dissertation 
In addition to the introduction, the dissertation consists of five chapters and a 
conclusion. First, in Chapter 2, I formulate the notion of reproductive agency in 
line with Drucilla Cornell’s thought and concepts. The first part of the chapter 
deals  with  Cornell’s  thought.  I  introduce  her  notion  of  the  person,  which  lies  
behind the notions of the imaginary domain and bodily integrity I consider next. 
Inherent in the imaginary domain and bodily integrity is the psychoanalytically 
inspired understanding of the identification process and the imaginary aspects 
of the embodied self, as well as Cornell’s conception of the personality as some-
thing processual and always in the making. In constructing the notion of repro-
ductive agency I also lean on Judith Butler’s thinking, giving a brief overview of 
her ideas on performativity, agency and the relationship between materiality, 
language and agency. Butler’s thought complements Cornell’s concepts. Her 
ideas about the relationship between materialisation and language, and how 
agency  can  be  understood  in  the  context  of  the  imaginary  domain  and  bodily  
integrity,  are  particularly  relevant  to  my  work.  I  conclude  the  first  chapter  by  
giving  a  formulation  of  reproductive  agency  that  is  the  conceptual  tool  in  the  
redescriptions. 
The third chapter describes and contextualises the three selected 
policy documents. Although it is not the purpose of this study to give an exten-
sive picture of Finnish population-policy discourses, it is still necessary to give 
some  background  information  about  the  debates  that  preceded  the  policy  
documents under study. Chapter 3 gives general descriptions of the documents, 
whereas the following chapters concentrate only on certain aspects. The over-
view also gives some context to the later redescriptions. The three policy docu-
ments I describe and redescribe in this study are the Government report entitled 
‘Finland for people of all ages: Government report on the future: demographic 
trends, population policy, and preparation for changes in the age structure’ 
(Prime Minister’s  Office 2004, from now on referred to as GOV),  the Business 
and Policy Forum EVA’s report entitled ‘Condemned to Diminish? Finns and 
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the Difficult Art of Procreation’ (Tuomitut vähenemään? Suomalaiset ja lisään-
tymisen vaikea taito) (Wallenius 2003, referred to as EVA), and the Family 
Federation’s Population Policy Program (Väestöpoliittinen ohjelma) 
(Väestöliitto 2004a, referred to as FF).  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 cover the three specific themes addressed. The 
themes, which are the family, economics and gender, were selected following a 
careful reading of the policy documents during which they emerged as relevant 
and visible issues in general terms and from the perspective of reproductive 
agency. They are essential issues with regard to the birth rate, and why and how 
it could or should be affected. All three chapters covering these specific themes 
are constructed in the same way. First, I expand the notion of reproductive 
agency in order to strengthen the redescriptive tools I use. I then describe the 
policy documents concentrating on the theme of the chapter, and finally rede-
scribe them through the notion of reproductive agency.   
Chapter 4 concentrates on the family. Inherent in the concept of re-
productive agency is  the idea that  no one but the person herself  should be the 
source of values and meanings connected to the family. Such an understanding 
imposes demands on family-related public policies, which should be formulated 
in  a  way  that  does  not  presume  or  define  only  one  way  of  understanding  and  
living as a family. When reproduction is discussed in the documents, the family 
assumes importance in that it is considered the primary location of procreation. 
It  is  a  central  concept  that,  in  many  ways,  structures  the  debates.  The  three  
documents  deal  with  it  in  somewhat  different  ways,  however:  the  GOV  report  
puts forward the most impenetrable notion of the family as a single unit, 
whereas EVA and the FF deal with it in more diverse ways, noting that there are 
different kinds of families and also somewhat historicising the notion of the nu-
clear family. The redescription, however, reveals a mainly monogamous, hetero-
sexual nuclear family with biological children, which excludes different kinds of 
family and kinship arrangements that do not comply with the notion that a 
child’s parents are a heterosexual couple who have a sexual relationship with 
each other. The notions of the family in the three policy documents do not en-
hance reproductive agency in that the proposals show no intention to open up 
understandings of the family.  
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The fifth chapter concentrates on economic aspects of the popula-
tion-policy discourse in the documents. With regard to reproductive agency, 
certain economic arrangements, such as social policies, are considered impor-
tant as they define and construct the opportunities that give people the freedom 
to decide about their lives. The documents approach economics and the popula-
tion question from two perspectives. The first is the macroeconomic notion that 
a nation needs economic growth, and for this to be possible the population has 
to grow continuously. Secondly, the texts depict families as financially pressed, 
and suggest that family policies should support them in their decisions to have 
children. The macroeconomic viewpoint is problematic in the context of repro-
ductive agency in that it raises expectations that everyone should have children, 
and that it is a duty to procreate. Family policies, in contrast, are two-fold. On 
the one hand they could be seen in a positive light as enhancing reproductive 
agency in terms of helping families with children who are often under financial 
pressure. On the other hand, family policies also define certain limits for fami-
lies and parenthood, and thereby affect reproductive agency.  
I end Chapter 5 with a redescription of views that could be called a 
counter-discourse to the economics-based way of examining the population 
question. There are arguments suggesting that viewing procreation and having 
children as an economic decision is not a good approach. The discourse pro-
motes the idea that children should be valued as such, and that the family as a 
unit is an important institution. Those who promote family values also defend 
more or less explicitly traditional gender roles and, for example, support the 
family model of one breadwinner. Through the lens of reproductive agency, the 
vocabulary of family values is problematic as it promotes a very limited view of 
how reproduction  should  be  arranged.  One  is  not  given  the  freedom to  decide  
about procreation if traditional, European family values, such as women’s pri-
mary role in child-care, are promoted through family policies. 
The sixth chapter deals with the theme of gender. My formulation 
of  reproductive  agency  includes  the  idea  that  it  should  be  possible  to  rethink  
gender, which is a crucial aspect of how people process and form their embodied 
personality in relation to procreation. The selected policy documents deal with 
gender in diverse ways: the GOV report aims at gender neutrality, whereas the 
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EVA and FF texts deal with it in a more explicit way. Despite its aim at gender 
neutrality, the GOV report cannot avoid gendered implications. In a way, aiming 
at neutrality could be read as trying to promote reproductive agency and the 
possibility to relive and rethink gendered duties connected to reproduction. The 
underlying structures go unquestioned, however, implying that procreative and 
child-care  processes  are  limited  to  and  by  the  current  arrangements  of  sexual  
difference. The explicit approach to gendered problems related to reproduction 
reveals unequal structures, although EVA and the FF still cannot offer the free-
dom to rethink sexual difference. Overcoming binary structures related to pro-
creation would demand more drastic measures than are proposed in the docu-
ments.  
The  Conclusion  comprises  a  review of  my  findings  and  an  evalua-
tion of the different aspects of my study, including the conceptual framework of 
reproductive agency, the imaginary domain and bodily integrity. The purpose of 
the study is to offer a targeted redescription of the selected policy documents. 
Although the texts covered do not deal with all aspects of the Finnish debate on 
population policy, I am convinced that this type of study offers insights that are 
of relevance beyond the pages of these specific documents.  
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2 Formulating reproductive agency 
2.1 Introduction 
The tool for my redescriptions, the notion of reproductive agency, is to a large 
extent based on Drucilla Cornell’s thinking, which combines different strands in 
the  fields  of  philosophy,  political  science,  legal  studies  and  feminist  theory,  
among others. Cornell has made theoretical contributions to critical and femi-
nist theory, and has also written on practical political issues such as adoption1, 
abortion2, pornography3 and the war in Iraq, for example4.  
Cornell’s first book Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, 
Deconstruction and the Law (first published in 1991, new edition in 1999) deals 
with the notion of feminine and with Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Lacan 
and its connections to feminism. The next one, Transformations: Recollective 
Imagination and Sexual Difference (published in 1993) continued on the theme 
of transformation with regard to sexual difference. As far as my work is con-
cerned, her most influential books are The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Por-
nography and Sexual Harassment (1995), At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, 
Sex and Equality (1998) and Just Cause: Freedom, Identity and Rights (2000). 
Cornell  introduced the concept of  the imaginary domain in her 1995 book and 
developed  it  further  in  the  next  two.  All  three  books  include  political  analyses  
that lean on the concept of the imaginary domain. The Imaginary Domain and 
At the Heart of Freedom also deal with the notion of bodily integrity, which is 
an essential aspect of my work.  
Cornell’s first books show her interest in critical theory and critical 
legal studies, but she has also written on other issues. Defending Ideals: War, 
Democracy and Political Struggles (2004) deals with the importance of ideals 
and questions of war and nationalism. Between Women and Generations: 
Legacies of Dignity (2005), on the other hand, is autobiographical, although it 
also includes philosophical musings on dignity and witnessing. In recent years 
                                                             
1 See, for example, chapter 4 in Cornell 1998. 
2 See, for example, chapter 2 in Cornell 1995. 
3 See, for example, chapter 3 in Cornell 1995. 
4 See chapter 1 in Cornell 2004. 
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she has returned to critical  theory with her 2008 book Moral Images of Free-
dom: A Future for Critical Theory (Cornell 2008a) and her latest work, Sym-
bolic  Forms  for  a  New  Humanity:  Cultural  and  Racial  Reconfigurations  of  
Critical Theory (co-authored with Kenneth Michael Panfilio) (Cornell & Panfilio 
2010). She has also written about Clint Eastwood and American masculinity 
(Cornell 2009). 
My reasons for engaging with Cornell are related specifically to her 
thinking on personality formation and her theorising on thinking beyond stable 
stereotypes of femininity and masculinity, women and men. I see this as a start-
ing point for agency; it must be possible to re-think and re-imagine sexual dif-
ference, reproduction, and the roles of women and men in society. Cornell also 
challenges us to think about ideals and to push back the limits of what is under-
stood to be possible. I find her concepts a stimulating starting point on which to 
build  my  thinking  about  bodily  and  reproductive  themes  in  a  way  that  would  
connect them to concrete political practices. In my view it is crucial to maintain 
the interconnectedness between political practice and theoretical and philoso-
phical  ideas  in  general,  and  it  is  an  explicit  purpose  of  my  work:  to  show how 
theoretical ideas cannot be separated from political action and social reality, and 
to examine the ways in which theoretical premises play out in everyday life, be it 
on the political or the personal level. I focus on certain aspects of Cornell’s 
thought, including the idea of the imaginary domain and, connected to that, her 
conception of bodily integrity. I do not discuss in any depth her engagement 
with Derrida, for example, nor do I analyse her Kantian and Ralwsian influences 
in detail. Her thinking draws on many different sources that often appear con-
tradictory,  and  examining  it  in  all  of  its  intricacies  would  be  another  work  in  
itself5.  
The rest of this chapter comprises six sections. First I briefly outline 
how Cornell understands the notion of the person, and the next three sections 
describe the concepts of the imaginary domain and bodily integrity, and how 
they are useful in the construction of the redescriptive tool. Section six examines 
both Cornell’s and Judith Butler’s thought on agency, and in the final section I 
                                                             
5 For an examination of her work see, for example, Heberle & Pryor (2008). 
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formulate the notion of reproductive agency. Reproductive agency here refers to 
the possibilities to reconfigure the current situation with regard to reproductive 
options; reconfiguration refers to the possibilities to live the current hegemonic 
and often natural-seeming constellations of reproductive life differently. The 
formulation of reproductive agency relies a great deal on the principle that peo-
ple themselves should be the source of the values and meanings they connect to 
their procreative lives, and outsiders such as the state or the legal system should 
not limit their options. The idea that people attach values and meanings to their 
lives relies on a specific notion concerning the personality, and I start my ex-
amination of Cornell’s thought with her concept of the person. 
 
2.2. The concept of the person 
A useful starting point in the construction of the notion of reproductive agency 
is  Drucilla  Cornell’s  concept  of  the  imaginary  domain,  which  is  strongly  based  
on her concept of the person. The origin of the notion of the person is the Latin 
word per-sonare, which literally means sounding through6,  thus  a  person  is  
what shines through a mask, although usually it is the mask that is associated 
with  the  word  ‘persona’.  Cornell  is  referring  here  to  the  kind  of  psychological  
thinking that equates the different personae an individual has with different 
roles that he or she assumes in different situations. However, she does not see 
the persona as a role or a mask that one puts on, rather the opposite: it is some-
thing  that  lies  behind  the  role  or  the  mask.  Inherent  in  the  notion  of  shining  
through  is  the  assumption  that  a  person  is  able  to  imagine  herself  as  a  whole,  
can pull herself together, so to speak. An important aspect of pulling oneself 
together  is  the  fact  that  the  wholeness  is  imagined:  it  is  impossible  to  achieve  
true success in becoming whole, or, for that matter, in being able to conceptually 
separate the ‘mask’ from the ‘self’. (Cornell 1995, 4-5) 
                                                             
6 Cornell assigns the etymology of the word persona (per-sona) to the idea of shining through in 
her book The Imaginary Domain (Cornell 1995, 4), but there seems to be a misreading since the 
word person is usually traced back to per-sonare, meaning sounding through, or the Etruscan 
word phersu, both of which refer to masks used by actors (see e.g,, The Oxford English Diction-
ary 1989, 596, Barnhart 1988, 780) 
16 
 
The wholeness or coherence of a person is always becoming, mean-
ing that personality is a process, something that is continual. This processual 
characteristic of the self does not imply a sense of disintegration, however - on 
the contrary, there is a sense of integration. A sense of coherence is not achieved 
because there is a stable, unified and unchanged core, but because the person 
imagines herself as unified and whole. The process is continuous and one can 
never  fully  succeed  in  it;  one’s  personality  is  never  complete.  It  could  be  said  
that the personality is a project7. In Cornell’s words, one becomes a person, or to 
be more precise is becoming a person. Moreover, the continuous process of per-
sonality formation involves different personae, meaning that people always 
work  through  different  identifications  in  the  process  of  pulling  themselves  to-
gether and imagining themselves as entities (ibid.). Cornell writes: 
 
A person is not something “there” on this understanding, but a pos-
sibility, an aspiration which, because it is that, can never be fulfilled 
once  and  for  all.  The  person  is,  in  other  words,  implicated  in  an  
endless process of working through personae. (ibid., 5) 
 
Cornell insists that, because the formation of the personality is an 
on-going  project,  it  should  be  legally  protected.  She  sees  freedom  as  a  chance  
that is dependent on a preceding set of conditions that secure the individuation 
process. There should be protection, ‘as a legal matter of equality, the equivalent 
bases for this chance to transform ourselves into the individuated beings we 
think of as persons’ (ibid.). She lists the following three conditions she considers 
necessary for a minimum degree of individuation that will enable people to par-
ticipate in public and social life as equal citizens: 
 
1. bodily integrity 
2. access to symbolic forms sufficient to achieve linguistic skill 
permitting the differentiation of oneself from others 
                                                             
7 It is possible to connect this idea about the projected character of the personality to Sartre’s 




3. protection of the imaginary domain (ibid., 4). 
 
My interest is in the first and third of these conditions. I will first consider the 
imaginary domain and then proceed to Cornell’s ideas on bodily integrity.   
 
2.3 The imaginary domain 
Cornell introduced the concept of the imaginary domain in her book The 
Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography & Sexual Harassment (1995), de-
veloping it further in her subsequent books At the Heart of Freedom: Femi-
nism, Sex and Equality (1998) and Just Cause: Freedom, Identity, and Rights 
(2000) and addressing practical political issues such as family law and Spanish 
language rights. She also considers the theoretical and practical political signifi-
cance of the concept in various articles, of which the most relevant in this con-
text are ‘Autonomy Re-Imagined’ published in the Journal for the Psychoanaly-
sis of Culture & Society in 2003, and ‘The Shadow of Heterosexuality’ published 
in Hypatia in 2007.  
Cornell  bases  her  theorising  on  the  concept  of  the  imaginary  do-
main on Immanuel Kant and John Rawls8. I refer to these thinkers although I 
do not examine their work in more detail. Cornell defines the imaginary domain 
broadly as ‘the moral and psychic place we all need in order to come to terms 
with who we are as sexuate beings and to have the chance to claim our own per-
son as a sexuate being’  (Cornell  2007,  230).  This short  definition requires fur-
ther clarification on two points. Firstly, it makes no reference to Cornell’s very 
strong emphasis on freedom in connection with the notion of the imaginary 
domain, and secondly, Cornell later expanded the concept to include other iden-
tifications in addition to those connected to a sexuate being. I begin my closer 
examination of the imaginary domain with the identification processes that are 
so crucial to the formation of the personality. 
 
                                                             
8 See Thurschwell  2008 for a detailed explanation of the points of convergence and departure 
between Cornell, Kant and Rawls. J.M Bernstein does not consider Cornell’s Rawlsian and Kant-
ian commitments deep, and sees them as more of a strategic ploy (Bernstein 2008, 83). 
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2.3.1 Identification processes 
The open-ended approach to the personality implies a process that demands the 
continual working through of different personae: we work through different 
identifications as we attempt to cohere as a person, a self. Cornell writes: 
 
Our  basic  identifications  are  fundamental  aspects  of  our  lives.  We 
internalize these basic identifications initially as essential to our-
selves, often even without recognizing, let alone rationally assess-
ing, the fact that we do so. We cohere into a self only by making 
sense of these basic identifications, whether we consciously ques-
tion them or not. (Cornell 2000, 137) 
 
Our personality is formed in continuous identificatory processes. Some of the 
identifications  are  conscious  and  even  rational,  but  most  are  unconscious  and  
not something that people would rationally choose or evaluate. As Cornell notes, 
this process points us towards culture, and is strongly connected to our envi-
ronment. Culture and society set the conditions that affect personality forma-
tion: people cannot ‘just step out of their identifications’, which have to be as-
sumed and are not just given. (ibid., 131 & 135) The implication of assuming of 
identifications is that the formation of the personality is not totally dictated by 
culture.  The  individual  has  an  active  role  in  the  process,  although  one  cannot  
extricate oneself from culture or society. 
In elaborating on the interaction between cultural and social condi-
tions and the activity of a person, Cornell distinguishes between limits and pa-
rameters. Limits refer to cultural and social conditions that are inherited and 
which a person cannot simply decide to change. As an illustration of the differ-
ence  between  limits  and  parameters  she  mentions  that  the  former  would  pre-
vent her from gaining social acceptance just by identifying herself as a Latina9, 
no matter how much she wanted to do so.  Parameters,  in turn,  refer to condi-
tions that may change and thus facilitate new identifications. She continues with 
her example of identifying herself as a Latina: what if she married a Mexican, 
                                                             
9 Cornell  notes  that  she  is  positioned  as  a  white  Anglo-American  who  is  a  US  citizen.  She  
adopted a child from Paraguay (see Cornell 2005, 98). 
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moved to Mexico, became a Mexican citizen, became fluent in Spanish and 
raised children as Mexicans? At that point, identifying herself as a Mexican 
would seem more feasible, even though some Mexicans would still consider her 
an Anglo (ibid., 140-141). This example shows how there are limits to the identi-
fication process in that people cannot just assume certain identifications and 
expect social and cultural acceptance or recognition, but this does not mean that 
identifications are locked and immune to change. People’s parameters may 
change, and the changing enables the onset of different idenficatory processes. 
Such processes include various aspects such as class, race, language, gender and 
nationality, and although sex and gender comprise one type of process, it is not 
the only one10.  Given  my  engagement  with  questions  of  reproduction  in  this  
study, however, sex and gender as identificatory processes are of significance. 
The psychoanalytical and, more specifically, the Lacanian back-
ground to Cornell’s thinking about the identification process should also be 
mentioned. I will return to certain Lacanian strands in her thought later, but at 
this point I will refer to the imaginary nature of identity. The concept of the 
imaginary is one of the ‘orders’ of experience in Lacanian thought. It is charac-
terised by the narcissistic relation with the image through which a sense of 
wholeness and unity is achieved (Frosh 2003, 107). Lacan rejects the notion of 
unified or authentic identity on the grounds that identity is always threatened 
by unconscious desires. It is based on an image of oneself that is reflected back 
from someone else. The specular image implies that although identity feels real 
to the person concerned, it is never actually owned: it is always unconsciously 
dependent on something or someone outside of oneself. (Minsky 1996, 141) As 
Rosalind  Minsky  notes:  ‘We are  given  a  sense  of  identity,  but  we  think  we  are  
given  an  authentic  identity’  (ibid.,  145).  Identity  is  first  discovered  during  the  
mirror stage at around the age of six months when the baby first perceives itself 
as an entity, and finds in the specular image reflected back to it by its primary 
caretaker a coherent unity and bodily integrity, i.e. the sense of being centred in 
its own body (ibid., 144-145).  
                                                             
10 See Cornell 2000 for an examination of identifications not connected to gender. 
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Cornell’s notion of the imaginary domain is connected to the form-
ing  of  a  sense  of  identity,  or  working  through  different  identifications.  People  
cannot  discover  who  they  are  without  these  identifications,  which  colour  the  
way in which they envision themselves but do not determine the reach of their 
imaginations (Cornell 2003, 144). Psychoanalysis teaches us that people can 
never  fully  know themselves,  and  that  they  rely  on  others  to  know their  limits  
and creative powers. Thus, ‘we need the imaginary domain so desperately pre-
cisely because our self-representations are always in flux as we engage with oth-
ers and with our own unconscious stirrings, sexual and otherwise’ (Cornell & 
Willis  2002,  88).  The  need  for  the  imaginary  domain  is  a  logical  conclusion  
given Cornell’s notion of personality as something that we never fully know and 
that we are continually re-working and re-thinking. 
In 1993 before the publication of  The Imaginary Domain in 1995,  
and as a forerunner of the concept of the imaginary domain, Cornell wrote 
about recollective imagination. This notion is used in connection with legal in-
terpretation and transformation, but she also refers to the construction of sub-
jectivity and the possibility of agency (see Chapter 2 in Cornell 1993). She notes 
how ‘the self is continuously “birthed” again through time and its encounters 
with others’ (Cornell 1993, 41). The processual nature and other-dependence of 
the self is clearly present even at this stage. People create and recreate the self 
through an act of recollective imagination, which means that they interpret the 
past in a continuous process of pulling themselves together. It should be re-
membered here that the past is interpreted and imagined in the processing, as 
Cornell notes:  
 
We  cannot  just  reach  back  to  the  “actually  was”  as  if  there  were  a  
preinterpretive past that was “just there”. We receive the past only 
through the process of critical interpretation. (ibid., 29)  
 
One aspect of the imaginary domain is the continuous interpretation and rein-
terpretation of the past, which is then projected into the future. 
Cornell  is  not  the  only  theorist  engaging  with  the  notion  of  the  
imaginary. It is a category that has proliferated in social criticism and feminist 
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theory (Narach 2002, 65), and as Kathleen Lennon notes, there has been a shift 
from imagination to the imaginary (Lennon 2004, 107). One way of distinguish-
ing between the two concepts is to understand imagination as a faculty that re-
fers to creating inner and outer images, whereas the imaginary refers to con-
cepts that have at least some form of connection to psychoanalytical ideas that 
recognise links between images and affects (ibid., 107 & 109). Kathleen Lennon 
notes: 
 
For Lacan the act of identification is a manifestation of affect. It is 
an emotional act, not a cognitive judgement. It is joyful and jubilant 
and, at other times, aggressive and angry. These emotions are ex-
pressed  by  means  of  the  child’s  relation  to  the  image.  Such  mo-
ments of imaginary identifications persist throughout our lives as 
vehicles of affective phantasy. (ibid., 110) 
 
Cornell clearly follows the psychoanalytical line of thought about the imaginary 
in connecting the notion of the imaginary closely to the emotional investments 
people make in their embodied selves. She notes that it is through the bodily ego 
that the body becomes meaningful as a self: people invest emotionally in their 
bodies, and these investments are inseparable from the sense of self (Cornell 
1998, 35). The imaginary is an important concept in Cornell’s theorising, and 
Lacanian influences are also significant. This is not her only source, however. 
She combines an emphasis on freedom with the Lacanian influences, which 
brings a unique twist to her thought.  
 
2.3.2 The imaginary domain and freedom  
Another important aspect of the imaginary domain is the concept of freedom, 
which connects Cornell to certain strands of liberal thinking11. Cornell states 
that ‘[t]he freedom to create ourselves as sexed beings, as feeling and reasoning 
beings, lies at the heart of the ideal that is the imaginary domain’ (Cornell 1998, 
                                                             




ix).  One  of  her  sources  is  the  Kantian  idea  of  the  equal  worth  of  free  persons,  
and she expresses the wish to ‘defend the Kantian conception of our equal worth 
as free persons who possess a value-conferring capacity, partially setting our 
ends by reason’ (Cornell 2000, 133). According to this understanding, as human 
beings, people are the source of values that they attach to their ends. Ends refer 
to objects of free choice and are set partially by reason12. As human beings we 
make choices and attribute values to them, and it is the value-conferring capa-
bility as rational human beings that we recognise in each other (ibid., 132-133). 
Cornell writes: ‘An individual respects the equal worth and dignity of all others 
because  she  shares  in  the  humanity  that  makes  them the  source  of  value  they  
give to their own ends’ (ibid., 133). 
Yet  the concept of  freedom is  multifaceted,  and Cornell  subscribes 
to very specific views of it. Tuija Pulkkinen notes that in the tradition of German 
idealism  the  concept  of  ‘freedom’  is  connected  with  the  notion  of  an  autono-
mous agent who reflectively governs itself (Pulkkinen 2000, 13). Cornell rejects 
the idea of the totally autonomous subject, but she does allude to the notion in 
the Kantian ideal that the individual person should be legally considered the 
responsible source of judgements and evaluations, although she does not claim 
that people can make evaluations and judgements freely and solely in accor-
dance with moral law (Cornell 2000, 131). Given her lack of belief in the totally 
autonomous  subject,  Cornell’s  notion  of  freedom differs  from the  idea  of  free-
dom in most political thought. As Pulkkinen explains, freedom in the tradition 
of German idealism, which refers to the moral capacity of a rational creature, is 
a totally different concept from that of liberty in the liberal tradition, which re-
fers to people’s ability to act according to their will without obstruction (Pulkki-
nen 2000, 10-13). Cornell connects freedom to morality and people’s capacity to 
make moral judgements, even though she does not agree with the Kantian ideal 
of the totally autonomous subject. Her idea of freedom is thus connected to 
German  idealism  as  a  version  of  the  Kantian  understanding.  This  makes  Cor-
nell’s liberalism very specific. 
                                                             
12 Cornell emphasises that ends are set partially by reason, as according to her reading of Kant 
an ‘end’ may also be an object of desire or inclination (Cornell 2000, 132). 
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The notion of the liberal abstract person, who seems to be non-
gendered but is in fact male, has provoked criticism of Liberalism13 from differ-
ent feminist perspectives (see, for example, Pateman 1988). According to Adam 
Thurschwell, Cornell avoids the dangers of abstraction:  
 
Cornell can revert to these traditionally liberal motifs without fal-
ling back into the dangers of abstraction identified by feminists be-
cause protection of the imaginary domain guarantees that the per-
son’s  sexual  difference  cannot  be  used  as  a  marker  of  disentitling  
the person to equal respect. (Thurschwell 2008, 41) 
 
When  Thurschwell  refers  to  liberal  motifs  he  does  not  clearly  distinguish  be-
tween the different strands of liberalism, and I would argue that in Cornell’s 
case it is meaningful to differentiate the libertarian vein from the Rawlsian one, 
which relies on Kantian thought. According to the libertarian version, autonomy 
is a negative freedom, the right to freedom from undue interference in making 
choices and the satisfaction of individual preferences, whereas Rawlsian liberal-
ism understands autonomy as the capacity for rational self-legislation, which is 
the  defining  feature  of  people  (Mackenzie  &  Stoljar  2000,  5).  In  drawing  on  
Kantian and Rawlsian thinking, which she combines with her theorising about 
the imaginary domain,  Cornell  does not conceive of  human beings as ahistori-
cal, non-gendered individuals, although it is undeniable that she gives freedom 
priority in her thinking14.  For  her,  freedom is  connected  to  the  protection  of  a  
person’s internal self-conception, it allows respect for difference and is open to 
revision and reinterpretation (Thurschwell 2008, 40, 49).  
                                                             
13 Liberalism here refers to the liberal ontology of political theory positing that people are ‘tran-
scendentally singular individual agents’ (Pulkkinen 2000, 2), which means that the individual is 
understood to  be  purified  of  any  specificity,  as  non-gendered,  non-aged  and non-raced  (ibid.,  
128). The individual has two basic characteristics: individual interest and the capacity to choose 
(ibid., 2). 
14 The emphasis on freedom also implies, in a certain sense, the priority of freedom over equal-
ity. Cornell writes: ‘I am not arguing that we should cease to address issues of gender discrimi-
nation as matters of social inequality. I am arguing that if we are not equivalently evaluated as 
free persons as an initial matter, we will be unable to fairly correct that definitional inequality; 
our  life  chances  and prospect  will  be  limited  by  the  very  definition  of  our  inequality’  (Cornell  
1998, 20, emphasis in the original). 
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The respect for difference in Cornell’s thought derives from her em-
phasis on the person as the source of her or his own values and life goals. Her 
emphasis on the freedom to choose one’s own values and goals means that she 
avoids the feminist ‘special treatment/equal treatment’ problem. This means 
that when women are treated equally the same standards seemingly hold for 
men and women, when in fact the standards are disadvantageous to women. 
The alternative is to give women ‘special benefits’, which enables specified defi-
nitions or categorisations of what it means to be a woman. (Thurschwell 2008, 
41) Cornell, however, emphasises the freedom to form one’s own personality 
and define the meanings and values of one’s own life. The imaginary domain is 
what makes the defining and processing possible, and against which for exam-
ple laws should be evaluated. As Thurschwell puts it: does a statute respect peo-
ple’s fundamental freedom to define their own conceptions of themselves as 
physical, sexed beings? (ibid., 41) When the imaginary domain is used as a 
measure there are no unified standards with regard to gender (equal treatment), 
and no specified definitions of what it means to be a woman (special treatment): 
the measure is the respect for each person’s imaginary domain. 
In formulating the imaginary domain Cornell makes connections 
that are not self-evident, and combines two rather different forms of thinking – 
Lacanian ideas about the formation of the self and Kantian ideas about freedom. 
As she notes, the imaginary domain ‘illuminates what freedom demands of crea-
tures that inevitably are shaped by their own identifications’ (Cornell 2000, 
135). Because people are never complete in terms of their personality formation, 
they need space for sorting through different identifications. Moreover, they 
should be the only source of the values and meanings connected to the identifi-
cations and the sorting through, and thus should be free in terms of personality 
formation. The subject is understood as symbolically and socially constructed, 
and fragile freedom engages people in the practice of self-responsibility (ibid., 
131). Such practice is significant from a feminist perspective and in terms of 
agency. Cornell understands ‘freedom as a practice of assuming responsibility 
for our evaluations of our basic identifications as we make them our own in the 
course of experience’ (ibid., 135). The fact that people make evaluations of their 
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basic identifications implies self-responsibility, but it also implies the right to 
the imaginary domain, which accords freedom to actually make the evaluations.  
The idea of responsibility is essential to the idea of agency. As Paul 
Benson notes, feminists stress the need for women to take responsibility for 
their  actions  and  feelings  as  a  precondition  for  reclaiming  and  expanding  per-
sonal and political agency (Benson 2000, 73). Taking responsibility and being 
responsible  are  connected  to  being  worthy  of  a  certain  moral  standing.  When  
one is considered morally responsible, one is also considered worthy of a certain 
social standing, which gives eligibility for different kinds of moral exchange and 
participation in a community of moral dialogue (ibid., 79 & 83). The connection 
between responsibility and the ability to act as a full member of a community is 
also why Cornell considers it important to assign self-responsibility to people in 
their evaluations of their basic identifications. Being responsible means being 
considered a full member of a moral community. Then again, as Benson notes, a 
certain sense of self worth is necessary for a person to be fully responsible for 
his or her actions (ibid., 78). A sense of self worth is connected to the notion of 
the imaginary domain, which is needed for people to be able to freely form their 
personality. The right to the imaginary domain is one aspect of holding people 
responsible for the evaluation of their identifications in that it enables them to 
formulate and evaluate them. The responsibility is a sign that the person is a full 
member of a social and moral community. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that Cornell formulates the imagi-
nary  domain  and  freedom  as  ideals  (see,  for  example,  Cornell  2000,  135-132)  
that  cannot be fully  achieved in our everyday political  and social  life.  They are 
unreachable goals that nevertheless should guide feminist efforts. The point is 
that  the  imaginary  domain  and  the  free  person  are  open  notions  in  the  sense  
that  the  freedom  to  decide  about  and  process  one’s  values  and  life  choices  
should not be predefined. The imaginary domain is a normative ideal in the 
sense that that everyone is entitled to it, but it does not imply any substantive 
claims about how people should arrange and represent their lives or the imagi-
nary domain.  It  is  ‘the place of  prior equivalent evaluation that  must be imag-
ined no matter what historical and anthropological researchers tell us is “true” 
about women’s nature’ (Cornell 1998, 15), meaning that, regardless of the cul-
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tural or social order in place, the imaginary domain should be recognised as an 
initial matter: 
 
The moral demand lies at the heart of the hypothetical situation of 
the imagination, and it is out of this hypothetical situation that a 
fair proceduralist conception of justice can be developed. This de-
mand for what ought to be does not, however, turn us directly to the 
real world for its justifications. (ibid., 15-16) 
 
The imaginary domain and the freedom to define one’s personality, values and 
meanings should come before any claims about justice. Of course, the freedom 
to imagine meanings in life is an imaginary rather than a realisable state. How-
ever, Cornell maintains that freedom in personality formation should be the 
ideal, a goal to be kept in mind when issues such as justice, social and cultural 
arrangements and politics are theorised and enacted in practice. Related to how 
it works in practice is her defence of the imaginary domain as a right, and the 
connections she makes with the state and the law. 
 
2.3.3 The imaginary domain, law and the state  
The connection of the imaginary domain to the state and law can be examined 
from different perspectives. One connection is through the idea of the disconti-
nuity thesis. The discontinuity thesis is a term that Cornell borrows from 
Ronald Dworkin, and it relates Cornell’s thinking about the role of the state in 
regard to representation of the imaginary domain. Cornell understands the dis-
continuity thesis as separating what the people consider good for themselves 
from  what  should  be  imposed  by  the  state  as  the  general  good  (Cornell  1998,  
59). The general idea of the good life cannot be deduced from a person’s ideas 
about what is good. With this notion, Cornell maintains that what the state or 
law does cannot be based on one form of arranging one’s life. Cornell discusses 
the discontinuity thesis in connection with the right to self-representation of 




If the state were to favor only one form of representation of sexuate 
being, it would violate the basic mandate of a politically liberal soci-
ety  that  all  of  us  are  to  be  given  equal  concern  as  persons.  This  
equal concern follows from the equal intrinsic value of each one of 
us as a person. (ibid., 59) 
 
Cornell refers to the sexuate being in the above quotation, but she has expanded 
the idea of the imaginary domain to include all sorts of identifications. For ex-
ample, one might think that the state should not favour one form of self-
representation of the national identity15. The relevant aspect to my study is rep-
resentation of the sexuate being in that it is closely related to reproduction. In 
this regard, the discontinuity thesis also implies that the state should not prefer 
any one form of family arrangement, given the connections of representations of 
one’s sexuate being to procreation and notions of the family.   
Another element that illustrates the significance of the imaginary 
domain in relation to the state and the law is Cornell’s defence of it as a right. As 
Adam Thurschwell notes, Cornell’s conception of such a right is a natural exten-
sion of the liberal idea of freedom; according to Kant, people have the innate 
right to determine and act on their own ends on condition that this right is con-
sistent with others’ similar freedom (Thurschwell 2008, 39). Cornell’s defence is 
significant, but what is even more relevant is the reasoning behind it. Her view 
of the imaginary domain as a right is connected to her vision of the role of the 
state and the legal system in the construction of the self. As she sees it, the sub-
ject is socially constituted and is thus deeply other-dependent, the other refer-
ring both to the social and the cultural, i.e. ‘the Other’, and to concrete other 
people. The unfinished nature of the personality and its constant state of be-
coming mean that there is a projection into the future based on the specular im-
age provided by others. Combining the notion of the subject being constituted 
by the Other with the time frame of future anteriority, which refers to the self as 
constantly ‘coming to be through the confirmation of the projection of what she 
                                                             
15 In my view, separating different identifications is somewhat artificial as they are intertwined 
and implicated in each other: for example, having a certain national self-representation includes 
certain self-representations of one’s sexuate being. 
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has been given by others’ (Cornell 1995, 41-42), facilitates conception of the le-
gal system and the state as symbolic Others.  
The legal system not only recognises persons, it also constitutes and 
confirms  who  is  to  be  understood  as  a  self.  In  this  sense  it  is  active  in  that  it  
validates who is established as an entity and who is guaranteed the minimum 
conditions of individuation. If the legal system is understood as constitutive of 
the self, the imaginary domain can be defended as a right, but in a different way 
from the liberal tradition that defines freedom in negative terms. As Cornell 
notes, the formulation of law as a symbolic Other changes the perception of 
rights in terms of negative freedom, in other words avoids the negative connota-
tion of freedom as freedom from state intervention (Cornell 2000, 42):  
 
But, because the self depends upon the other for the achievement of 
individuation, if the state recognises and confirms whoever is rec-
ognised as a constituted person, then there can never be any simple 
negative freedom for persons (ibid.).  
 
The  fact  that  all  people  are  constituted  by  the  Other,  which  includes  the  state  
and the legal system, renders the question of negative freedom, i.e. freedom 
from  state  intervention,  pointless.  No  matter  what  it  does,  the  state  is  in  one  
way  or  another  involved  in  the  formation  of  the  self,  and  the  more  important  
question concerns how the state and the legal systems go about it. 
Cornell’s understanding of the law as a symbolic Other has political 
consequences. If the legal system is to be taken as one of the primary systems of 
cultural  symbolisation,  then  neither  the  law  nor  legal  rights  should  be  dis-
missed, although the masculine, white, Western definition of rights must be 
challenged. Traditional justifications for rights are based on very particular and 
inaccurate conceptions of the subject and of the self, but recognising this does 
not mean that one should abandon the concept of rights. Feminists should em-
phasise the right to feminine imaginary that is not relativised to the context. In 
Cornell’s view, there is a need for new imaginaries of what it is to be a woman 
and how women are symbolised in law, and in this the imaginary domain is in a 
crucial position. As a concept it emphasises women as the source of their own 
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imagining, and the right of everyone to self-representation. (Cornell 1995, 85-
86) Indeed,  women have been systematically  denied their  status as subjects  of  
rights  because  of  the  gender  hierarchy.  Moreover,  the  projection  of  women as  
subjects of rights challenges the traditional discourse, but the new discourses 
that thereby re-articulate sexual difference and that expresses women as sub-
jects of rights does not have to depend on universalist premises that dismiss 
gender, nationality and race, for example. Laws both limit and enhance who 
people  can  become  in  that  they  give  content  to  humanity.  However,  the  law  
should not attempt to articulate sexual difference, but should provide moral and 
psychic space through which people can come to terms with it or other identifi-
cations. (ibid., 83, 87-88) In other words, the law should secure the imaginary 
domain.  
Cornell’s notion of the state and the legal system as symbolic Others 
is highly relevant to my argumentation in this study. I interpret her references 
to the state also to mean different public policies that, through constituting the 
everyday  environment  in  which  people  live,  affect  how people  can  and  should  
behave and how they can imagine themselves. Policies, in turn, create an envi-
ronment that enables and disables, encourages and discourages certain modes 
of being and the self, and therefore affect personality formation. As the state and 
its policies affect how people imagine themselves, politics and policies become 
important elements with regard to the imaginary domain. Nonetheless, Cornell 
does not see representation of the imaginary domain as an absolute right, and 
has formulated some limitations to how it can be represented.  
 
2.3.4 Limitations on the representation of the imaginary domain 
Cornell acknowledges two limitations on representations of the imaginary do-
main. The first is a straightforward ban on violence and the use of force against 
another person. The second is something she calls ‘degradation prohibition’ 
(Cornell 1998, 60), which she defines as follows: ‘[t]he degradation prohibition 
forbids the characterization of someone as unworthy because of how she has 
constituted herself from her basic identifications’ (Cornell 2000, 150). The word 
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‘degradation’ here refers literally to grading down, seeing someone as unworthy 
or as a lesser form of being because of how she has formed her personality: 
 
It should go without saying that hierarchical gradations of any of us 
as unworthy of personhood violates the postulation of each one of 
us as an equal person called for by a democratic and modern legal 
system. (Cornell 1995, 10) 
 
Cornell is strongly against hierarchical evaluation and marking of 
some people as unworthy. As she notes, the recognition of equal intrinsic value 
demands the treatment of each person as an equal, and not just equal treat-
ment,  which  is  based  on  Ronald  Dworkin’s  distinction.  Treatment  as  an  equal  
refers to a fundamental right to be treated with respect and concern equal to 
anyone else; equal treatment, in contrast, refers to the equal right to opportu-
nity, resource or burden. (Cornell 1998, 59-60, 209n56) Equal treatment thus 
refers  to  the  absence  of  obstruction,  in  other  words  the  idea  of  negative  free-
dom, whereas treatment as equal focuses on the way one acts towards other 
people, in other words whether they receive equal respect and concern. Equal 
respect or concern also refers to Cornell’s formulation of the imaginary domain 
as a place for prior equivalent evaluation. Degradation prohibition thus also in-
corporates the idea of equal personhood before any social, cultural or political 
arrangements.  The  imaginary  domain  should  be  prioritised  over  any  claims  
about justice or social arrangements. 
Thus far I have discussed Cornell’s idea of the imaginary domain as 
an important part of the formation of the personality: how it relates to the iden-
tification process, the role of freedom and the notion of rights, and the limita-
tions in its representation. Cornell also sees the formation of the personality as 
embodied, meaning that there is always a bodily aspect in how people see them-
selves. She theorises this in terms of bodily integrity, which is another crucial 




2.4 Bodily integrity 
2.4.1 The embodied self 
Cornell’s ideas about the imaginary domain provide a productive starting point 
for my analyses and for the development of a redescriptive tool. In order to add 
further  pertinence,  I  now  turn  to  Cornell’s  thinking  on  bodily  integrity,  which  
relates to her ideas about the imaginary domain. The notion of bodily integrity 
is commonly used in the context of human rights codes, specifically with regard 
to issues such as freedom of movement, security of person and reproductive 
rights16.  It is also an expression that is more generally applicable not only in 
political theory but also in feminist literature17. Drucilla Cornell formulates the 
concept in her own way, as described in detail below.  
There is a close connection between Cornell’s concepts of the 
imaginary domain and bodily integrity. There is always an embodied aspect in 
an individual’s representation and image of his or her personality. The body is 
not  separate  from the  personality,  nor  is  it  something  that  the  self  inhabits  or  
owns: it is an inseparable part of how people imagine themselves as whole. This 
thinking is based on Jacques Lacan’s ideas on the mirror stage in an infant’s life, 
which he places between the ages of six and eighteen months. This is when the 
infant starts to recognise its mirror image and to display jubilation at the recog-
nition. Lacan attributes the jubilation to the infant’s first experience of perceiv-
ing itself as a whole. In reality it is still dependent and has only limited control 
of its body, so, it is, in fact experiencing a wholeness that it does not physically 
have. (Cornell 1995, 38-39, Cornell 1998, 34-35) As Cornell notes: 
 
This perception of wholeness occurs when the infant is, in reality, in 
a state of complete helplessness. Thus the image functions both as a 
projection and an anticipation of what the infant might become but 
is not now. (Cornell 1995, 39)  
 
                                                             
16 See for example Council of Europe 1950, 1963 and United Nations 1948. 
17 For an example of different ways to understand the concept of bodily integrity see Patosalmi 
2009, in which I compare Martha Nussbaum’s and Drucilla Cornell’s notions of bodily integrity. 
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The disjuncture between image and reality implies that the mirror-
ing refers to other things than an image in a concrete mirror, and is dependent 
on other people. The infant’s primary caretakers and what they do function as a 
mirror. They mirror and treat the child as a coherent being when taking care of 
it, and the mirroring confirms the imagined coherence it experiences. The pri-
mary caretaker also represents a coherent self to the infant. According to Cor-
nell: 
 
The primary caretaker appears as whole to the baby, who invests in 
the primary caretaker because there she sees bodily coherence she 
can  count  on  to  meet  her  needs.  By  identifying  with  the  primary  
caretaker’s own projected wholeness, the child finds another means 
of achieving a sense of continuity for her own fragile bodily ego. 
(Cornell 1998, 35) 
 
The  primary  caretaker  thus  has  a  dual  role  in  confirming  the  in-
fant’s  imagined wholeness by treating it  as  if  it  had bodily integrity on the one 
hand,  and  on  the  other  hand  being  an  object  of  identification  for  the  baby  by  
projecting wholeness. As Cornell remarks, it is only through the mirroring proc-
ess that the infant acquires an identity (Cornell 1995, 39). The implication here 
is that there is no self or personality that is not dependent on other people. A 
person’s subjectivity, the embodied self, is deeply other-dependent, and is 
formed in the interactions he or she has. Other-dependence does not indicate 
any sort of social determinism, however. Although the subjectivity is given from 
outside of the self, how the different identifications are worked through and 
sorted out is a process that is not totally determined, but is dependent on both 
the social world and the inner workings of the individual’s personality.  
There are two major aspects in the Lacanian understanding of the 
mirror stage worth closer examination: temporality and the imag-
ined/imaginary quality of bodily integration. As Cornell observes, the stabilisa-
tion of the bodily ego must have a projected future. With regard to the develop-
mental account of the mirror stage, the power for the infant is not the recogni-
tion of similarity in the mirror, but the anticipated motor unity associated with 
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bodily integration (ibid., 39-40). In more general terms, the future is crucial to 
the process of ‘pulling oneself together’, which is experienced as a sense of self-
identity over time (Cornell 1998, 36). One aspect of the formation of the self is 
the ability to see oneself as a temporally continuous being, and this requires a 
projected future. Temporality and imaginary aspects are connected to the no-
tion of bodily integrity, and therefore I turn to these next. 
 
2.4.2 Temporal and imaginary aspects of bodily integrity 
The temporal and the imaginary are significant aspects of bodily integrity and 
are thus relevant to my development of the notion of reproductive agency, espe-
cially regarding possibilities of transformation and embodied agency. Elisabeth 
Grosz’s commentary on Cornell’s work is a good starting point for a study of 
Cornell’s conception of temporality with regard to bodily integrity. According 
Grosz, Cornell goes beyond the more common parameters of feminist thought 
about the future and temporality (Grosz 2005, chapter 5):  
 
Hers [Cornell’s] is a politics that envisions the capacity for trans-
formation  inherent  in  any  ordered  system,  the  system  itself  being  
unable to contain its own becomings and thus open to potentially 
endless variations (Grosz 2005, 72).  
 
The future is not just about the continuous process of becoming a personality, it 
also enables change: ‘expanding and transforming the horizons available for 
their [women’s] self-representations’ (ibid., 73). Thus, imagining and reimagin-
ing oneself as an entity over time is one element in the theorising of transforma-
tive  potential.  Then  again,  some consider  Cornell’s  open  conception  of  the  fu-
ture too indeterminate. According to Lois McNay, for example, it is too abstract 
and does not provide a sufficiently detailed socio-historical understanding of 
change (McNay 2003, 145). She does not consider ‘structural potentiality’ suffi-
cient for the feminist rethinking of social relations.  
In my view, McNay’s criticism is based on a rather restricted read-
ing of Cornell’s thinking. Cornell has written on many practical issues of impor-
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tance for feminists, and also proposed a concrete re-reading of many theoretical 
accounts (see, e.g., Cornell 1998), thus abstractness does not seem a valid criti-
cism.  Moreover,  it  seems  to  me  that  a  solid  theoretical  basis  that  does  not  ex-
clude potential avenues of analysis or prescribe only one future path, and yet 
facilitates the re-thinking of practical political and social situations, is extremely 
valuable. The notion of an open-ended future is relevant to agency in that open-
endedness allows the transformation of one’s personal, political and social life.  
Another significant aspect of the Lacanian inspired account of bod-
ily integrity is the imagined and imaginary quality of the process of personality 
formation. Imagined quality refers to the idea that bodily integrity is not actual 
reality. As Cornell notes, the infant’s body does not match the reflection of bod-
ily integrity, and there is always a moment of fictionality that constructs the ego. 
Thus, imagined quality is not overcome as an adult: people do not conquer the 
mirror stage, but go through continuous processing in which the embodied per-
sonality is formed. Cornell combines the aspects of temporality, imagined qual-
ity  of  bodily  integrity  and  other-dependence  of  the  self;  a  future  orientation  is  
needed so that one can imagine oneself as integrated over time, and others 
should respect the process of imagining coherence (Cornell 1995, 40): 
 
Our “bodies”, then, are never really our own. The idea that we own 
our bodies is a fantasy that imagines as completed that which al-
ways remains in the future anterior. Therefore, to protect “our-
selves”  from  threats  to  our  bodily  integrity  we  have  to  protect  the  
future into which we project our unity and have our bodily integrity 
respected by others. (ibid.) 
 
Cornell gives two meanings to the word ‘imaginary’ in her notion of 
the imaginary domain: it refers to a space that is not actual or tangible space18, 
and in a psychoanalytic sense it refers to identifications with primordial others 
(Cornell 2003, 144). It is clear that when Cornell writes about the space needed 
                                                             
18 The question of concrete space in the formation of the personality, as in Virginia Woolf’s ideas 
on a ‘room of one’s own’, has been an interest in feminist thinking and I think it is still a relevant 
feminist concern. Cornell does not discuss the need for a concrete space in the development of 
the personality, but I would not say that it is meaningless to her; it is just not examined here. 
35 
 
for personality formation, she does not mean concrete space, but rather refers to 
a psychic domain and identification processes. Such processes, again, are con-
nected to Lacanian thinking, according to which the structure of the imaginary 
body-image  is  based  on  a  number  of  principles:  it  is  the  product  of  the  highly  
particular, indeed idiosyncratic meanings with which bodies have been endowed 
within  the  confines  of  the  nuclear  family,  and  the  corporeal  schema  is  also  a  
consequence of the internalisation of the corporeal schema of others (Grosz 
1990, 46). Cornell does not presuppose an individual without history or locality, 
and her specific psychoanalytic theorising on bodily integrity emphasises her 
understanding of personality as created in interaction with others as the person 
identifies with those who are a part of her or his life.  
A further significant aspect of the corporeal schema in Lacanian 
thinking is the affective aspect, which means that the body image is character-
ised by emotional investment (James 2002, 177-178; Lennon 2004, 109-110). 
This view is also evident in Cornell’s formulation of bodily integrity, for exam-
ple:  
 
Through the bodily ego, the body becomes meaningful as our self, 
not only as a functional source of delights or a means to an end. Our 
investment in our bodies is in this sense inseparable from our most 
basic sense of self. (Cornell 1998, 35) 
 
The emotional investment in the physical aspect of one’s personality is also a 
significant feature in the inseparability of the body and the mind; people do not 
see their bodies from an objective or unemotional perspective. One more psy-
choanalytic aspect in the notion of the imaginary is its link to the moment of the 
mirror stage, which is characterised by unity and wholeness. Although there are 
contradictions between the specular image and the actual experience of the 
body, the specular image is characterised by unity. As Elisabeth Grosz writes: 
 
The child’s identifications with its specular image impels it nostal-
gically  to  seek  out  a  past  symbiotic  completeness,  even  if  such  a  
state never existed and is retrospectively imposed on the pre-mirror 
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phase; and to seek an anticipatory or desired (ideal or future) iden-
tity in the coherence of the totalized specular image. (Grosz 1990, 
39)  
 
Cornell implies that it is impossible to go beyond the mirror stage, thus in this 
sense  it  is  not  a  developmental  stage  but  a  process  that  continues  throughout  
life  (see Cornell  1995,  40).  She refers to the process by which most adults  pull  
themselves together as ‘semiautomatic’, but it can be disrupted by rape or other 
violent assault, for example, recovery from which usually demands more con-
scious imaginative processes (Cornell 1998, 36)19.  
Cornell’s reliance on psychoanalytic thought has also provoked 
criticism of her notion of the body, some of which is related to my development 
of the notion of reproductive agency. Vicki Kirby’s critique (Kirby 1997, chapter 
3) is interesting, although it is worth noting that her analysis was published in 
1997  and  relied  on  Cornell’s  earlier  work,  and  therefore  does  not  refer  to  The 
Imaginary Domain, which was published in 1995. According to Kirby, Cornell’s 
work is ultimately based on the Cartesian distinction between the mind and the 
body in that language is made synonymous with the creative possibilities of the 
imagination and the scene of creation is identified as the mind (Kirby 1997, 92). 
As she notes, ‘Cornell doesn’t question the givenness of the ideal, the complexity 
of this particular identity, or the autogenesis of intelligibility that occurs in ap-
parent isolation from the matter of the body’ (ibid., 91). Elisabeth Grosz argued 
along the same lines more recently, noting that Cornell’s work is still aligned 
with the oppositions between nature and culture, and the body and the psyche. 
Lacan  is  the  psychoanalytic  thinker  of  choice  exactly  because  he  distinguishes  
the biological from the symbolic. According to Grosz, Cornell relegates biology 
and  matter  ‘to  a  never  possible,  ever  receding  background  upon  which  “origi-
nary” writing takes place’, devaluing it and transforming it from noun ‘matter’ to 
verb ‘mattering’, and thus desubstantialising it. (Grosz 2005, 77-78) In Grosz’s 
view,  
 
                                                             
19 Bodily integrity can also be thought of as a matter of degree: one may experience less integrity 
in certain situations, although one does not lack it altogether (James 2002, 189). 
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if becoming, difference, and iteration are what make the self-
identity  of  the  subject  and  of  culture  impossible,  so  too,  they  im-
mensely complicate and render self-identity problematic in the 
arena of nature, and materiality, as well. The biological, the natural, 
and the material remain active and crucial political ingredients pre-
cisely because they too, and not culture alone, are continually sub-
jected to transformation, to becoming, to unfolding over time. 
(ibid., 78-79) 
 
It is apparent from Kirby’s and Grosz’s criticism that Cornell’s work 
can be read as Cartesian, or as not taking materiality into account. I believe that 
she aims to overcome the binary logic of the body and the mind, however. She 
clearly does not examine the role of materiality and biology, but rather concen-
trates on the inseparability of the physical body and the process of personality 
development. One of the differences between Grosz’s and Kirby’s viewpoint and 
Cornell’s idea of the role of the material may lie in the active role that Grosz, and 
especially Kirby, assign to the material rather than whether the material is de-
valued. Kirby argues that nature is literate, an outsider that reads and writes 
(Kirby 1997, 127), although it is not clear to me what exactly this means.  
I  will  return  to  the  question  of  materialisation  later,  but  at  this  
point  it  is  worth  remembering  that  it  is  possible  to  conceive  of  the  imaginary  
nature of bodily integrity as imagined fullness, or an attempt to achieve an un-
blemished identity. The concept of the imaginary domain could also be read as 
capturing some of the meanings referring to attempts at wholeness and a pure 
identity. As Cornell theorises how people imagine themselves as whole, the 
process could be understood as an attempt to attain the (imagined) unblem-
ished identity of the moment of the mirror stage. The imaginary domain is char-
acterised by other-dependence and attempts at wholeness. Other-dependence 
and aiming at coherence are also closely linked to bodily integrity, which is 
deeply dependent on others. It is often assumed that the physical body, under-
stood as a separate material entity with certain natural-seeming characteristics, 
is unambiguously defined, but the imagined unity of the embodied self reminds 
38 
 
us of its formation in identificatory processes incorporating both material and 
intangible aspects that cannot be separated. 
In my view it is important to understand that Cornell’s aim in theo-
rising bodily integrity through Lacanian thought is to overcome any dualist con-
ception. She thinks of the self as embodied; it does not refer to a mind that in-
habits a body. Cornell’s theorising is intriguing not only in describing the self as 
embodied and processual, but also in that it includes some normative aspects 
while at the same time purporting to evade closure of thinking. The imaginary 
domain could be understood as a diagnostic tool with no specific normative plan 
with regard to the content of laws, for example. At the same time, it also in-
cludes some principles that are worthy of respect, and as far as Cornell is con-
cerned it is a right that should be valued as fundamental. 
In my view, bodily integrity is an aspect of embodied subjectivity. It 
is also a concept that encapsulates various meanings. In summing up the multi-
plicity of Cornell’s ideas about bodily integrity I refer to Susan James who men-
tions various aspects of imaginary integrity: a person’s body image can be char-
acterised as integrated, as opposed to being imagined as a fragmented assem-
blage of parts; integrity refers to the quality of emotional investments in the 
body, positive investments creating a more integrated image; the concept of in-
tegrity also directs attention to the boundary around the body, although this is, 
at best, only relatively firm; finally bodily integrity incorporates a sense of sex-
ual  integrity,  which  James  considers  absolutely  central  in  Cornell’s  thinking  
(James 2002, 188-189). As James’ categorisation shows, Cornell’s conception is 
open to various interpretations, and highlights several aspects of the embodied 
self. As such it is relevant to my aim of developing the concept of reproductive 
agency.  
 
2.5 The imaginary domain as an evaluative tool 
I am aware as I develop the notion of reproductive agency of some of the limita-
tions in Cornell’s thinking. The focus in this section is on selected areas of criti-
cism  that  are  relevant  in  the  present  context.  I  study  questions  related  to  the  
39 
 
notion of social imaginaries and Cornell’s conception of freedom. Both of these 
issues are significant for the development of the notion of reproductive agency 
as a tool for evaluating politics and policies. I begin with the question of social 
imaginaries, which in Susan James’ words means ‘embedded narratives, perva-
sive images and potent symbols that run through our practices’ (James 2002, 
192). James draws on the work of Cornelius Castoriadis and Moira Gatens, who 
conceive of self-understanding as an understanding of the interrelations be-
tween the self and others. The term imaginary refers to the symbols, images and 
representations that make it possible to answer the questions, ‘Who are we?’ 
and ‘Who am I?’. For Castoriadis and Gatens, the imaginary is primarily a social 
phenomenon as opposed to Lacan’s psychic perspective of ‘an individual capac-
ity to achieve an integrated sense of oneself’. (ibid., 185, 183)  
As Susan James notes, Cornell does not ignore the social imaginary, 
but she largely refrains from discussion, especially about the relationship be-
tween the individual imaginary domain and social imaginaries (ibid., 192). This 
question is closely connected to the perceived liberal value of freedom. Accord-
ing to both Linda Martín Alcoff and Susan James, Cornell chooses to emphasise 
the individual imaginary domain, and even a libertarian version of personality 
construction that exempts private life from public judgement (Alcoff 2004, 227; 
James 2002, 192-193). However, Alcoff acknowledges that, at the same time, 
Cornell debunks the public/private distinction (Alcoff 2004, 227), and assimi-
lates the conceptions of positive and negative freedom in the protection of the 
imaginary domain.  
In my view, Alcoff’s and James’ interpretations have some validity. 
Cornell emphasises an individual’s freedom to interpret life as she chooses, to 
attach her own values and meanings to her experiences and identifications, and 
based on that to construct her personality. The role of social imaginaries in this 
is hazy. Further, she does not explain the logic of the representations and sym-
bols  included  in  practices  that  affect  our  individual  imaginary  domain.  At  the  
same time, she is clear about the other-dependence of the personality forma-
tion, which makes it apparent that she does not agree with the idea of the totally 
autonomous and pre-social subject. This disrupts the distinction between the 




Cornell thus incorporates the imaginary domain into a liberal 
framework and challenges liberal political philosophers to explain 
why it should not be protected, both by negative rights which pre-
vent interference, and by positive rights to the conditions that make 
it possible for people to express their imaginary domain in their 
lifestyles (James 2002, 193). 
 
Susan James interprets Cornell’s notions of the imaginary domain 
as something that people express (ibid.). In my view this is somewhat mislead-
ing.  I  see the imaginary domain more as the setting of  the identification proc-
esses, something that enables the formation of the imaginary wholeness of the 
personality rather than something that primarily seeks an expression. In other 
words, I do not think that Cornell refers to imagination in the sense of creativity, 
although freedom with regard to its expression could be considered essential for 
the process of personality formation. James’s point that positive rights create 
the conditions for the imaginary domain (ibid.) is nevertheless relevant. Limita-
tions on the imaginary domain and personality formation might include the 
economic and material conditions in which people live. Taking these conditions 
into the account facilitates the formulation of tools with which to evaluate poli-
cies. Conditions for the imaginary domain are examined more extensively in 
Chapter five. 
With regard to the concept of freedom that is central to Cornell’s 
thinking, I suggest that her incorporation of both negative and positive aspects 
into her idea of the imaginary domain is valid, but it does not get over the prob-
lems inherent in the right to an individual imaginary domain. Linda Martín Al-
coff poses an interesting question:  
 
I wonder what Cornell makes of the case of Brian Dalton, who was 
prosecuted for writing descriptions of the sexual torture of children 
for his own enjoyment. Aside from the question of whether Dalton 
should have been sentenced to prison, are we simply to counte-
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nance his moral right to his own personality formation? (Alcoff 
2004, 227) 
 
This question is an interesting one: if no one is harmed, are people 
allowed absolute freedom in their expression of their imaginary domain? Free-
dom in this context could be considered in terms of what can be presented pub-
licly or in a way that allows accidental access to any images or discourses20. If, 
for example, nobody can accidentally come across violent, fictional stories, such 
stories do not interfere with other people’s rights to their imaginary domain. 
Cornell uses the example of pornographic images as a case of material that 
could be zoned: it would be illegal to display pornographic images so that any-
one could see them accidentally, thus sex shops would not display such images 
in their windows, although they could freely sell pornographic material to any-
one going into the shop (Cornell 1995, 147-158). In terms of Alcoff’s example, 
would it then be lawful for shops to sell fictional stories of children’s sexual tor-
ture (i.e. no children are involved) to those who are interested in the subject, 
provided that nobody else could accidentally come across the material, and thus 
uphold their right to their imaginary domain?  
Questions related to absolute freedom in the representation of the 
imaginary domain are also connected to the relationship between the individual 
imaginary domain, social imaginaries and the role of the state. Cornell does not 
analyse the question of social imaginaries, which is a deficiency in her theoris-
ing, but she does not overlook the role of other people in the construction of the 
self. As Susan James notes about Cornell’s thought in relation to social imagi-
naries: 
 
Although Cornell does not ignore the social imaginary – she ac-
knowledges,  for  instance,  that  we  are  shaped  by  the  world  into  
which we are thrown and cannot be the original source of our own 
                                                             
20 Cornell notes that there are images that devalue one’s ‘sex’, which can challenge one’s self-
respect and present someone as unworthy of personhood. If one is forced to view these images, 
harm is created. (Cornell 1995, 147-148) 
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values – she refrains from much explicit discussion of its relation to 
the individual imaginary domain. (James 2002, 192) 
 
The psychoanalytic narrative of the formation of the embodied personality, or 
ego, acknowledges that the personality is dependent on others. Cornell’s exten-
sion in terms of understanding the state and the legal system as Others is sig-
nificant in that it shows how these systems are meaningful for our subjectivity. 
In recognising the constitutive character of the state for the self, Cornell ac-
knowledges the meaningfulness of what Susan James calls social imaginaries. 
Nevertheless, Cornell’s focus is on the individual imaginary domain. Susan 
James argues that the significance of the imaginary domain in Cornell’s theoris-
ing is not that it relies on symbols and images, but that it encompasses feelings 
and thoughts that are fundamental to a person’s sense of self (ibid., 193): 
 
These thoughts and feelings will be imaginary, sometimes in the 
everyday sense of knowingly representing what is not, sometimes in 
the more technical sense of unconsciously covering over fragmenta-
tion and lack. In either case, however, what qualifies them for entry 
into the imaginary domain is their subject matter. The question of 
how they arose and how they will be received (their relation to the 
social imaginary) thus becomes marginal to the project of specifying 
the character and content of the imaginary domain. (ibid.) 
 
Cornell does not deny the meaning of social imaginaries. Symbols and images 
affect the formation of a person’s self, but in Susan James’ view, Cornell empha-
sises the imaginary domain as part of the project of personality formation, 
which directs attention to the individual, to the individual’s right to an imagi-
nary domain, to feelings and thoughts that are attached to socially mediated 
symbols and images.  
An interesting twist to James’ reading, however, lies in Cornell’s 
evasion of normative political accounts while at the same time providing a tool 
with which to evaluate how the state protects the imaginary domain. Cornell 
evades normativity in insisting on freedom in terms of personality formation, 
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and protection from outside influence on one’s identifications. At the same time, 
she also acknowledges the relevance of the conditions in which the personality is 
formed, making it possible to evaluate how social and political conditions enable 
the imaginary domain. Susan James argues that the implication in Cornell’s 
thought is that the state cannot protect all kinds of representations of the 
sexuate being: 
 
Hard choices have to be made, and the state will have to reach a 
view about where to exert itself, where to refrain from intervention 
and how to modify existing practices. These decisions need to be 
grounded, at least in part, on an examination of the social imagi-
nary and its effects on subjectivity. If, as Cornell claims, any as-
sessment by the state of the relative gravity of harms to the imagi-
nary domain is a violation of the individual, it is difficult to see how 
the state can take on the obligations that amount to protecting the 
imaginary domain. (ibid., 192) 
 
However, Cornell does not claim that all kinds of representations of the sexuate 
being must be protected by the state. In her evaluation of state action and poli-
cies her guiding principle is her very specific understanding of freedom and the 
freedom to create one’s personality. State actions should therefore be evaluated 
against this principle: does a specific policy enhance or impede the formation of 
the  personality,  bearing  in  mind  the  degradation  prohibition  of  the  imaginary  
domain? Cornell’s thought has its problems, but it does facilitate the evaluation 
of public policies and laws. This is a solid starting point in my construction of 
the notion of reproductive agency as an evaluative tool. Next, given my intention 
to evaluate how the environment for agency in procreative matters is enabled 
and disabled in the three policy documents under study, I consider Cornell’s 




2.6 Agency in Cornell’s and Butler’s thought 
2.6.1 Cornell on agency 
Drucilla Cornell does not explicitly give a great deal of attention to the concept 
of agency. She does use it in her essay ‘Pragmatism, Recollective Imagination, 
and Transformative Legal Interpretations’ (Cornell 1993, chapter 2), linking 
transformation, the construction of the self and agency, and outlining some of 
the  themes  she  elaborates  in  her  later  work  in  connection  with  the  imaginary  
domain. She remarks that there is no self-enclosed subject in that the self can-
not cut herself off from the Other, and also notes that ‘I’ repeats itself through 
iterability. (Cornell 1993, 41) She did not introduce the notion of the imaginary 
domain until 1995 in her book The Imaginary Domain,  but  the  above-
mentioned article incorporates the idea of constantly becoming subjectivity, 
which is connected to agency. She writes: 
 
What we think of as agency is precisely the engagement of the self 
with its own iterability, which is never just given but always con-
firmed or disconfirmed in the process of signing for oneself. It is the 
very process that allows us to underwrite a statement such as “I am 
Drucilla Cornell” again and again over time. (ibid.)   
 
Signing for one’s personality is linked to recollective imagination, which refers 
to acts through which the past assumes its meaning. The past does not have one 
true  meaning,  but  it  is  created  via  recollective  imagination,  through  which  we  
interpret it and create meanings for it. Cornell continues: 
 
Agency is this specific sense of possibility for an “I” that is both de-
fined and recreated through recollective imagination. The recollec-
tion of oneself is always an act which imagines through the remem-
brance of  its  own claims of  selfhood what can never be fully  recol-
lected, but only forever reimagined and re-told. The iterability of 
language allows us to regenerate ourselves through the continuing 




Cornell connects agency with the iterability of language and of the 
self, and the possibility is included in the continual processual nature of the self. 
Given that the self is not a set and unchanged entity, it is possible to change it 
through redefinition. There is also a close connection between the idea of agency 
and the concept of the imaginary domain. Although Cornell dismisses the totally 
autonomous subject as an impossibility, her contention that people should be 
the  source  of  ideas  about  their  own  personality  gives  space  for  agency  in  that  
people  have  the  opportunity  to  re-think  and  re-work  their  ideas  about  them-
selves and how they present themselves to the world. Cornell writes in relation 
to the imaginary domain: ‘By demanding an imaginary domain, we are insisting 
that we will not be confined in our life’s opportunities because of the imposition 
of  physical,  cultural  and  legal  definitions  of  ourselves  as  unworthy  of  person-
hood’ (Cornell 1995: 232).  She refers to a politically free person as ‘individuated 
enough to represent herself as the source of evaluation of her life plans to make 
her claim upon society without appealing to her social position or her duties to 
society’ (Cornell 1998: 21). 
A significant aspect of reproductive agency is the embodied being, 
which is connected to the question of materiality. At this point I will expand my 
examination by bringing in Judith Butler’s views on gender performativity, and 
especially her thought on the relationship between materiality and language. 
Although Butler’s thought conflicts with Cornell’s thinking in certain aspects, 
her ideas complement Cornell’s view of the imaginary domain in taking into ac-
count the process of materialisation. Butler also sheds light on some of the 
problems related to Cornell’s views on the relationship between social imaginar-
ies and the individual imaginary domain. As Gill Jagger notes, Butler’s notion of 
performativity and her Foucauldian reading of the psyche as a product of social 
regulation avoid the tendency to privilege the psyche over the social (Jagger 




2.6.2 Butler, performativity and the relationship between material-
ity, language and agency 
It is worth re-stating Judith Butler’s idea that gender is perfomatively produced, 
i.e. produced by doing: 
  
In this sense, gender is always doing, though not a doing by a sub-
ject who might be said to pre-exist the deed. … There is no gender 
identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performa-
tively constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be its re-
sults. (Butler 1999: 33) 
 
The doing is done with or for other, although the other may be imaginary; ‘the 
terms  that  make  up  one’s  own gender  are,  from the  start,  outside  oneself,  be-
yond oneself in a sociality that has no single author’ (Butler 2004, 1). The sub-
ject, ‘I’ is constituted by norms, but at the same time one also tries to maintain a 
critical and transformative relations to norms (ibid., 3). As Gill Jagger points 
out, according to Butler, social power and regulation are in operation in the 
formation of the psyche, but the subjection also allows for the possibility of re-
sistance (Jagger 2008, 90). Butler’s intention in bringing up the constituted na-
ture of the subject is not to deny its existence, but to interrogate its construction 
as pre-given or foundational (Butler 1995, 42). 
Related to the question of subjectivity is the question of bodies and 
materiality. Butler notes that her intention is not to presume materiality or to 
negate it, but to problematise the question. Language is not opposed to materi-
ality, but neither can materiality be summarily collapsed into an identity with 
language. Language both is and refers to that which is material, and what is ma-
terial never fully escapes from the process by which it is signified. (Butler 1993, 
30, 68) In saying that language both is and refers to materiality, Butler is recall-
ing the materiality of the sign, but she is also suggesting that language is not all 
there is. Language refers to materiality, which means that materiality is neither 
just a set of signifiers nor just an effect of language. Nevertheless, she does think 
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that materiality is bound up with signification from the start, and it is difficult to 
think through the inseparable intertwining of language and materiality: 
 
To posit by way of language a materiality outside of language is still 
to posit that materiality, and the materiality so posited will retain 
that positing as its constitutive condition. (ibid., 30) 
 
In her discourse on materiality21, Butler is also talking about bodies: 
 
The body posited as prior to the sign, is always posited or signified 
as prior. This signification produces as an effect of its own proce-
dure the very body that it nevertheless and simultaneously claims to 
discover as that which precedes its own action. If the body signified 
as prior to signification is an effect of signification, then the mi-
metic or representational status of language, which claims that sign 
follows  bodies  as  their  necessary  mirror,  is  not  mimetic  at  all.  On  
the contrary, it is productive, constitutive, one might even argue 
performative, inasmuch as this signifying act delimits and contours 
the  body  that  it  then  claims  to  find  prior  to  any  and  all  significa-
tions. (ibid., 30, emphasis in the original) 
 
Butler does not deny its existence, but she does claim that we do not 
have access to materiality, including the body, outside of language. With regard 
to  the  body,  I  read  this  to  mean  that  the  materiality  of  our  bodies  is  not  self-
evident  or  ‘natural’  in  the  sense  that  how  we  understand  our  bodies  could  be  
                                                             
21 Karen Barad finds limitations in Butler’s theorisation about the relationship of matter, dis-
course and materialisation. Barad is in agreement with Butler to a great extent, but thinks that 
she does not go far enough in that she ultimately retains the idea of matter as a passive product 
of discursive practices rather than understanding it as an active agent. In addition, Butler’s ac-
count of materialisation concerns the construction of human bodies, whereas Barad’s posthu-
manist understanding, which she calls ‘agential realism’, aims to move beyond the anthropocen-
tric  view.  As  Barad  sees  it,  ‘matter  is  substance  in  its  intra-active  becoming  –  not  a  thing  but  
doing, a congealing of agency’. She maintains that matter refers to ongoing materialisation, and 
she  is  not  only  referring  to  human  bodies,  but  to  all  kinds  of  bodies.  (Barad  2007,  151-152)  
Barad is a theoretical physicist. She bases her account of agential realism – with a rich theoreti-
cal elaboration I cannot examine more closely here – on Niels Bohr’s philosophy-physics, which 




simply or straightforwardly said to derive from their material nature. The mate-
riality of personality, the embodied being and how we understand the body, its 
contours and characteristics is a process of materialisation. Butler’s views on 
materialisation should be separated from the idea of cultural inscription, how-
ever. According to Karen Barad, Butler does not refer to the surface of the body, 
but rather discusses the process of materialisation that produces our under-
standing of matter, its boundaries, fixity and surface (Barad 2007, 63-64). Ma-
terialisation is not just a question of culture affecting – inscribing – how people 
look on the outside or the surface of their bodies. Inherent in the term inscrib-
ing is the notion that underneath cultural inscriptions is a natural or biological 
body that is not dependent on culture. However, our cultural understandings 
about biology and nature are also dependent on language, not in the sense that 
language creates them or that the material is only language, but in the sense that 
we cannot access materiality without language. 
Butler’s conceptions of gender performativity and the constituted 
nature of the subject lead to a specific kind of understanding of agency. As she 
notes, one is tempted to think that one needs to assume the subject in advance 
so as to safeguard its agency, but she maintains that its constituted character is 
actually a precondition for agency. She writes: ‘For what is it that enables a pur-
posive and significant reconfiguration of cultural and political relations, if not a 
relation that can be turned against itself, reworked and resisted?’ (Butler 1995, 
46) The performativity, the iterability in the subject formation enables agency; 
cultural and political relations can change, be reconfigured exactly because they 
can be repeated differently. Butler also emphasises the fact that agency is a po-
litical prerogative (ibid., 46-47), and cannot be thought of as a self-evident ca-
pacity that the subject holds. As Tuija Pulkkinen notes, the agent is constructed 
within a continuous, never completed process and as an effect of certain powers 
operating in a specific context (Pulkkinen 2000, 189). Butler considers it impor-
tant to question the conditions in which agency is possible, and not to take it for 
granted: 
 
We need instead to ask, what possibilities of mobilization are pro-
duced on the basis of existing configurations of discourse and 
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power? Where are the possibilities of reworking that very matrix of 
power  by  which  we  are  constituted,  of  reconstituting  the  legacy  of  
that constitution, and of working against each other those processes 
of regulation that can destabilize existing power regimes? (Butler 
1995, 47) 
 
Butler’s  way  of  thinking  about  agency  also  bypasses  the  determin-
ism-voluntarism dichotomy. The focus of performativity is not on the question 
of choosing your identity or being determined by the environment, but on the 
powers conditioning the construction of the self (Pulkkinen 2000, 172). As 
Moya Lloyd notes, Butler sees agency  
 
as an effect of the operations of power/discourse and thus as phe-
nomenon that cannot be separated from contexts. This necessarily 
means that politics, as she understands it, is also related to context. 
This is why her politics is immanent politics of subversion. (Lloyd 
2007, 76) 
 
Contextuality of agency and politics are also questions that I keep in 
mind in my redescriptions of the three selected policy documents. With regard 
to reproductive agency, there is no subject that is expected to ‘own’ or to have 
agency as a distinct thing, and the idea is rather that agency and its possibilities 
and limits are produced in discourses that also affect personality formation. 
Still,  people  are  not  understood  to  be  powerless  or  without  agency,  which  is  a  
shifting possibility tied to location and history. As Butler notes, the subject is 
produced time and again, and the subject is the permanent possibility of certain 
resignifying processes, which get distracted and stalled, but which also may be 
reworked (Butler 1995, 47). 
Before  moving  on  to  the  notion  of  reproductive  agency  I  will  con-
sider some interpretations of Butler’s thinking about agency and, in order to 
sharpen my focus, examine how she and Cornell converge and how they differ in 
this respect. I do not intend to rehash in detail the claims that Butler does away 
with the subject, or that the subject becomes just an effect of the discourse (see 
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e.g.,  Benhabib  1995,  Dow  Magnus  2006,  83-86).  I  prefer,  instead,  to  examine  
aspects that highlight the similarities and differences in Butler and Cornell and 
thereby elaborate the concept of agency.  
As Moya Lloyd notes, Judith Butler’s ideas about agency have been 
interpreted as both supporting a voluntaristic understanding and denying 
agency altogether through the inclusion of determinism, according to which the 
subject is the product of discourse and has no potential for autonomous action 
(Lloyd 2007, 49). Emphasising the process of iterability or, for example, under-
standing gender as performance (as opposed to performative) allows interpreta-
tion  of  Butler’s  views  as  voluntaristic,  and  of  gender  as  something  that  one  is  
freely able to iterate or perform differently. There are different degrees of volun-
tarism,  but  someone  who reads  Butler  as  having  an  active  notion  of  agency  is  
Elena Loizidou (Loizidou 2007). She notes: 
  
Her [Butler’s] interventions introduced a refreshing perspective in 
feminist  thought.  Women were not any more to be viewed as pas-
sive, repressed by power and waiting for the regime of power to al-
ter, recognise and ‘represent’ them in order to be able to transform 
their conditions of livability. But as subjects embedded in power, or 
to  be  more  precise,  as  subjects  being  formed  by  power  and  lan-
guage, it meant that women could resist the conditions of their for-
mation. Her outlook presents us with an un-static and active rela-
tion to our lives (and its constitutive forms: power and language). 
(Loizidou 2007, 4) 
 
Loizidou also notes that Butler’s treatment of ethics, law, and poli-
tics is related to the question: ‘How can we have more livable and viable lives?’ 
(ibid., 6) She reads Butler in a way that allows active agency, and enables people 
evaluating and attempting to direct their lives to be more livable, to change dis-
courses and constituent powers.  
Conversely, Butler’s views of subjection and the inseparability of the 
self and the discourses could be read as a deterministic account of the subject. 
One of the most well known interpretations of Butler as denying the possibility 
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of agency is Seyla Behabib’s, who by concentrating on the role of the language in 
Butler’s account interprets her thinking on gender perfomativity as something 
that ultimately denies agency, noting that no speech-act theory of gender per-
formativity can provide an account of gender formation that would sufficiently 
explain the capacity for agency (Benhabib 1995, 110). Behabib continues: 
 
The theory of perfomativity, even if Butler would like to distinguish 
gender-constitution from identity-constitution, still presupposes a 
remarkably deterministic view of individuation and socialization 
processes which falls short of the currently available social-
scientific  reflections  on  the  subject.  The  viability  of  some  form  of  
human agency, however, is crucial to make empirical sense of proc-
esses of psycho-sexual development and maturation. (ibid.) 
 
It is not my intention to go into all the argumentation about differ-
ent readings of how agency could be interpreted in Butler, but as these conflict-
ing interpretations show, her work is multifaceted with regard to the question of 
agency. According to Moya Lloyd, Butler develops ‘a non-voluntarist account of 
agency’ (Lloyd 2007, 49). Butler’s thought on gender performativity and it-
erability implies the possibility of change, but because one is not able to control 
social aspects of language, it is not possible to direct the transformations in a 
voluntaristic way. At one point in her theorisation of non-voluntarist agency 
Butler addresses problems of resistance related to Foucauldian and Lacanian 
versions of subject formation (Jagger 2008, 89-90, Disch 1999, 552-553). The 
problem with theorisation about productive power is that the subject is not able 
to resist the effects of power, and disciplinary power works unilaterally on the 
subject. Psychoanalytic theory, in turn, concentrates on the psychic and fails to 
theorise on political resistance. (Disch 1999, 553-554) Thus Butler aims to theo-
rise  agency  in  a  way  that  would  overcome  the  dichotomy  of  determinism  and  
voluntarism  related  to  Foucauldian  and  Lacanian  theory.  One  consequence  of  
this aim is some indeterminacy in thinking, and this is one of the criticisms lev-
elled at both Cornell and Butler. 
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I have already mentioned Lois McNay’s criticism of indeterminacy 
in Cornell’s thought. She makes the same claim of ‘structural indeterminacy’ 
with regard to Judith Butler. In Butler’s case, however, it refers to her  
 
account of the performative construction of identity [that] lacks an 
anticipatory  or  hermeneutic  dimension  that  can  explain  the  active  
dimensions of subject formation and how the inculcation of norms 
is always partially transcended in the process of the living through 
of those norms. (McNay 2003, 143) 
 
According  to  McNay,  agency  for  Butler  is  more  a  quality  of  structures  than  of  
subjects (ibid.), whereas Cornell’s problems with indeterminacy are connected 
to her understanding of temporality and the future. Moreover, Cornell’s notion 
of the future anterior – a future based on a past that cannot be fully recollected 
and that creates a future not fully determined by the actualised past – ‘remains 
an abstract possibility that does not lend itself to a thoroughgoing socio-
historical understanding of change’ (ibid., 145). McNay continues: 
 
In Cornell, the category of indeterminacy stands in for an analysis 
of the ways in which power relations shape and deform the experi-
ence of hope. Thus, Cornell disregards the difficult question of how 
such an abstractly formulated feminist ethics relates to the realities 
of women’s oppression, expressed as thwarted expectations and 
diminished hopes. (ibid.) 
 
McNay’s  criticism of  both  Butler  and  Cornell  is  that  their  theories  are  too  ab-
stract to be helpful in analyses of historical situations, and especially of power 
relations.  
McNay’s reading of Butler relies on the idea that her account of 
change and agency is based only on linguistic and symbolic practices, but as dis-
cussed above, the self in Butler’s thought is embodied and thus material. More-
over, McNay does not agree that, for Butler, identity is doing. Understanding 
identity as doing has analytical potential in terms of how identity is done and in 
53 
 
what kind of conditions, but it also shows that McNay’s reading of Butler’s ac-
count is beside the point. According to McNay, Butler’s thinking implies that 
agency is a quality of structures rather than subjects, but as Karen Barad notes, 
Butler rejects the binary of agency/structure altogether (Barad 2007, 62). In line 
with Foucault’s thinking about ‘the historical conditions that call forth certain 
kinds of subjectivity’ (ibid.), Butler’s idea of performativity implies that identity 
is  not  a  singular  act  by  an  autonomous  subject,  but  a  doing  ‘in  which  subjects  
are called into social being from diffuse social quarters’ (Butler 1997, 160). 
With regard to Cornell, I argued earlier that she pays little attention 
to social imaginaries, and is more interested in the individual imaginary do-
main. This does not mean that she is not inclined to examine changes in histori-
cal situations, and in certain respects on the question of agency she comes close 
to Butler’s views on reiterability and change. Cornell acknowledges that the self 
is socially constituted and other-dependent. She also sees the personality as a 
process, something that has to be done again and again, and this also includes 
possibilities for transformation. Nevertheless, despite her agreement with But-
ler on many points, her strong commitment to the ideals of equal value and eve-
ryone’s freedom to form their personalities is also a point of departure with re-
gard  to  their  views  on  agency.  Although  there  are  some  elements  in  Butler’s  
thought that engage with the notion of freedom, she does not focus on questions 
such  as  what  freedom  means  or  freedom  as  the  purpose  of  political  theory  
(Lloyd 2007, 133). Cornell, however, considers the notion of freedom important: 
predefined values and meanings of life should not be imposed on people, who 
should have the freedom to work out these things for themselves. It is important 
to remember that this freedom is ideal. I read Cornell’s emphasis on freedom to 
mean that people should be treated as if they were free, although this can never 
be realised. With regard to agency this means that acting as if one were free may 
or  may  not  effect  changes,  but  at  least  it  makes  change  possible  when  people  
reiterate differently.  
I  argue  that  Cornell  does  not  claim that  one  is  able  to  fully  deter-
mine the direction of change, or foresee the effects of one’s actions, and in this 
regard she and Butler are in agreement. However, Cornell concentrates on an 
individual’s potential for personality formation, although as will become clear in 
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this study, this has political and social connections and significance. Butler, on 
the  other  hand,  focuses  on  the  constitution  of  identity  and  the  workings  of  
power. As Gill Jagger notes: 
 
Agency, then, becomes a matter of reworking injurious interpella-
tions, of unsettling passionate attachments to subjection. Its roots 
are not to be found in the structure of the subject and autonomous 
actions, which this view of power exposes as an illusion (...), but in 
the workings of power in the simultaneous productions of subjects 
and subjection. They are to be found in the combined operations of 
social power and psychic regulation and in the possibility of resis-
tance and resignification. (Jagger 2008, 104) 
 
In this regard I focus on other aspects of Cornell’s thinking. She 
concentrates on an individual’s potential for personal change, but as I have 
pointed out, her theorising also offers interesting insights into the formation of 
the personality and its connections with its social and political environment. I 
do not wish to exacerbate the differences between Cornell and Butler because 
there are also points of convergence, but in the context of this study, the most 
significant difference is that Cornell considers agency more of an individual ac-
tivity, related to the imaginary domain and the formation of the personality, 
whereas for Butler it is attached to the discursive context and the operation of 
subjection and power. Cornell is also strongly committed to the ideal of equal 
value and indeterminacy is an important element in thinking in terms of not 
claiming to know in advance what is good for people and allowing them to find 
out for themselves. It is also worth noting that indeterminacy is an element in 
the  ideal.  According  to  Cornell,  we  should  aim for  freedom and the  imaginary  
domain, even though their meanings change over time and they cannot be de-




2.7 Reproductive agency 
In this chapter so far I have developed the groundwork for exploring the notion 
of reproductive agency. My understanding of the concept is very specific, draw-
ing on Drucilla Cornell’s concepts of the imaginary domain and bodily integrity. 
The  term ‘reproductive  agency’  has  also  been  used  in  a  more  general  sense  in  
contexts in which women’s reproductive decisions are discussed. Therefore, be-
fore outlining my own interpretation, I will make some more general observa-
tions. 
The notion of reproductive agency is often used in discussions 
about women’s rights and their ability to decide about procreation, whether and 
when to have children. It is thus linked to the history of fertility control among 
women,  and  the  process  of  gaining  the  rights  and  having  the  option  to  decide  
and control their reproductive capacities. The history of fertility control is com-
plex,  and  although  the  turning  point  is  often  dated  to  the  time  when  women  
were seen to achieve control of their bodies with the invention of oral contracep-
tives, and to the advent of legalised abortion in the 1960s and 1970s, the history 
of attempted influence on overall levels of national fertility is a long one. As An-
gus McLaren notes, the regulation of reproduction is not a straightforward story 
of  development  from  subjection  to  freedom,  and  cultural,  social,  economic,  
medical and other aspects intertwine in how fertility has been viewed through 
the ages (McLaren 1990, 1-11). Regulation has public and private aspects, and 
operates on different levels. Attempts to influence the birth rate involve not only 
public policies and politics, but also very intimate and personal individual deci-
sions. As fertility becomes a social issue, such decisions concerning reproduc-
tion become a matter for public concern. 
Fertility has always been subject to control in one form or another. 
The mode of control has varied: sometimes the aim is to increase, and at other 
times to curb population growth. The 19th century witnessed a significant 
change in population development as birth rates dropped significantly at the 
same time as death rates decreased. It is significant that this drop in birth rates 
happened before the advent of effective contraceptive measures. (ibid.) The de-
velopment of the modern contraceptive is often considered decisive in popula-
tion development, although the control of reproduction is not only about the 
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effective prevention of pregnancy. Women’s reproductive agency is usually un-
derstood in historical studies simply as their ability to control their reproduc-
tion. As I see it, however, it is not limited to the control of reproductive capaci-
ties, but more comprehensively covers procreation as a part of personality for-
mation.  
Although it  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  study  to  chart  how women’s  
reproductive agency has been understood or constructed historically, I do deal 
with issues that are connected to historical debates on reproductive agency and 
fertility control, and address questions of how procreation is understood politi-
cally and socially. It is a widely held view that women’s reproductive agency has 
increased  with  the  invention  of  modern  contraceptives  and  reproductive  tech-
nologies. This is understandable, and in many ways reflects what has happened. 
However, at the same time medical and cultural pressures related to procreation 
have also strengthened, and the increase in reproductive freedom is not as clear 
as it may seem at the first sight. McLaren mentions as an example that over 20 
per cent of white women in the US were childless at the age of forty in the 1920s, 
but by the 1980s the figure was down to 10 per cent (ibid., 260-261). He contin-
ues:  
 
It may be no longer be expected that a woman will have large num-
ber of  children,  but an enormous amount of  normative pressure is  
exerted by governments, churches and the popular culture on 
women to ‘fulfil’ themselves by having at least one child. (ibid., 261) 
 
My  study  examines  some  of  these  normative  pressures  that  are  exerted  on  
women by politics and policies that aim to affect reproductive decisions. My 
viewpoint on reproductive agency is limited to the decisions concerning whether 
to have children or not, but such decisions connect the political and individual 
level; people’s personal choices are considered to be of political concern. The 
decision to procreate, of course, has different aspects, and is influenced by mat-
ters to do with care, the family, motherhood, fatherhood and custody arrange-
ments.  I  address  various  questions  related  to  such  decisions,  but  the  specific  
focal point of my examination is the connection between personal decisions and 
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political concerns. The decision to reproduce is a central area in population-
policy thinking, and on the individual level it is at the heart of the personality-
formation process. Whether or not to have children is also a marker that divides 
women, and has been used as a way to degrade some groups. It is therefore not 
merely a question of the political significance of women reproducing, but also 
concerns the refusal to procreate. My aim is thus to offer tools that facilitate ex-
amination of the whole variety of reproductive decisions and the connections to 
politics and policies that target reproductive agency. 
My formulation of  reproductive agency is  based on the idea of  the 
imaginary domain. As Cornell puts it, the imaginary domain is needed for the 
individual to freely form her personality, to constantly think through who she is 
and who she wants to become, and thus to become a full member of the moral 
community and act as a responsible citizen. Personality is embodied, and bodily 
integrity  is  an  aspect  of  the  imaginary  unity  of  the  self.  The  personality  is  
formed performatively in identificatory processes. Performativity means that 
there is no absolute difference between the self and the discourses, practices and 
norms that produce and condition one’s being. The notion that the self cannot 
be totally separated from discourses and practices also enables agency, in that it 
is possible to reiterate discourses and norms differently and thus propel trans-
formations.  
Agency implies the possibility to repeat or reiterate identities differ-
ently and thus also to produce changes in the conditions that construct one’s 
subjectivity, even though the effects of the reiterative process cannot be known 
beforehand. Although it is possible to focus on Butler’s emphasis on workings of 
power  and  subjection,  her  relevance  to  this  study  lies  in  her  notion  of  gender  
performativity. The conception of gender as doing, as something that needs to 
be reiterated and repeated, is a basic premise for my notion of agency. The idea 
of the unfinished nature of personality is also significant for me in Cornell’s 
thought. Her account of the imaginary domain and bodily integrity is read as an 
account of how she sees the construction of subjectivity and what she considers 
essential in it. The imaginary domain is considered a place in which to rethink 
identity, a space for the creation and recreation of the self and the norms that 
condition  us  all.  A  significant  aspect  of  this  is  its  connection  with  politics,  the  
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law and other social arrangements. The relevance of the imaginary domain to 
my redescriptive work is in how it can be employed as a diagnostic tool in study-
ing political and social arrangements and policies. It is possible to question 
whether a certain policy enhances or inhibits the free formation of the personal-
ity, and whether the imaginary domain needed for this process is secured. 
How,  then,  do  I  formulate  the  concept  of  reproductive  agency?  In  
my view it incorporates the idea that it should be possible to re-configure and 
live differently the hegemonic forms of reproduction. Procreation is an impor-
tant part of being an embodied human being. Although medical science has 
progressed so far as to blur reproductive roles with regard to biological parent-
hood, the connection between women and pregnancy is still very tight. Women 
have traditionally suffered because of the assumption of their role in the repro-
ductive process as the primary carer. I examine reproduction from a perspective 
that questions the traditional settings of procreation in terms of parenthood, sex 
and  gender.  I  would  like  to  reiterate  Cornell’s  words,  which  still  describe  the  
situation in Finland in many cases: women’s reproductive capacity is frequently 
seen as the real difference that explains or justifies women’s inequality in em-
ployment, for example (Cornell 1998, 66). She writes: ‘That a pregnant woman 
is a person remains an incongruous if not a preposterous idea in the public 
imagination: how can anyone claim pregnant women to be the same as men 
when they are so obviously different?’ (ibid.) Her point is that pregnancy does 
not and cannot take away a woman’s standing as a person. She continues: 
 
[T]he  demand  is  that  our  reproductive  capacity  not  be  allowed  to  
deny our claim to be a person. Although pregnant, we, like men and 
women who are not pregnant, remain the only legitimate moral 
source of our life’s direction. (ibid., 67)  
 
Cornell’s point is that the potential to become pregnant does not 
take  away  a  person’s  right  to  the  imaginary  domain,  or  the  right  to  define  life  
goals and values, including the meanings and values connected to procreation 
and parenthood. Then again, motherhood is not something that should define 
being a woman. One should be able to decide about reproduction, including re-
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fusing to procreate, without the decision being valued as a bad choice. Cornell 
uses the term ‘degrade’, meaning downgrading someone because of how she has 
chosen to live her life (ibid., 60). If one is free to decide about procreation one 
should not be degraded because of one’s choice to procreate or not to procreate, 
or because of how one has decided to arrange parenthood. Parenthood and pro-
creation are just some areas in which people should be the source of their own 
life goals, values and meanings. Reproductive decisions fundamentally affect 
how people understand and process their selves, and politics and polices that 
target  or  aim to  influence  reproductive  agency  in  one  way  or  another  are  very  
relevant to freedom.  
Cornell understands the concept of the imaginary domain as largely 
connected to individual personality formation, but it should also be borne in 
mind how, together with the notion of reproductive agency, it is also connected 
to politics and change. When there are opportunities to live differently, to reit-
erate the discourses that define femininity and masculinity and how to ‘do your 
gender’, there are also opportunities for change. Performativity enables change. 
I redescribe political discussions, and my redescriptions not only offer a clearer 
picture  of  the  current  situation,  but  also  open  our  minds  to  different  kinds  of  
views, possibilities for living differently. The concept of reproductive agency, 
drawing from the notion of the imaginary domain, emphasises freedom from 
oppression with regard to reproduction, thereby creating conditions that enable 
people to decide as freely as possible about procreation. Such freedom is natu-
rally an ideal. One can never be free in the liberal sense of the word, and is al-
ways  influenced  by  the  existing  society  and  culture.  The  ideal  of  reproductive  
agency, in the form of being able to re-configure and live differently the hege-
monic  modes  of  reproduction  and  the  family,  can,  however,  be  used  as  a  tool  
with which to evaluate policy proposals.  
Given  that  I  have  developed  my  notion  of  reproductive  agency  in  
the context of Drucilla Cornell’s thinking, I reiterate her view that there should 
be no state-imposed sexual choices or reinforcement of a rigid gender identity. 
States should not, for example, force women to play the role of primary carer in 




[F]irst, we must demand inclusion in the moral community of per-
sons as a matter of right and demand that, as persons, we be given 
equal and maximum liberty to determine our sexual lives, including 
what meaning to give to our reproductive capacity; second, as rec-
ognized persons we must demand a scope of rights, resources, and 
capabilities consistent with our treatment as equals. (ibid., 67) 
 
Cornell’s  basic  principle  involves  securing  the  right  not  only  to  the  imaginary  
domain,  and  the  freedom to  determine  one’s  life  and  its  goals  and  values,  but  
also to the necessary resources and capabilities. Thus the imaginary domain and 
reproductive agency offer a perspective on concrete policies – which are part of 
the symbolic, cultural and political environment in which people live – in terms 
of evaluating how well they comply with this demand. I therefore assess the 
concrete policies or policy proposals against the ideal of reproductive agency. 
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3 The policy documents described 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim in this chapter is to introduce and contextualise the three population-
policy documents I redescribe later on. I introduce the documents in their en-
tirety  here,  and  focus  on  specific  themes  in  later  chapters.  The  selected  docu-
ments deal with the declining birth rate and the need for a Finnish population 
policy for the 21st century. Of course, reproductive agency in itself is not an ex-
plicit aim or subject of discussion and policy in the documents, but the texts are 
examples of proposed politics and policies that target people’s reproductive be-
haviour and decisions. The proposals therefore include and elaborate on notions 
of reproduction and reproductive agency.  
I should point out that this study is not a policy analysis of Finnish 
population policies. It is not my aim to examine the kind of policies adopted in 
Finland, how they have developed, how they are implemented or what their ef-
fects are. I rather see population policies as a subject or theme of political dis-
course.  My intention  is  to  reveal  and  to  analyse  through  redescription  the  fre-
quently implicit values and meanings that are advocated through and reflected 
in the policy proposals.  
It is also worth noting that reproductive agency is understood here 
as something that the discourses, as one element, construct; it is not something 
that one has or does not have. As a notion it is rather used as a tool for examin-
ing  the  possibilities  and  potential  inherent  in  the  documents  for  more  or  less  
freedom in the process of procreative personality development. The discourses 
analysed in this study are just one element in the process through which people 
decide about their reproduction. They do not force people to act in a particular 
way, but they do contribute to the environment in which personality formation 
takes place. Conversely, the policy documents were not produced in isolation, 
but were influenced by existing views about reproductive agency.  
My redescription focuses on three texts from three different sources 
that present clear policy proposals to counteract the problem of the declining 
birth rate. The texts are: 1) the Governmental report on the population problem 
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called ‘Finland for people of all ages: Government report on the future: demo-
graphic trends, population policy, and preparation for changes in the age struc-
ture’  (GOV);  2)  the  Population  Policy  Program of  the  Family  Federation  (FF);  
and 3) the report on the population question contracted by the Business and 
Policy Forum EVA and written by Tapio Wallenius, entitled Tuomitut 
vähenemään: Suomalaiset ja lisääntymisen vaikea taito (in English ‘Con-
demned to diminish: Finns and the difficult art of procreation’; EVA). The texts 
represent three very different kinds of interests and agendas, and I introduce 
them in more detail later in this chapter. I do not examine the production proc-
esses, although I provide background information about the organisations that 
published  the  documents  and  discuss  briefly  why  they  were  written.  The  texts  
are similar in the sense that they are all in the public domain and are ostensibly 
aimed, at least partly, at the general public and people interested in population 
issues. EVA and FF could also be seen as lobbying material aimed at the Gov-
ernment and Parliament. In this sense they differ from the Governmental 
document,  which  is  an  expression  of  goals  or  aims  that  the  coalition  Govern-
ment were able to agree on. 
Although the analysis of general population-policy discourse is not 
the main aim in this dissertation, it is worth recalling the notion of the material-
ity of discourses. In this case it means that the discussion on the need for a Fin-
nish population policy has concrete and material consequences, which are not, 
however, total or deterministic. The discourses, and even the proposals that are 
not  implemented  in  the  eventual  policies,  iterate  and  re-iterate  and  thus  pro-
duce conditions and the environment for ways of living, and simultaneously re-
flect existing views. Thus the documents have a double role: they affect the cir-
cumstances in which people form their personality, and they reflect the circum-
stances in which they were created. They create elements of and possibilities for 
living, and also contribute to the creation of the imaginary domain. They may 
express some deeply held values and views of Finnish society that affect the 
imaginary domain and its formation, or they may introduce new perspectives 
that either enhance or impede free personality formation. My intention here is 
to examine how the three policy texts enhance or restrict the potential for re-
productive agency,  and to identify  the potential  inherent in them, but I  do not 
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go  into  how  this  is  realised  in  people’s  lives.  The  three  documents  deal  with  
various issues from immigration to regional politics and the reform of the pen-
sion system, and I have no intention of tackling them all. For my purposes, the 
relevant questions in the documents are: ‘Why are Finns not having more chil-
dren?’ and ‘What can be done about it?’ 
I  use  the  language  that  is  used  in  the  documents  in  the  following  
general descriptions of the selected policy documents, which means that at this 
point there is no questioning or analysing of how the texts express issues related 
to reproductive agency. Although my purpose is to shed light on how texts that 
seem politically neutral can put forward strong viewpoints on gender and pro-
creation I save this for later, and merely summarise the documents here. First, 
however,  I  will  briefly  contextualise  the  Finnish  debate  on  the  population  and  
the birth rate. 
 
3.2 Background 
3.2.1 On the history of Finnish population policies 
Finland gained its independence as a nation state in 1917, but the debate about 
the specifically Finnish population was already underway in the 19th century. 
The population was on the increase throughout the century, but when the birth 
rate dropped dramatically in around 1910 the issue became a topic of public dis-
cussion. Although there was some newspaper coverage of the population prob-
lem in the 1920s (Lindgren 1976, 18), public concern and more extensive discus-
sion  did  not  surface  until  the  early  1930s  (Pitkänen  1988,  63-63).  The  Winter  
War in 1939-1940 acted as an additional impetus provoking debate on popula-
tion policy, and the slow growth of the population was considered a problem 
that should be addressed on the policy level (Simonen 1991, 50). The late 1930s 
and 1940s witnessed the emergence of new and renewed family, maternity and 
child policies, which also included pronatalistic aims. With the baby boom that 
followed  the  Second  World  War  the  birth  rate  jumped,  and  worries  about  the  
declining birth rate subsided, although the national population remained an 
interest in some quarters of society. One institution that retained an interest in 
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the population question was the Family Federation22, which was established in 
1941, and one of the reasons for its foundation was the worry about the declin-
ing birth rate (Väestöliitto 2010a).  
Interest in population issues revived in the late 1960s and the 
1970s. The Finnish birth rate was very low in the early 1970s and this, combined 
with active immigration to Sweden, caused concern in the Family Federation 
and among others interested in demography. (Strömmer 1991, 46-37) Jouko 
Hulkko,  who  was  the  executive  manager  of  the  Family  Federation  at  the  time,  
wrote in 1973 that Finland did not have population policies aimed at balanced 
development  and  renewal,  and  demanded  a  social  policy  that  would  take  into  
account the population policy (Hulkko 1973, 125-126). Of more relevance is the 
fact that the 1970s was the decade when a pronatalistic population policy trans-
formed  into  a  family  policy  that  no  longer  included  strong  elements  aimed  at  
raising the birth rate. The new family policies were more clearly part of the de-
velopment of the welfare state, which aimed at universal services and equality. 
(Nätkin 2002, 181) Leena Suominen’s study of the family-policy proposals in the 
Finnish parliament from 1934 to 1973 mostly confirms this view. Family policies 
in the 1930s and 1940s in particular were more strongly connected to the popu-
lation policy – such as raising the birth rate – than the policies introduced in the 
1970s. A further significant stated motive, according to Suominen’s study, was 
social in terms of equalising the differences in standards of living. (Suominen 
1976) It is notable that the global question of overpopulation, which re-emerged 
and  was  strongly  debated  in  the  1970s,  was  also  discussed  in  Finland,  but  the  
overpopulation problem was not connected to questions related to the Finnish 
population (see e.g., Strömmer 1991, 47-48). 
Population issues lost some of their urgency in Finland in the 
1980s. Family policies were developed further, including the introduction of 
parental and paternity leave, alongside the existing maternity leave. The argu-
mentation  for  these  policies  was  not  usually  based  on  the  population  issue,  
                                                             
22 In Finnish, the Family Federation is called Väestöliitto, which means The Population Federa-
tion. The Federation, however, uses in its English material (see for example Väestöliitto 2009) 
the name Family Federation, which I also adopt.  The Federation had a semi-public role in the 
formation and implementation of Finnish family and population policies until the 1970s, and 
has always had close contacts with the Government and the state. 
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however. As an example of the lack of attention to the population perspective, 
the Ministry for Health and Social Affairs drew up a long-term plan in 1982 in 
which  the  stated  aim of  the  family  policy  was  to  improve  the  situation  of  chil-
dren and families. There would be beneficial effects in other areas such as popu-
lation, economics and labour, but population growth was not the focus. (Hulkko 
1985, 30) The Family Federation nonetheless continuously maintained its inter-
est in population issues, and published policy programmes and research on re-
lated matters. For example, its Population Policy Programme published in 1987 
stated that it was possible to change the direction of population development as 
long as there was a policy programme and enough money to implement it (Ollila 
1994,  88).  The  best  option  would  be  to  raise  the  birth  rate  to  the  replacement  
level, and to improve the circumstances for having children (ibid., 89).  
There were some discussions on issues related to the population in 
the  1980s  and  1990s,  although not  in  the  Governmental  sphere.  For  example,  
there were worries about labour shortages during the period of strong economic 
growth in the 1980s, but these worries subsided during the 1990s with the onset 
of the economic depression and the very high unemployment rates (Valkonen 
2006, 5). The term ‘population policy’ was re-introduced into Governmental 
discourse in 2004 in connection with the publication of the Government report 
on the future (GOV). Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen noted in his opening 
speech during the parliamentary discussion on the report that Finland had not 
had a population policy for a long time (Eduskunta 2004). The Family Federa-
tion also published its Population Policy Programme (FF) in 2004, and the Fin-
nish Business and Policy Forum EVA had published its report on the population 
a year earlier in 2003 (EVA). Matti Vanhanen also attracted public attention in 
2003 when he demanded an active population policy in a newspaper column 
and in a radio interview (see e.g., Vanhanen 2003). 
 
3.2.2 The debate on the declining birth rate and the need for a 
population policy in the 21st century 
The  starting  point  of  the  21st-century interest in population matters pre-dates 
Vanhanen’s statement in 2003. Two years previously, in 2001, Parliament had 
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discussed  a  consultation  paper  drawn  up  by  the  Committee  for  the  Future23 
(tulevaisuusvaliokunta in Finnish) suggesting that the Finnish Government 
should provide Parliament with a review of demographic questions. The major-
ity of parliamentarians taking part in the discussion agreed that the review was 
needed. As the leading Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat24 reported, ‘Par-
liament  acknowledges  the  low  birth  rate’  (Helsingin  Sanomat  2001a).  In  con-
nection with this news story the paper also published a feature of the ‘3+ Team’, 
a group of people advocating family policies, especially for families with three or 
more children. The article is entitled ‘Motoring and housing costs dampen the 
desire to have children’ (Helsingin Sanomat 2001b), and reflects the concern 
about the low birth rate. The decision to provide Parliament with a review of the 
population question led to the publication of the GOV report in 2004.  
The  discussion  on  the  low  birth  rate  in  2002  was  sporadic,  with  
some debate on the reasons for it and the late age of having children in connec-
tion  with  the  publication  of  the  Government  report  on  child  policy  (see  e.g.,  
Helsingin Sanomat 2002). The discussion became livelier in 2003 when Prime 
Minister Matti Vanhanen stated in a radio interview that Finland should intro-
duce a population policy.  One of  the most frequently quoted statements in the 
interview was, ‘Emme voi vain ukkontua ja akkaantua täällä’, which loosely 
translated means, ‘We [Finns] can’t turn into granddads and grannies just like 
that’ (Helsingin Sanomat 2003). Shortly afterwards Vanhanen re-iterated the 
need for an active population policy in a newspaper column, writing that such a 
policy should examine in depth the reasons for the low numbers of children. He 
also hinted that he would be proposing that this would be one of the main 
themes in the forthcoming Governmental report on the future. (Vanhanen 
2003)   
The Prime Minister’s demands for a population policy were not the 
only public statements in 2003 dealing with population issues and the declining 
birth rate. The first of the three policy documents I examine was published in 
2003.  EVA,  the  Finnish  Business  and  Policy  Forum,  published  its  population  
                                                             
23 The Committee for the Future is a Parliamentary committee concentrating on issues related to 
the future that could affect Finland in the long term.  
24 Helsingin Sanomat is by far the largest newspaper in Finland, and its influence on the Finnish 
media is significant. 
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report in early September, making a point of emphasising values and attitudes 
rather than financial incentives (EVA). The Family Federation published its 
Population Policy Programme, the second of my policy documents, in June 
2004. I examine this document in detail later, but Helsingin Sanomat reported 
its main message as being that Finns should have more children. In addition to 
addressing the usual questions to do with increasing the numbers of children, 
lowering  the  age  of  first  births  and  the  aging  population,  the  newspaper  also  
emphasised the need to increase the numbers of immigrants in order to ease the 
population problem. (Helsingin Sanomat 2004a, Helsingin Sanomat 2004b)  
The  year  2004  also  saw  the  publication  of  the  third  of  my  policy  
documents, the Governmental report on the future, which was published in No-
vember. Before its publication and the subsequent parliamentary discussion 
about it, Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen had paved the way by speaking and 
writing about population policy (e.g., Vanhanen 2004a, 2004b). When ‘Finland 
for people of all ages’ was published and was discussed in Parliament, Helsingin 
Sanomat pointed out that Matti Vanhanen was once again demanding a popula-
tion policy (Helsingin Sanomat 2004c). One editorial noted that the report was 
cautious in its social-policy proposals, but that it did bring up questions about 
immigration  and  the  situation  of  young  women  in  the  current  job  market  
(Helsingin Sanomat 2004d). 
The  documents  I  redescribe  were  published  in  the  years  2003-
2004. There has been some publicity and media coverage regarding the falling 
birth rate since then. For example, in 2005 Helsingin Sanomat published an 
article about young people’s willingness to have children in which a doctor 
working at the student health-care services suggested that young women dealing 
with conflicting expectations related to studying and their own biology were 
vulnerable to depression, and she urged students to have children earlier 
(Helsingin  Sanomat  2005).  Just  a  few  weeks  previously  there  had  been  a  col-
umn devoted to the birth rate, and a discussion in the Letters-to-the-Editor sec-
tion. The population and the birth rate also recurred as themes in a series of ar-
ticles published in Helsingin Sanomat in January 2007 under the general head-
line ‘Childless Finland?’  Examples of the articles include, ‘A lack of money de-
stroys dreams of a third child’ (Helsingin Sanomat 2007a) and ‘Researchers 
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demand  that  mothers  should  work,  as  well’  (Helsingin  Sanomat  2007b).  As  
these examples show, the birth rate and population policy was regularly under 
public discussion in the first decade of the 21st century in Finland, especially 
following the Prime Minister’s remarks in 2003.  
In the following sections of this chapter I examine more closely the 
three  reports  that  I  picked  out  from the  discussion  described  above.  Although 
these three policy documents are not meant to be representative of the entire 
discussion, in my view they cover relevant aspects of the Finnish population-
policy  discourse  of  the  21st century. Having been produced by three organisa-
tions with different interests  and points of  view, they provide various takes on 
the issues to be redescribed from the perspective of reproductive agency, and as 
such  are  also  indicative  of  the  more  general  issues  covered  in  the  discourse.  I  
examine the reports in their order of publication: the EVA Business and Policy 
Forum report published in 2003, The Population Policy Programme of the Fam-
ily  Federation  published  in  June  2004,  and  the  Government  report  on  the  fu-
ture published in November 2004. 
 
3.3 Policy document 1: Condemned to Diminish? – Finns and the 
Difficult Art of Procreation (EVA) 
‘Condemned to Diminish? – Finns and the Difficult Art of Procreation’ (in Fin-
nish  “Tuomitut vähenemään? – Suomalaiset ja lisääntymisen vaikea taito”) 
was commissioned by the Business and Policy Forum EVA. EVA is an acronym 
for  the  Finnish  name Elinkeinoelämän valtuuskunta, which loosely translated 
means Committee for Business Life. EVA describes itself on its website as ‘a pol-
icy and pro-market think-tank financed by the Finnish business community’ 
and  as  ‘a  discussion  forum  and  networking  arena  for  decision  makers  both  in  
business and society’. It publishes reports and policy proposals, among other 
things (EVA 2008). It is thus clearly an organisation that promotes business 
interests and favours market-based solutions. Its report on the population ques-
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tion, which was commissioned to Tapio Wallenius25,  was  published  in  2003.  
Pentti Vartia, the managing director of EVA at the time, notes in the introduc-
tion that the decreasing birth rate in Finland is a worrying phenomenon for the 
business world for many reasons (EVA, 3). Commissioned by a business-
friendly think-tank, the report examines the issues of demographics and popula-
tion  policies  specifically  in  terms  of  how  they  affect  business  life.  There  is  no  
detailed  explanation  of  how it  was  produced,  although the  influence  of  the  3+  
group, which promotes policies for families with more than three children, is 
acknowledged (ibid., 4) 
The report is divided into three chapters, entitled ‘Finns represent a 
shrinking and aging nation’, ‘Why don’t Finns have children?’ and ‘What can be 
done  to  raise  the  birth  rate?’  The  first  chapter  focuses  on  demographic  devel-
opments in Finland, restating the frequently heard arguments about the aging 
population and the ratio of working-age people to pensioners. In terms of prog-
noses, it is noted that predictions are very vague, and that researchers can only 
refer  to  probabilities  in  the  various  scenarios  of  population  development  they  
describe. Current prognoses are not necessarily any more accurate than earlier 
predictions (ibid., 9-11).  
The first chapter also covers the question of immigration and lon-
gevity in the light of the low birth rate, and notes that this cannot be considered 
a solution to the problem. It is acknowledged that Finland needs qualified peo-
ple who adapt quickly to Finnish society and working life, but in practice first-
generation  immigrants  cannot  be  expected  to  do  that.  It  is  also  acknowledged  
that even though people are living longer, no major changes are expected in the 
death rate26, and the important question regarding the size of the population is 
the birth rate27. (ibid., 9-13) The last section of the first chapter gives a brief his-
torical account of developments in Finnish fertility and the birth rate. The fertil-
ity rate dropped from nearly five children at the beginning of the 20th century to 
a low of 1.6 in the 1970s, rising slightly to 1.8 over the last three decades. Even 
                                                             
25 Tapio Wallenius worked in the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs specialising in environ-
mental policy, and as a consultant for various Finnish and international clients (Finnfund 2010). 
26 The death rate refers to the number of deaths in relation to the size of the population. Mortali-
ty  was  a  significant  factor  in  the  demographic  transition  in  Europe,  which  started  around the  
1870s. (Teitelbaum & Winter 1985, 5-17) 
27 The birth rate refers to the number of births in relation to the size of the population. 
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though this is not exceptionally low by international standards, it is clearly be-
low the replacement level28 of 2.1. Recent decades have also witnessed changes 
in the family structure in that there are more single parents and co-habiting 
couples, and more and more women are not having children at all. (ibid., 13-15) 
The focus in the second chapter of the report is on why Finnish 
people do not have more children. It gives five different explanations: ‘Support 
from society is inadequate’, ‘Women concentrate on work and a career’, ‘Work-
ing life does not leave time for children’, ‘Prolonged studies delay starting a fam-
ily’ and ‘Unbearable uncertainty prevails in the world of fixed-term contracts’. 
The  first  section  concerns  the  Finnish  national  policy  on  families.  Support  for  
families  was  reduced  during  the  1990s,  and  differences  in  family  income wid-
ened.  The  improvement  in  the  economic  situation  early  in  the  21st century re-
newed interest in increasing benefits for families. It was noted in the Govern-
ment family policy document, for example, that family benefits had deteriorated 
in comparison with other social benefits, and that there should be concrete ac-
tions to redress the balance.  The report  refers to Government promises to im-
prove benefits such as paid maternity and paternity leaves. (ibid., 17-20) 
The section dealing with how women’s education and participation 
in working life affect their having children also considers the changes in 
women’s lives that facilitate control over the number of children, such as effec-
tive contraception. In Finland women have been active in working life, yet the 
birth rate has remained at a relatively high level compared to many other coun-
tries.  One  reason  for  this  seems  to  be  the  day-care  arrangements,  which  allow 
women to engage in full-time work. It is also noted that gender equality does not 
extend to all areas of life, however, in that although women do work full time, 
they still do the majority of the housework. There is a brief reference to the role 
of fathers and the fact that far from all men exercise their legal right to paternity 
and parental leave. (ibid., 20-22) 
                                                             
28 Replacement-level fertility refers to the level of fertility in a generation of women that is ‘ex-
actly sufficient to replace itself with a new generation of women equal in size, taking account of 
the mortality expected under prevailing mortality conditions. … In low-mortality societies [such 
as Finland], replacement fertility requires approximately 2.1 children per woman’. (Teitelbaum 
& Winter 1985, 6) 
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There is also reference to how working life restricts the numbers of 
children women have. Specifically, the demands of current job markets seem to 
be  in  conflict  with  raising  children;  it  is  difficult  to  combine  family  and  work  
interests, jobs are insecure and fixed-term, and the general economic situation 
and unemployment worry people. It is also suggested that people may seek rea-
sons other than their own choice for not having children, and working life may 
constitute such a reason. (ibid., 23) The prolonged studying time at university is 
specific to Finland. Consequently, when students graduate they are usually con-
siderably older than their counterparts in many other countries, and given that 
people often prefer to graduate and have a stable job before starting a family, 
having children is postponed. (ibid., 24) 
There  are  various  reasons  for  long  study  times.  Student  organisa-
tions blame the quality of teaching (ibid.). Financing one’s studies is also often 
considered to have an effect. Higher-education institutions do not charge Fin-
nish  students  tuition  fees,  and  there  is  a  public  support  system  entitling  stu-
dents to study grants and housing benefits. The EVA report refers to demands 
that the grant system should allow full-time studying (Finnish students often 
have paid employment at the same time as they are studying), and there is also 
support for entirely loan-based financing, which is assumed to offer a higher 
incentive to graduate (ibid., 24). The final section of the second chapter is also 
related to working life. It brings up the problem of short-term fixed contracts for 
young women, which create many kinds of uncertainties and is also thought to 
affect having children. A lack of stability at the beginning of working life, which 
is also usually the time to start a family, fosters economic insecurity. A history of 
short-term and irregular work also affects the benefits, including the amount of 
maternity benefit.  (ibid., 26-27) 
Following its analysis of the background factors affecting the birth 
rate in Finland, the final chapter of the EVA report focuses on finding ways to 
improve  the  situation.  Analysis  of  the  relationship  between  the  birth  rate  and  
Government benefits and policies, income and other economic factors gives no 
simple or straightforward explanation. Devising measures that would affect the 
birth rate is thus not a simple task, and is further complicated by the splintering 
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of the target group: families, women and fathers29 change and become more 
heterogeneous. Family differentiation is one factor that makes it more difficult 
to formulate effective family policies. Women seem to form two distinct groups: 
those who have children and those who are active participants in the work force. 
The first three sub-sections in the final chapter are entitled, ‘The target group 
splinters’, ‘Current family policies are not a solution to the problem of the birth 
rate’  and  ‘Values  are  behind  everything’,  and  the  fourth  is  a  conclusion.  (ibid.,  
28-31) 
The report clearly states that EVA does not consider the current 
family policies an effective solution to the problem of  the birth rate.  It  further 
questions how, if the mechanisms through which family policies operate are not 
known, it is possible to effectively direct the policies. More than anything, it 
seems that values have the strongest influence: current Finnish values do not 
support having children or consider children valuable in themselves. Parental 
goals play a crucial role in decisions related to starting a family and facing the 
related risks: the more having children is considered in terms of economic secu-
rity and readiness, the greater is the uncertainty experienced by prospective 
parents. The report concludes that there are various explanations for the low 
birth rate, but in the end, individuals’ life-style decisions affect the decision to 
have children and the state cannot be responsible for changing an individual 
citizen’s values. The report ends with a brief section advising business organisa-
tions  and  trade  unions  of  their  responsibilities  in  helping  to  raise  the  Finnish  
birth rate. (ibid., 28-38)  
 
3.4 Policy document 2: The Population Policy Programme of the 
Family Federation of Finland (FF) 
The Family Federation, which is called Väestöliitto (the Population Federation) 
in Finnish, is a non-governmental organisation that was established in 1941 be-
cause of worries about the low birth rate and the poor conditions in which fami-
                                                             




lies with children were living. Initially it had close connections to the Govern-
ment, and until the 1970s held a semi-official position with regard to family and 
population policies in Finland. It had a central role in the formation of policies 
related to contraception and abortion counselling, and sterilisation until 1972, 
for example, when all these functions transferred to public clinics under the new 
health-care law. (Auvinen 1991, 234)  
The Family Federation comprises its member organisations, of 
which there are currently 32, including family, youth and student bodies, medi-
cal associations and trade unions (Väestöliitto 2010c). The main sources of in-
come in 2009 were RAY30 with 45 per cent, earnings from the Federation’s own 
operations31 (29%), and the state (13%) (Väestöliitto 2010b, 36). The Family 
Federation ‘takes the initiative to reform legislation, carries out social and medi-
cal research, and gives counselling on family affairs, family planning, hereditary 
diseases, and infertility’; it also ‘publishes material on human relationships and 
sexual health, and offers consultative aid and education to professionals in the 
respective fields’. With regard to family, housing and population policy, it ‘takes 
the initiative to reform legislation and gives statements on family matters and 
population trends’. Its stated aim is to ensure that Finnish decision makers take 
into account the ageing population and the perspective of families with children, 
and  its  mission  is  ‘to  produce  and  disseminate  information  about  the  signifi-
cance of the population’s size and structure’. (Väestöliitto 2004b, 2-3) The Fam-
ily Federation has a clear task to promote the growth of the Finnish population 
and the conditions of Finnish families. 
The Family Federation’s Population Policy Programme is more ex-
tensive than the report commissioned by EVA, and it also includes clear policy 
proposals. The Federation started to publish its programmes in 1975 and the 
immediate predecessor of the one under investigation appeared in 1998. A spe-
cial group at the Family Federation is responsible for producing the pro-
grammes. The Federation also set up a working group on population policy in 
                                                             
30 RAY, in Finnish Raha-automaattiyhdistys (Finland’s Slot Machine Association), raises funds 
through gaming operations to support Finnish health and welfare organisations.  It  has the ex-
clusive  right  in  Finland to  operate  slot  machines  and casino  table  games,  and to  run a  casino  
(RAY 2010). 
31 The  Family  Federation  provides  childcare  and fertility  services,  for  example,  and has  clinics  
advising on sexual health. 
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2003,  which  includes  experts  from various  fields  and  organisations  concerned  
with demographics, statistics, immigration and economics, among other things. 
Consequently,  there  are  several  experts  on  hand  when  the  programmes  are  
compiled.   
The current Population Policy Programme, published in 2004, has 
seven main chapters. The aim, which is to produce concrete choices for popula-
tion policy, is stated in the introductory chapter, and it takes both a long-term 
(to  the  year  2040)  and  a  short-term  (to  the  year  2015)  view.  It  is  noteworthy  
that it voices awareness of criticism of the notion of population policies, and 
attempts to dispel any doubts about its intentions in stating that although there 
are negative connotations, it is possible to have a dispassionate discussion about 
the different factors affecting the population, such as the birth rate, ageing and 
migration (FF, 7-8). The second chapter discusses different definitions of popu-
lation policy, and generally narrows it down to matters concerning the birth rate 
and migration in the context of public policies. (ibid., 9) 
The third chapter tracks the demographic changes in Finland in 
2000-2040. The first section deals with growth. The Finnish population has 
increased slowly, and according to the latest data will continue to grow until the 
2020s, starting to decrease from 2024 onwards. It is probable that the birth rate 
will remain stable in the near future, whereas migration may fluctuate rather 
strongly. (ibid., 11) The second section concerns the age structure, and re-
iterates the frequently heard notion of an ageing population: by 2020, 23 per 
cent of Finnish people will be over 65 (ibid., 12). The third section is devoted to 
the birth rate and family creation. Finland has a relatively high birth rate com-
pared with many other European countries, although people are delaying start-
ing a family for longer and longer, even if it is in their minds to do so. Section 
four is about immigration. Finland has low numbers of immigrants, and the net 
migration  level  is  one  of  the  lowest  in  the  European  Union.  The  fifth  section  
traces the regional or geographic developments in population trends: the major 
regional differences and uneven development may cause problems to accumu-
late in certain areas (ibid., 13-17).  
Section  six  is  the  most  extensive  in  the  third  chapter,  and  it  com-
prises several sub-sections. The overall theme is the development of the Finnish 
75 
 
population in 2000-2040, based on alternative calculations. It describes three 
different fertility scenarios - lower fertility, heightened fertility and replace-
ment-level fertility – and two scenarios related to migration: negative net mi-
gration  (i.e.  more  people  moving  out  of  Finland  than  moving  in)  and  positive  
net migration. These basic alternative scenarios are then considered from three 
developmental  perspectives:  population  size,  changes  in  the  work  force  and  
trends in the age structure. The predicted size of the Finnish population in 2040 
varies between 4.2 and 6.2 million depending on the scenario. Regardless of the 
scenario  however,  the  size  of  the  work  force  will  diminish  and  the  aging-
population trend will continue: the predicted proportion of people over the age 
of 65 in 2040 varies between 32 and 24 per cent.  (ibid., 17-23) 
Chapter four lists the population-policy goals of the Family Federa-
tion, which are based on the scenario of balanced development, meaning that 
the current population of 5.2 million will be maintained until 2040. With regard 
to the birth rate, the fertility goal is 1.9 children against the current 1.7, the aim 
being to lower the age at which women have their first child from 28 to 26, and 
more fertility and adoption services are suggested. As far as immigration is con-
cerned, the goal is positive net migration, about 7,000 people annually. (ibid., 
24-25) 
The fifth chapter, entitled ‘Means of implementing the population 
policy’ comprises the bulk of the programme, and analyses reasons for the low 
birth  rate,  the  means  of  raising  it  and  the  issue  of  immigration.  The  low birth  
rate has been attributed to European values and changes in the economy and 
working life, for example. The most fundamental change has been the transition 
from a collective, family-centred and duty-based society to a society that em-
phasises individual rights, which has also had an effect on women’s rights. The 
question of what influences the birth rate is rather complex, however (ibid., 26-
29). The Family Federation does maintain that without an active population 
policy the Finnish birth rate will start to decrease after 2020.  
The first measures advocated to raise the birth rate are to bring 
about changes in values and attitudes. It seems that people in general have 
child-friendly attitudes and value children, but these values are not reflected in 
the political decision-making. The Family Federation emphasises the need to 
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take more account of people’s feelings in this regard. (ibid., 29-31) Secondly, 
measures should be taken to help childless people to have children. This also 
relates to changing values, and includes offering fertility and other medical ser-
vices, making international adoptions easier, and improving wellbeing in rela-
tionships. (ibid., 32-33) The third set of measures relate to timing, and include 
lowering the average age of bearing children by two years, making it easier for 
women to have children while they are studying, improving housing policies and 
raising the minimum maternity benefit (ibid., 33-34). Fourthly and finally, there 
should be measures supporting families with many children in order to increase 
the proportion of families with more than three children. Such measures include 
lowering the cost  of  day care,  helping mothers to return to working life  after  a  
long  period  at  home,  and  raising  benefits  for  those  taking  care  of  children  at  
home. (ibid., 35-36) 
The Family Federation assigns a key role to immigration in popula-
tion policy. According to the report, Finnish population growth will be based 
entirely on immigration by 2015 (ibid., 36). Managed immigration should focus 
mainly on labour migration, the aim being to achieve the same levels of em-
ployment among immigrants and natives (ibid., 38-39). The numbers of Finns 
emigrating is low at the moment, but the aim still should be to improve the con-
ditions of those on short-term fixed contracts, because the improvement consti-
tutes a disincentive in terms of moving abroad (ibid., 39). Finland has been 
lacking a proper immigration policy, and active measures are needed. There has 
been no systematic integration policy for immigrants either, and there should be 
more resources and open-minded programmes. (ibid., 38-42) 
The  sixth  chapter  of  the  Population  Policy  Program  describes  
demographic  scenarios  until  the  year  2040.  Scenario  A  is  ‘aging  Finnish  
Finland’, with no active population policy and a fertility level of 1.5. The popula-
tion would number 4-4.5 million, and a third would be over the age of 65. Most 
people would be concentrated in large urban areas. (ibid., 43-44) Scenario B is 
Finland with balanced population development and an active population policy. 
The fertility rate will rise to 1.9-2 and about a quarter of people will be aged over 
65.  There  will  be  an  increase  in  the  numbers  of  immigrants,  from the  current  
110,000 to between 300,000 and 400,000. (ibid., 46-47) 
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The seventh and final chapter of the report summarises the pro-
gramme and the  proposed  actions.  There  has  been  a  change  in  the  discussion  
related to population policy since the publication of the previous programme in 
1998. It is now clearly recognised that the baby-boom generations born after the 
Second World War are becoming pensioners and there will be a shortage of la-
bour, and that family questions have become a matter of political rhetoric. In 
conclusion, it is suggested that there are measures that can be taken to combat 
the  decline  in  population  levels  provided  that  there  is  the  will  to  do  so.  (ibid.,  
50) 
 
3.5 Policy document 3: Finland for people of all ages: Government 
report on the future: demographic trends, population policy, and 
preparation for changes in the age structure (GOV) 
Each Government issues a report on the future, in which it examines an issue it 
considers important for Finland from a broad perspective and in the longer 
term than just one parliamentary season. Matti Vanhanen’s first Government 
decided to concentrate on demographic issues in its 2004 report, which was 
published in both Finnish and English. I have taken the English version as my 
main source in this work. I also peruse the Finnish version in my redescription 
of the text, and if needed note relevant questions related to the translation. The 
English version includes English summaries of the supplementary expert re-
ports32 and the abstracts of commissioned papers related to the preparing of the 
report, which were written in Finnish but are not examined in this study. Both 
the expert reports and a series of seminars with experts from various fields con-
tributed to the preparatory work.  
The GOV report comprises 13 chapters in total. The first chapter 
gives the background: preparation for demographic change is of great relevance 
for the future of Finland, and the purpose of the report is to give a comprehen-
                                                             
32 The  expert  reports  are  called:  ‘Changes  in  the  population  age  structure  and  preparing  for  
them’, ‘Regional demographic trends and policy reform needs’, ‘Influencing demographic trends 
– should the birth rate and immigration be increased’, ‘Economic growth and public finances in 
the context of an aging population’ and ‘Aging as a resource’. (GOV) 
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sive and target-based evaluation of the situation. (GOV, 9-10) The second chap-
ter, entitled ‘Preparing for demographic trends is a key issue for the future’, con-
tinues on the same theme. It is noted that Europe is the only continent in which 
the population is declining, and according to Statistics Finland, the Finnish pub-
lic statistical authority, Finland’s aging population will start edging downwards 
in numbers before 2030. (ibid., 11-12) The report also sets out some necessary 
policy premises and values, including inter-generational solidarity and avoiding 
narrowing the range of choices for future generations. (ibid., 13-14) 
The theme in the third chapter is common to all of the selected 
population reports: demographic trends. The GOV report first considers global 
trends. Population growth has been relatively constant in Finland, and the 
country has had one of the highest birth rates in Europe, although it is still be-
low the replacement level. (ibid., 14-16) Culturally Finland is a homogenous 
country,  although  immigration  has  increased  since  1990.  Changes  in  the  age  
structure have been mainly attributable to mortality and birth trends. (ibid., 17-
18) It is impossible to forecast population trends accurately given that projec-
tions  are  based  on  actual  outcomes,  and  the  choice  of  assumption  affects  the  
results.  However,  it  can  be  said  that  the  number  of  people  of  working  age  in  
Finland is declining quickly, and this causes a higher level of old-age depend-
ency. Moreover, demographic trends vary regionally: growth is slow in the ma-
jor cities, areas close to the major cities are experiencing the fastest growth, and 
rural regions are experiencing depopulation. (ibid., 19-24) 
The fourth chapter focuses on the consequences of the demographic 
trends, first listing the challenges and opportunities and then examining them 
more closely. In particular, the fact that the workforce will be smaller and older 
will require adaptation. Lower levels of unemployment are predicted, but there 
will still be structural imbalances in labour supply and demand. The predicted 
changes in working life and social activities will require investment in occupa-
tional well-being, and a less dynamic but more experienced workforce. (ibid., 
26-28) The third age, in other words the new, long phase of life between work-
ing  age  and  old  age,  is  bringing  new  challenges,  not  the  least  of  which  is  the  
weaker potential for economic growth due to the ageing and shrinking popula-
tion. Connected to this is the strain on public finances on account of the dimin-
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ishing tax base and rising pension costs, although there are potential savings in 
the education sector, for example. According to the baseline scenario, public 
finances will fall into deficit between 2020 and 2030, which will require higher 
levels of employment and productivity. (ibid., 28-32) Furthermore, despite the 
creation of new jobs, the viability of many regions may be in jeopardy. In con-
clusion, it is suggested that the greatest challenge will lie in securing and financ-
ing services due to the growing numbers of older people. (ibid., 32-34) 
The fifth chapter, entitled ‘Government conclusions on develop-
ment’, presents the Government’s policy proposals. The first section describes 
the policies that are already in place, many of which take account of the ageing 
population, and the second section analyses the current provisions in terms of 
adequacy. It is acknowledged that there has been Governmental action, but it 
has concentrated on cost estimations, and preparatory measures that vary by 
sector and are short-term. There is not enough emphasis on the opportunities 
arising from the change in the age structure, although it is admitted that the 
projections are uncertain. (ibid., 35-38) As stated in the third section, ‘prepara-
tions for the change in the age structure must be coordinated, broad-based, and 
sustainable in the long-term’ (ibid., 38). There is a need for a population policy 
that addresses the demographic development, and there should be open discus-
sion about influencing demographic trends. There should also be investments in 
health and functional ability. Particular attention should be paid to children and 
young  people  given  that  investing  in  them is  an  investment  in  the  future.  An-
other  focus  area  is  labour  productivity  and  increasing  employment  levels,  and  
the need to reform social-security provisions and their financing. Furthermore, 
it is crucial to maintain balanced regional development and services. Finally, 
elderly people should be seen as a resource, and ageing as an asset. There has 
not been enough emphasis on the positive aspects of the demographic develop-
ments, such as the opportunity to reform the public sector and shift priorities, 
and  the  qualitative  consequences  of  having  a  more  active,  healthy  and  skilled  
body of elderly people who constitute a human resource. (ibid., 38-44) 
The sixth chapter calls for policy measures. It is necessary to in-
crease immigration levels in order to secure a balanced population structure and 
a sufficiently high birth rate. Increasing the population is not the primary objec-
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tive  –  it  is  more  a  question  of  the  age  structure  –  but  if  the  policy  is  imple-
mented it will also have that effect. (ibid., 45) The first step is to create favour-
able conditions for having more children. Measures promoting a higher birth 
rate might include lowering the age at which women have children, reducing the 
amount of atypical employment (short-term, fixed contracts), encouraging the 
reconciliation of work and family life, alleviating housing and subsistence diffi-
culties for families with children, and ensuring reproductive health. In addition, 
the Government proposes increasing the levels of work-related immigration and 
making it easier for foreign students who study in Finland to enter the Finnish 
labour market after graduation. (ibid., 46-50) 
The focus in the seventh chapter is on promoting health and func-
tional ability. Given the increase in life expectancy, measures should be taken to 
enable people of all ages to lead a happy and fulfilling life, specifically with re-
gard to the maintenance of health and functional capabilities. The state should 
be prepared for an increased need for services for the elderly living at home, for 
example, and for preventive services. (ibid., 51-54) The eighth chapter concen-
trates on care for children and the young. Recommended measures include 
monitoring income development in families with children, preventing poverty 
and social exclusion, and promoting health and cognitive development. It is also 
important to guarantee education, training or traineeship for young people, and 
to maintain a regional balance of education opportunities. (ibid., 55-56)  
Chapter nine considers ways of strengthening the potential for eco-
nomic growth, which is seen as one of the greatest challenges arising from 
demographic change. The first section concerns unemployment and ways of re-
ducing it, especially in terms of structure. The Government is also committed to 
increasing professional and regional mobility, and to shortening study times. 
(ibid., 57-59) The focus in the second section is on the goal of reinforcing genu-
ine competitiveness and productivity. There is a particular need to increase pro-
ductivity in the service sector, and one way is to strengthen know-how. There is 
also  a  need  to  support  research  and  development  and  innovation,  and  to  pro-
mote good management practices. (ibid., 60-61) 
Chapter ten, entitled ‘Reform of benefit schemes’, offers suggestions 
in terms of re-thinking the different social-security arrangements in Finland. 
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One of the starting points is the need to promote employment in all age groups, 
referring to work opportunities for older people, and also to accelerating studies 
and easing entry into working life among the young. As stated in the first sec-
tion, ‘benefit schemes must be assessed from the point of view of labour input 
and increased flexibility’ (ibid., 63). Finland has shorter working-life expectancy 
but a higher number of annual working hours per employed person than the 
other Nordic countries: employed people work relatively hard and full-time. 
There is  a  need to make employment models more flexible so that  that  people 
will find it easier to combine family life, studying and training with employ-
ment. Reforms should cover the benefit system, taxation and services. (ibid., 62-
64) The focus in the second section is on early-retirement schemes. Older peo-
ple should be encouraged to stay in employment, and this requires improve-
ments in occupational wellbeing and working conditions. Section three refers to 
the need to assess the effects of the reform in the pension system, and to ensure 
the financial sustainability and fairness of the earnings-related pension scheme. 
Other social-security reforms are considered in the final section of the chapter. 
Action should be taken to prevent unemployment from becoming long-term, 
and to find new ways of funding unemployment benefits. There is also a need 
for the reform of services for the elderly. (ibid., 64-67) 
Chapter eleven discusses regional development and the need to 
safeguard  basic  public  services.  The  developmental  aim  is  to  create  a  multi-
centred regional structure based on a competitive metropolitan area and a net-
work of regional centres. This will ensure regional competitiveness and the bal-
anced development of the infrastructure. (ibid., 68-70) In terms of the availabil-
ity of services, the municipalities face many challenges. For example, change in 
the population structure increases spending and the need for staff to supply the 
services. The aim of the reform in municipal financing and transfers from cen-
tral to local government is to ensure the accessibility of statutory services. At-
tention should be paid to older people’s ability to utilise information and com-
munications  technologies.  Moreover,  there  will  have  to  be  new forms  of  coop-
eration on the inter-municipal and sub-regional levels. (ibid. 70-74) 
Chapter twelve considers ways of supporting older people and util-
ising the resources they represent. One policy would be to encourage the elderly 
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to participate actively in various areas of society, and to make it easier for them. 
This would mean, for example, giving active people of retirement age more op-
portunities to continue in productive or working life if they so wish. More active 
participation means that demands for personal health and recreational services 
are likely to increase. The report reiterates that older people are an important 
resource for the whole of society. (ibid., 75-77) The final chapter follows up the 
preparations for the demographic change. Given that changes are difficult to 
foresee, preparations must be regularly reassessed. Inter-sectoral cooperation 
would facilitate more systematic follow-up. (ibid., 78-79) 
As the above descriptions of the three selected policy documents 
show, there are several common themes. There are also differences in how the 
texts deal with the population question and the need for population policies, 
however.  I  concentrate  on  three  specific  themes  in  the  following  descriptions  
and redescriptions of the documents, the family, economics and gender. The 
redescription is done from the perspective of reproductive agency developed in 
the first chapter. Descriptions of the documents using the concepts used in the 
texts  do  not  necessarily  reveal  the  values  and  logics  that  support  the  concepts  
and the vocabularies, making the policy proposals and their principles seem 
natural and without options. The following redescriptions illuminate the con-





 4 Thematic description and redescription I: the 
family 
4.1 Introduction 
The first theme I describe and redescribe is one of the focal subjects in the 
population policy documents: the concept of the family, which is very prominent 
in the discussion on reproduction and the birth rate. The family could be seen as 
one  of  the  organising  principles,  a  kind  of  social  imaginary  that  structures  the  
discourses on population policies and fertility in the documents. It features par-
ticularly strongly in the parts of the texts in which measures aimed at affecting 
the birth rate are directly discussed, and when concrete policy proposals are 
made. As one of the formative concepts in the debate, it offers a perspective that 
gives the different policy proposals their intelligibility, presupposing the auto-
matic self-evident nature of the family. It is assumed that everyone knows what 
is meant by it, and that the meanings connected to it are widely shared. It is also 
used in a way that unquestionably makes it the primary unit in matters to do 
with having children. It could be referred to as a self-evident theme in the policy 
documents  in  that  they  deal  with  demographic  problems,  but  one  should  not  
assume that there is a ‘natural’ connection between the family, and demograph-
ics and the population debate. The way the concept of the family is used reveals 
something about the rationale behind the policy proposals. 
The three selected policy documents primarily portray the family as 
a heterosexual couple with children, and the proposals are largely based on this 
idea. The heterosexual, monogamous family is the unit through which the poli-
tics and policies of increasing the birth rate are articulated. This is, however, a 
very limited conception, which is evident if it is considered from the perspective 
of reproductive agency and the imaginary domain. If the idea of the imaginary 
domain is to be taken seriously, the notions of the family in the documents af-
fect freedom in terms of reproductive agency.  
By  way  of  introduction  to  the  thematic  description  and  redescrip-
tion in this chapter, I take a closer look at Drucilla Cornell’s re-thinking of fam-
84 
 
ily law and the ways in which it connects to my notion of reproductive agency. I 
base my examination on a close scrutiny of Cornell’s theorising, which provides 
a  framework  for  my  redescription.  I  also  briefly  discuss  the  application  of  her  
thinking to the Finnish legal system, and how some of her concepts can be seen 
in the Finnish context. I then move on to describing the notion of the family in 
the documents. All the texts use the word ‘family’ (perhe in Finnish). There are 
many commonalities in the usage, such as children making the family, hetero-
sexuality, an emphasis on the couple relationship, and the central place of the 
family in the discussion on population growth. There are also differences in 
conception,  however.  The  GOV  report  refers  to  the  family  as  a  single,  opaque  
unit and does not dissect it in detail, whereas the EVA report and the FF Popula-
tion Policy Programme consider it in more varied ways, and as multifaceted.  
After the description I redescribe the documents through the notion 
of reproductive agency and examine the themes that emerge from my re-
reading.  I  discuss  the  opaqueness  of  the  concept  of  the  family,  which  is  prob-
lematic from the perspective of reproductive agency in terms of the failure to 
acknowledge personal imaginaries. I also analyse the definitions of the family in 
the  texts  and  the  way  they  are  ruptured  in  some  of  them.  The  definitions  are  
significant in the context of reproductive agency in that they provide substance 
for thinking and re-thinking conceptions of  the family.  Finally  in the chapter I  
consider notions of kinship in the texts, and their relationship with the concept 
of reproductive agency. In conclusion, I synthesise the redesrciptions and con-
sider the difficulties in re-thinking the family institution. The redescriptions 
show that none of the texts create productive discourses and an environment for 
reproductive agency with regard to the family in a way that is consistent with 
notion of the imaginary domain. 
 
4.2 Expansion of the redescriptive tool: the family and the imaginary 
domain 
Drucilla Cornell’s thought exemplifies how the family can be rethought based on 
the notion of the imaginary domain, and offers new insights into the concept of 
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reproductive agency. The following quotation restates some basic premises of 
the imaginary domain: 
 
The  imaginary  domain  gives  to  women,  as  well  as  to  men,  the  
chance to become a person, to interiorize and cohere the identifica-
tions that make us who we are into a self. (Cornell 1998, 100) 
 
Respect for the imaginary domain and for people’s ability to cohere 
into a self is thus a goal towards which societies should strive, although Cornell 
is aware that the goals can never be achieved. With regard to women’s position 
in society, despite the positive changes in status regarding the family and its 
relationship with the state, women are still differently positioned compared to 
men. Cornell bases her thinking on women and the family partly on Hegel. Joan 
B.  Landes  has  also  written  about  Hegel  and  his  conception  of  the  family,  and  
this sheds light on Cornell’s interpretation. In Landes’ view, Hegel considers the 
modern family to be an ethical root of the state as within it individuals first 
learn to orient their activities toward the whole. A family member is simultane-
ously  a  member  of  civil  society  and  the  state,  so  a  full  individual  is  a  family  
member,  a  member of  civil  society and a citizen at  the same time.  An individ-
ual’s consciousness of himself as a moral agent is a product of social experi-
ences, which happen both inside and outside the family, and the family provides 
a material and ethical base for individuality. (Landes 1982, 125-136)  
Women and men are differently positioned, and their roles with re-
gard to the state and civil society are different. According to Cornell, Hegel sees 
the woman as bound by her duties in the family. Her obligation is to serve man’s 
needs. The family is a natural organisation and women can participate in the 
ethical life of society – which includes family life and organisations of civil soci-
ety such as corporations, unions and other associations – because of their cen-
tral  role in the family.  Men, in contrast,  exercise their  subjectivity both as citi-
zens and as members of civil society because their ‘natural’ side is taken care of 
in the family. A woman’s true nature is to be duty bound to the family, and this 
obligation also means that the state owes allegiance to women only in their role 




As Joan B. Landes writes:  
 
Only woman is singularly destined to experience the passive stance 
in  love,  to  both  lose  and  achieve  her  individuality  in  and  through  
another person, the man; while he, according to his separate na-
ture, is allowed to transcend mere loving in order to participate in 
the “substantive life in the state, in learning … and in labour”. … In 
Hegel’s  view,  man and  woman belong  to  separate  spheres.  This  is  
the  result  of  their  different  natures.  Woman  is  destined  to  be  a  
mother and a wife. Her sexuality is appropriated by the male in 
marriage. (Landes 1982, 138) 
 
Cornell notes that she, as a feminist, obviously disagrees with 
Hegel’s contention and continues: 
 
But his description of how a woman’s legal identity is intertwined 
with her duties to the family, and not in her entitlement as a person, 
remains a powerful explanation, in spite of his own intent to justify 
it, of why it has been so difficult to adequately challenge family law. 
(Cornell 1998, 101) 
 
Although things have changed since Hegel’s time, Cornell does not 
believe that as far as women are concerned the changes adequately challenge 
what she calls patriarchy. She has her own definition of patriarchy, which she 
says ‘indicates the manner in which a woman’s legal identity remains bound up 
with her duties to the state as wife and mother within the traditional heterosex-
ual  family’  (ibid.,  101-102).  In  her  view,  the  legal  system  does  not  consider  
women to be fully persons, and in many cases a woman’s legal status is under-
stood through her role as a mother and a wife. This connection has historically 
made women dependent on men in various ways from employment to sexuality, 
and conceiving of women as mothers and wives connects them to men in a sub-
ordinate way. Cornell’s argumentation is that from the perspective of the law 
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and the state, a woman’s standing in the public sphere is based only on her role 
in the family, hence her right to freely form her own personality is not acknowl-
edged in that she is assigned the role of a mother and a wife. Complementarily, 
men are assigned the specific role of head of the household and a participant in 
public  life.  Thus,  although  men  are  freer  than  women  in  many  respects,  their  
imaginary domains are also restricted through being forced into certain roles. 
Assigning gendered duties in relation to the state presupposes a 
specific family model, that of heterosexual, monogamous marriage. Rethinking 
women’s  position  with  regard  to  the  state  and  state-imposed  duties  requires  
rethinking the family. Cornell notes that women ‘cannot demand release from a 
legal identity that defines and limits what it means to be a woman through state-
imposed duties without challenging the legal institution of the monogamous 
heterosexual family’ (ibid., 102). The feminist demand for women to be able to 
form their personality freely also means that the heterosexual family that is en-
forced through law must be questioned. Feminist rethinking of the family gives 
more freedom also to men in forming their personality and re-thinking the 
meanings and representations of fatherhood. 
The question of legal personhood and of differences between per-
sons has been less prominent in the Finnish legal system than in common-law 
countries due to the strong ideology of equality and cultural homogeneity. The 
issue of legal identity has recently assumed more significance, however, on ac-
count of the increasingly international legal environment and the weakening of 
the welfare state, for example. When Finland’s modern legal system was created 
in the 19th century, the legal person was primarily a Lutheran male land-owning 
farmer or a member of the gentry who operated in the public domain. As else-
where, the family was a domain in which neither equality nor freedom of con-
tract was applied. (Pylkkänen 2007, 150-152)  
The removal of most of the formal legal gender inequalities from 
the Finnish law in the first part of the 20th century, in laws on suffrage, marriage 
and qualification for public office for example, simultaneously strengthened the 
position of the middle-class nuclear family. Women as independent legal sub-
jects were given rights, but at the same time the division between the public and 
the private was reinforced. Many of the factors related to the idea of the nuclear 
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family started to change in the 1960s, and the building of the welfare state led to 
reforms in social rights and social citizenship in particular. Working life and 
economics became the basis of legal personhood. In recent decades Finland’s 
membership of the European Union has strengthened individual rights and the 
liberal understanding of personhood, in other words individual freedom and 
autonomy have become more dominant. Nevertheless, a certain emphasis on 
the welfare state is built into the Finnish legal system. According to Anu Pylk-
känen,  as  a  result  of  this  strengthening  of  the  liberal  framework,  and  the  dis-
mantling of the welfare state that has been happening in the early 21st Century, 
legal personhood is becoming more deeply gendered. (ibid., 150-157, 159) 
Cornell’s observation that women’s legal status has been under-
stood through the family and the role of the mother is also relevant in the Fin-
nish context. As Anu Pylkkänen notes, women’s legal personhood has been 
largely constructed in a way that emphasises social utility and community: the 
regulation of and discussion about the family, sexuality and reproduction in 
particular reflect how corporality and sexuality enter the legal sphere (ibid., 
159).  The  regulation  of  the  family  and  reproduction,  be  it  through  the  legal  or  
political system, or social policy, is not free from gendered constructions in 
Finland, meaning that women’s and men’s positions in the family are perceived 
as different. In this respect, Cornell’s point about the gendered nature of 
women’s legal position is relevant in the Finnish context. Demands related to 
the imaginary domain and the freedom to form one’s personality are related to 
the gendered constructions of the Finnish legal, social and political personhood. 
Cornell draws on the ideal of the imaginary domain in formulating 
a concrete programme for the reform of family law, which I examine briefly be-
low. The proposals, which should not be viewed as fixed propositions, offer 
some ideas for bringing about a change in thinking with regard to an apparently 
natural institution such as the family. They are also directly connected to state 
regulation, in other words they are not meant to reflect general ideas about the 
family as a social institution, or to examine how the care of children is arranged 
in  practice  or  how the  division  of  labour  is  worked  out.  The  idea  is  to  suggest  
reforms of concrete laws that regulate family life.  
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Cornell starts her discussion from the premise that family regula-
tion should protect all lovers who choose to enter into a civil marriage33 or some 
other form of domestic partnership, which means that the privilege of hetero-
sexual relationships should be removed. Her point is that the state should not 
define what is considered the good family. She recognises that children need a 
stable, lasting relationship, but sees no reason to prioritise heterosexual, mo-
nogamous marriage: all lovers should be able to contract a civil marriage if they 
so choose. Moreover, the government should have no legitimate interest in mo-
nogamy. (Cornell 1998, 123-125) People should be as free as possible to arrange 
their intimate relationships. In privileging the marriage of a man and a woman 
who have a sexual relationship the state is defining what a proper family should 
be like.  
Cornell’s  second  point  is  that  the  government  should  provide  a  
structure for custodial responsibility for children, which should not to be linked 
to the sexual relationship.  
 
To achieve the needed stability for children, the assumption of cus-
todial responsibility would carry with it all that it does now – finan-
cial  support,  limits  on  movement,  and  so  forth.  Parents  would  be  
legally established at the same time they assumed custodial respon-
sibility; each child would have a legally recognized family. … Custo-
dial responsibility would remain for life; legal responsibility to cus-
todial children would continue regardless of the sexual lives of the 
members of the custodial partnership or team. (ibid., 125)  
 
Every child would have a legally recognised family, which would not necessarily 
coincide with the traditional Western or Anglo-American notion; it would be 
                                                             
33 In her talk about marriage in connection with the regulation of the family, Cornell is following 
the American understanding of the family in terms of marriage. As Martha Albertson Fineman 
notes in her writing on the current American family and the political rhetoric about social pol-
icy: ‘Marriage is considered central to the concept of the family, and the family is perceived of as 
the  foundation  of  society’  (Fineman 2004,  xvii).  I  am grateful  to  Jaana  Vuori  for  pointing  out  
the difference between the American view of the family as marriage and the Finnish or Nordic 
idea that the children constitute the family. It should be noted, however, that race and ethnicity 
play a role here, and for example African-American notions about the connections between mar-
riage, family and kinship are different (see e.g. Butler 2004, 103). 
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possible to create a team of carers, for example. Under Cornell’s proposition 
that the custodial relationship would remain for life, it could be terminated only 
in exceptional circumstances (in the case of sexual or physical abuse, for in-
stance). (ibid., 125-127) 
Thirdly, Cornell refers to the ‘equitable distribution of the burdens 
of reproduction and the equal protection of the health of young children’, mean-
ing the provision of healthcare for children and income maintenance for fami-
lies in the form of publicly funded childcare as a parental entitlement (ibid., 
128). The demand for publicly funded services is based on the idea that material 
conditions have significant effects on the ability to develop as a person. Without 
services such as childcare, people may be forced to make choices they would not 
make if their material conditions were different. Publicly funded childcare is an 
example of a material condition that facilitates the combination of motherhood 
and working outside the home at all income levels, giving women choices in 
their lives and in constructing their personalities.  
 Cornell’s propositions should be viewed as ideals, or as she notes 
they ‘stretch our imaginations’ (ibid., 127). However, stretching the imagination 
is often necessary for reforms to take place, and I will therefore keep her ideas in 
mind when I begin my redescription of the policy documents. Cornell’s proposal 
for the reform of family law is a good reminder about the need to denaturalise 
the construction of the nuclear family. Her suggestion can be read as a norma-
tive attempt to reform the family, but it can also be understood as a proposition 
about rethinking the regulation of family relations. As such it reminds us that 
the family is not a natural or unchanged entity, but a historically changing ar-
rangement. The rethinking of the relationship between the state and the family 
is also an example of taking reproductive agency seriously. Disconnecting the 
family from the heterosexual monogamous relationship increases the options in 
terms  of  deciding  about  reproduction  through  the  family.  There  are  many  dif-
ferent kinds of custodial relationships and parental arrangements, including 
those that are not dependent on sexual orientation or a sexual relationship. 
Cornell’s thinking on family reforms also has its limitations. In writ-
ing about provisions for families in the form of income maintenance or public 
childcare services she clearly locates herself in the United States. Many of these 
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provisions are already in place in Finland, which has extensive family policies. It 
is worth remembering that family policies are not neutral, however; they define 
who  is  entitled  to  what  kinds  of  services  and  for  what  price.  The  relevance  of  
Cornell’s ideas on supporting families through public policies lies in the recogni-
tion that freedom is not always advanced through aiming at minimum state in-
terference. The conditions in which people form their personalities affect the 
process. The question of conditions in the context of the imaginary domain and 
reproductive agency is examined more thoroughly in the next chapter.  
Related to the development of reproductive agency as a concept, 
there are elements in Cornell’s thinking suggesting that people should be the 
source of their own values with regard to procreation arrangements. In practice 
this means that the state should have no legitimate interest in how people form 
families. On the other hand, reproductive agency is heavily dependent on how 
various social policies are arranged in that it is very much socially and politically 
constructed. How people see their procreative options is affected by the ways in 
which public policies are arranged, but public policies also allow freedom in cre-
ating conditions in which people are able to engage in personality formation in a 
way that would not necessarily be possible without public provisions. The above 
examination of the connections between the imaginary domain, reproductive 
agency and the family gives insights into my redescription of the selected policy 
documents. First, however, I will describe how the family is understood using 
the language of the documents themselves. 
 
4.3 Thematic description I 
Discussion about the low birth rate and population issues almost inevitably in-
corporates the concept of the family, at least to some extent. This section con-
cerns how the concept is used in the three selected policy documents. I focus 
specifically on the word ‘family’ (perhe in Finnish), examining in which contexts 
and for what purposes it is used, and what presuppositions are connected to it 
(i.e. what the family is understood to be or how it is defined). I begin my analy-
sis with what I call an opaque concept of the family as encountered in the GOV 
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report. Opaqueness here refers to the presentation of the family as a single unit 
with internal workings, relationships and power structures that are not publicly 
visible; it is treated as if it were one operator with one will and one mind. I then 
move on to the more open and multifaceted views of the family that are to be 
found  in  the  EVA  and  FF  reports.  There  are  also  commonalities  and  unifying  
aspects in how the family is  understood in the three texts,  which I  consider at  
the end of this section.  
 
4.3.1 The opaque family 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the GOV report represents the opaque under-
standing of the family, in other words the text treats the family as a single unit. 
There is  no reference to what happens inside it,  such as who the members are 
and what roles they play. Both the EVA report and the FF Population Policy 
Programme take a somewhat more analytical approach in that they also con-
sider women’s role in the family and working life in relation to reproduction 
(see e.g., EVA, 31-32 and FF, 30-31).  
The first time the concept of the family comes up in the GOV report 
is  in  connection  with  the  birth  rate.  It  is  noted  that  ‘the  birth  rate  is  high  in  
countries where family-oriented social policies and measures reconciling work-
ing and family life have been used to enable the combination of both’ (GOV, 16). 
It is acknowledged in the same paragraph that family structures in Finland have 
changed  rapidly  (ibid.),  but  there  is  no  further  explication.  This  section  of  the  
report skims over the idea of the family rather quickly, although it mentions the 
significant notion of historical changes in family structures.  
The word ‘family’ is used most frequently in the section dealing 
with favourable conditions for having children. The focus is on actions that the 
Government could take to encourage families to have more children. In this 
context, family policies are seen to have a significant effect on the birth rate, and 
are understood widely as including different kinds of monetary benefits, ser-
vices and efforts to reconcile work and family life. The Government’s aims are 




Higher birth rates can be promoted most effectively by supporting 
fall in the child-bearing age, seeking to reduce atypical employ-
ment, encouraging the reconciliation of work and family life, and al-
leviating housing and subsistence difficulties for families with chil-
dren. Ensuring reproductive health is also important. (ibid., 46) 
 
The word ‘family’ is frequently, although not exclusively, used as a qualifier 
(family policy, family life, family allowance, family welfare) in the section on 
favourable  conditions  for  having  children.  There  is  no  further  explication;  in  
other words, the concept of the family is used often, but in a way that makes the 
notion impenetrable. 
The above-mentioned opaqueness is evident in the way the GOV 
report treats the family as the primary unit in terms of having children. This 
view is present in the other texts as well, but the GOV report has a specific ap-
proach that emphasises the unitary nature of the family: it is the family as a unit 
that has children, not individual women. A good example of this unitary think-
ing is the second paragraph in Chapter 6.1 (Favourable conditions for having 
children), which starts: ‘The Government has taken steps to improve the posi-
tion  of  families  and  their  ability  to  have  children  and  ensure  their  welfare  by  
raising the family allowance and improving the parental allowance, child home 
care allowance, and children’s afternoon activities.’ (ibid.) The implication is 
that it is the family that has the ability to have children, and in order to raise the 
birth rate the life of families needs to be supported and improved. The aim to 
improve  the  position  of  families  is  seen  as  an  instrument  for  raising  the  birth  
rate. As the report notes: ‘The Government will continue to exercise a compre-
hensive family policy that encourages higher birth rates’ (ibid.). 
Thus,  the ability  to have children is  clearly a family matter;  as  the 
report notes, ‘[t]he Government has taken steps to improve the position of fami-
lies and their ability to have children’ (ibid.). The idea that children are had by 
families is  even stronger in the Finnish version of  the report,  which states,  for  
example, that a higher child-bearing age and longer study times lower the num-
ber of children a family has (GOV/FIN, 35). Thus, even child-bearing age is as-
sumed to be a characteristic of the family, although it is the woman whose age is 
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relevant in terms of  the link between age and increasing the number of  births.  
The GOV discussion about favourable conditions for having children is so tightly 
defined through the notion of the family that ‘mothers’ and ‘fathers’ are both 
mentioned only once in this context: mothers in relation to compensation for 
parental leave to the employer (GOV, 46), and fathers in connection with family 
leave the proposal to encourage fathers to use their rights in this respect (ibid., 
47). Other than these two exceptions, it is the united unit of the family that is 
considered the focal point of the policies.  
I find ‘opaque’ a good term to describe the way the concept of the 
family is used in the GOV text. It is frequently used in the singular or as a quali-
fier of different policy elements: it is a single entity that possesses the capacity 
to have children.  The singular nature is  taken even further in the Finnish ver-
sion, in which even the age of having children is portrayed as a family character-
istic.  
 
4.3.2 A cautious dissection of the concept of the family  
Both the EVA report and the FF Programme use the concept of the family in a 
somewhat different way from the GOV report. Although the notion of family 
policies is prominent in the EVA and FF texts, the family is not as strongly sin-
gular and opaque as it is in the GOV report. The EVA report acknowledges in the 
introduction that the family is not a single entity in its statement that Finnish 
men’s attitudes toward the family and childcare need improvement (EVA, 4). 
Reference to men’s attitudes imply that women and men may have different po-
sitions with regard to the family, and what family members do may conflict with 
what  is  considered  good  for  the  entire  unit.  The  members  may  have  different  
attitudes towards the family, and their roles vary. 
Both  the  GOV  and  the  EVA  reports  often  use  the  word  ‘family’  in  
connection with the birth rate. According to the EVA report, Finnish families 
have 1.8 children on average. The change in family structure is acknowledged, 
and although this is not an issue that is given much attention, it is noted that 
more  and  more  families  are  co-habiting  (i.e.  couples  are  not  getting  married)  
and the number of  single-parent families is  growing (ibid.,  14).  The concept of  
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the family is considered from a broader perspective than in the GOV report, and 
it is made clear that it is open to change, and that marriage, for example, is no 
longer a prerequisite.   
This broadening of the perspective is visible in Chapter two of the 
EVA report, which deals with the question of why Finnish people do not have 
more children, and discusses family policies and economic incentives for having 
children. In terms of opening up the concept, the report analyses the distribu-
tion  of  housework  between  men  and  women,  acknowledging  that  it  is  women  
who give birth. It seems that when children are born into the family women con-
tribute  more  than  men in  terms  of  caring  for  the  child  and  doing  other  things  
related to starting a family (ibid., 22). Reference to children being born into the 
family is a good example of the seemingly self-evident connection between hav-
ing children and having a family, but it does show some awareness of the differ-
ent  and  differently  placed  parties  that  the  family  is  thought  to  consist  of.  An-
other example in the same context is in the next paragraph, which uses the Fin-
nish term perheenisä, the father of the family or pater familias (ibid.). This also 
acknowledges the different parties that form the family: it is not singular in that 
it includes fathers (and complementarily mothers). Reference to fathers may 
seem self-evident, but it acknowledges one position in the family that is as-
signed  to  an  individual  and  thus  identifies  this  individual  from the  communal  
unit. 
Another section in which the EVA report takes a different stance on 
the  concept  of  the  family  than  the  GOV  report  is  in  Chapter  three  under  the  
subheading ‘The target group splinters’. It states, ‘families, women and fathers 
change and become more individual34’ (ibid., 31). Later it gives some statistics: 
37  per  cent  of  families  with  children  do  not  comprise  the  traditional  married  
couple with children; 13 per cent comprise co-habiting couples with children; 20 
per cent consist of a mother and children, and two per cent of a father and chil-
dren. Moreover, a considerable proportion of the married couples with children 
are reconstituted families in one form or another, and there are some same-sex 
                                                             
34 The text uses the terms family, women and fathers as opposed to women and men, or mothers 
and fathers, for example. The usage of the differently gendered terms is discussed in Chapter 
five of this work. 
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couples with children. (ibid., 32) This listing of different kinds of family forma-
tions shows some historical awareness, although this is not apparent to the 
same extent in all parts of the report. Nevertheless, it acknowledges the preva-
lence of divorce and some variety in sexuality. It is not assumed that all families 
are alike, which one could say is a minimum level of thinking from new perspec-
tives.  
Individualism is considered an important value in the EVA report, 
and is emphasised in several places. Chapter three, for example, mentions the 
increasing individualisation of the family structure, referring in particular to 
single-parent and same-sex families, and the difficulty in finding the right poli-
cies (ibid.). One might assume that this acknowledgement of individualism 
would  make  the  report  more  likely  to  embrace  new family  forms  and  broaden  
the perspective, but it still does not consider how things could be arranged dif-
ferently or what free choice with regard to the family and procreative life might 
mean.  
The FF,  as the name implies,  attaches importance to the notion of  
the family. Although the Finnish name does not contain the word ‘family’35, one 
of the basic principles of the Federation is to improve the situation of families 
(FF, 7), and its programme concentrates on family policies. As in the other two 
texts  described  here,  the  situation  of  families  with  children  is  a  central  theme 
and family policies are one of the focal points. Moreover, the family is men-
tioned in connection with the low birth rate, although the FF analyses the birth 
rate mostly from the perspective of women, emphasising in particular the age at 
which women have children (ibid., 13-14); unlike the GOV report, the text does 
refer to the age of women (not families) who have children.  
The FF also refers to individualisation, but from a somewhat differ-
ent perspective than the EVA report. In the latter it is a question of families, and 
members of families, becoming individual in the sense of being different and 
having different interests, whereas the FF mentions the transformation from a 
collective, kin- and family-based society to an individualistic society that em-
phasises individual rights (ibid., 26). Here the historicity is recognised in that it 
                                                             
35 The Finnish name Väestöliitto means the Population Federation. 
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is acknowledged that the family as a social institution is amenable to change. It 
is glossed over to some degree, however, because different constructional ele-
ments  that  would  make  changes  in  the  institution  more  concrete  are  not  dis-
cussed. For example, there is no mention of the short history of the bourgeois 
nuclear family or of the practical consequences of the more collective family 
model.   
The  FF  Program,  like  the  EVA report,  includes  some analysis  that  
separates women and men, and thus, unlike the GOV report, constructs a family 
unit comprising individual persons of different genders (see e.g., ibid., 31). The 
FF ends up analysing questions related to the different members of the family in 
a way that emphasises harmoniousness, however. It is understood that there are 
different  family  members,  but  neither  conflicts  inside  the  family  nor  the  con-
flicting interests of the members are acknowledged. An example of the harmo-
nious family is one in which women’s and men’s motives for having children are 
compatible. On the question of motives, the report states that women justify 
having their first child on the experience of motherhood, the continuation of life 
and giving a meaning to life. The first two of these are also mentioned with re-
gard to men, for whom the joy in following the child’s growth and development 
is  the  third  motivating  factor.  (ibid.,  31)  The  FF  Program  does  not  examine  
situations in which couples have differing life goals or motivations with regard 
to family life. 
In  addition  to  the  harmoniousness,  the  FF  text  also  considers  the  
family a central entity in people’s lives. It refers to value surveys suggesting that 
the family is  one of  the most important things in life,  and that  Finnish people 
value  the  family  institution  (ibid.).  It  is  suggested  that  conflicts  are  more  be-
tween the family and other sections of society than inside the family. As the re-
port notes, working life is one element that creates pressure on family life: ‘The 
current atmosphere of hurry, uncertainty and work pressure does not favour 
starting a family or staying together as a family’ (ibid). Although the FF does not 
see the family as a singular operator, it does imply that its members live in har-
mony, and that pressures come from outside the family unit. EVA, on the other 
hand, acknowledges that different family members may operate in conflicting 




4.3.3 Commonalities in the concept of the family 
As the above sections show, the concept of the family is different in the three 
policy documents, although there are also unifying aspects. The first commonal-
ity is the self-evident connection with population policies, which goes in several 
directions. Population policies deal with growth in the birth rate and reproduc-
tion,  which is  connected to the family as the site  of  reproduction.  The value of  
the family as the primary location of reproduction is not problematised or dis-
cussed in any of the texts. Inherent in such an understanding is a connection 
with  biological  reproduction.  The  FF  does  mention  adoptive  families,  but  oth-
erwise biology is a fundamental assumption. The role of biological reproduction 
is evident in the centrality of the question of the birth rate. The GOV report has 
a section entitled ‘Favourable conditions for having children’ (GOV, 46), the 
EVA  report  has  a  chapter  entitled  ‘How  could  we  raise  the  birth  rate?’  (EVA,  
28),  and  the  FF  Program has  a  section  entitled  ‘Means  of  increasing  the  birth  
rate’  (FF,  29).  All  these  texts  deal  with  how  Finnish  families  could  have  more  
biological children. 
Another theme that is common to all three texts is the basic premise 
of the family as heterosexual, a major aspect of which is the at least seemingly 
monogamous sexual relationship, which is reflected in the constitution of the 
family  as  one  man  and  one  woman.  The  EVA  report  does  acknowledge  that  
there are same-sex families (EVA, 32), but does not examine the issue any fur-
ther and does not reflect it in other parts of the report. Polyamorous relation-
ships are not discussed in any of the texts. Heteronormativity is not explicitly 
stated either, but it is easy to infer when the text at one point refers to families 
and parents, and then starts to use gendered concepts such as father and 
mother  with  reference  to  parents.  The  following  example  of  this  usage  is  from 
the EVA report in the chapter on why Finnish people do not have more children. 
One subsection, ‘Women concentrate on work and a career’ (EVA, 20-22), deals 
with issues related to women’s paid employment, including day-care arrange-
ments. The complementary partners for women and mothers in the discussion 
about women’s position in the labour market and the home are men and fathers. 
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When women’s domestic work is discussed, the contrast lies in the fact that 
women carry a heavier burden than men with regard to childcare, and that 
many fathers do not take advantage of the paternity and parental leave to which 
they are entitled by law (ibid., 22). A similar example of heterosexual comple-
mentarity in the FF text  is  the statement that  encouraging men to take part  in 
the  domestic  work  may  help  women to  cope  (FF,  35).  These  are  just  some ex-
amples of the assumption of heterosexual, monogamous sexual relationship that 
is prevalent in all of the documents.    
As the above analysis shows, the three texts have several things in 
common: they take the family as the starting point with regard to increasing the 
birth rate, and they assume a heterosexual and, in principle, monogamous fam-
ily based mainly on biological reproduction. They also differ, most notably in 
their perceptions of the family unit. The GOV text is the most opaque, and does 
not consider the historicity of the family or the different perspectives of the 
various members. The EVA report and the FF text do not portray the family so 
strongly  as  a  single  unit,  although the  FF  text  does  not  acknowledge  that  men 
and women may have conflicting interests concerning reproduction and family 
life.  Having  described  the  use  of  the  concept  of  the  family  in  the  three  texts,  I  
will  now redescribe the texts  from the perspective of  reproductive agency.  The 
focal point in this redescription is still the notion of the family. 
 
4.4 Thematic redescription I 
My first redescription covers five topics: the family as a single opaque unit, the 
meaning of family values, definitions of the family, the differences of the con-
cept of the family in the three texts, and the notions of kinship included in the 
policy documents. All of these topics arose from my reading of the documents 
from the perspective of reproductive agency, although the connections are dif-
ferent. The first sub-section concerns the question of treating the family as if it 
were a single unit or operator. The concept of the imaginary domain emphasises 
everyone’s  right  to  form  their  personality  and  to  give  values  and  meanings  to  
their  identifications.  The emphasis  is  on individual  choice,  and I  discuss ques-
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tions of individuality in the context of the family understood as s single opaque 
unit. Connected to the questions of individuality and reproductive agency are 
the public/private distinction, the politics and policing of the family, and the 
connection with reproductive agency. The question of family values is related to 
the freedom of giving meanings and values to one’s own life, and is thus highly 
relevant to reproductive agency. The three texts differ to some extent in how 
they perceive the notion of the family, and from the perspective of reproductive 
agency these differences provide a basis for rethinking of the notion of the fam-
ily. Finally in this first thematic redescription, I examine the notions of kinship 
in  the  three  texts,  and  how they  influence  the  concept  of  the  family.  Such  no-
tions are usually implicit, but they nevertheless structure how the family is un-
derstood. 
  
4.4.1 The family as a single, opaque unit 
The first group of issues emerging in the redescription is related to the notion of 
the  family  as  a  single  unit.  Reference  to  the  family  making  reproductive  deci-
sions  hides  the  many  kinds  of  power  structures  that  operate  within  it.  These  
power structures have long been of interest to feminists, who have considered 
them from various perspectives. The ideology that glorifies the family as a do-
mestic haven but at the same time denies men’s dominance and women’s sub-
ordination, the privatised family that cuts women and children off from outside 
contact and support, and the power structures related to the traditional setting 
of the male breadwinner and the female homemaker are just some of the issues 
that feminists have addressed (Thorne 1982, 2). In this sub-section I examine 
two issues that are connected to the idea of the family as a single, opaque unit: 
individuality and individualisation, and the public/private distinction. 
The  family  as  a  single  unit  is  problematic  from  the  perspective  of  
reproductive agency in that decisions about procreation are not only joint deci-
sions within the unit or couple but are also always deeply personal and individ-
ual. At this point it is worth recalling Cornell’s idea of bodily integrity: people 
should have the right to project their bodily coherence as freely as possible. In-
deed, it is difficult to think of any aspect of bodily integrity that affects more a 
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woman’s  ability  to  project  herself  as  a  whole  over  time  than  determining  
whether to have a baby or not (Cornell 1995, 35); in other words, reproduction 
is fundamental to a woman’s experience of bodily integrity. The idea of the fam-
ily as a single unit deciding about reproductive issues clearly acknowledges nei-
ther  women’s  nor  men’s  reproductive  agency  in  that  it  fails  to  recognise  their  
individual viewpoints and imaginings in deciding about procreation. A policy 
according  to  which  it  is  ‘the  family’  that  has  children  overlooks  the  idea  of  re-
productive agency. 
One  thing  that  tends  to  be  neglected  in  discourse  referring  to  the  
family as the unit  having children is  that  it  is  a  woman who gestates and gives 
birth. How the decision to reproduce is made is glossed over when the assump-
tion is that it is the communal unit of the family that has children. Having a 
child requires input from a woman’s and a man’s body, and individual men and 
women  imagine  their  personality,  and  reproduction  as  a  part  of  that,  in  their  
own  way.  Even  though  a  (heterosexual)  couple  discusses  the  decision  to  have  
children, both parties have to make individual decisions about procreation and 
the embodied personality, although the woman as the one carrying the child and 
giving birth is in a different position from the man. If reproductive agency is to 
be taken seriously, everyone should have the right to decide about parenthood 
in a way that maintains respect for their imaginary domain, and allows them to 
develop a coherent personality. Becoming a mother is physically more demand-
ing for the woman in that  it  is  her body that  carries the child for nine months 
and gives birth, but it should also be remembered that parenthood may be a 
profound experience in other ways, and thus a central part of men’s personhood 
as well. 
An issue related to individuality is the individualisation of different 
family members. Individualisation here refers to the sociological notion con-
cerning the process by which the family is conceived of socially and culturally in 
smaller units than heretofore: the nuclear family and the couple relationship are 
seen  as  separate  from  the  larger  family  or  kin,  the  man  as  separate  from  the  
family, the woman as separate from the husband, and so on. The process of in-
dividualisation with regard to the family is, of course, multifaceted and non-
linear. It has been widely studied in sociology, also from a feminist perspective, 
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and it is acknowledged that women’s position in the family has changed. How-
ever, Ritva Nätkin notes that the individualisation of women and children in our 
society is an illusion to some extent because in many cases it is with reference to 
the Western traditional nuclear family, although one could say that many of the 
problems related to the bourgeois model of the nuclear family have become 
more  visible  and  many  processes  are  shown  not  to  be  natural  or  unchanging.  
(Nätkin 2003, 20-21)  
Referring to the family as a closed, single unit is an example of how 
the process of individualisation in this regard is still not self-evident. The GOV 
text avoids recognising the individual members of the family. A good example of 
this  blindness  is  the  way  it  deals  with  the  rise  in  the  age  of  child  bearing  and  
studying: 
 
The average child-bearing age has risen continuously, causing 
childlessness and health risks and reducing the eventual number of 
children. Longer study times have not only postponed entry into 
working life but also having children. The possibility to combine 
studying and family life must therefore be improved. Student fami-
lies with children are supported through general family policy. 
(GOV, 46) 
 
The text does not recognise that it is women’s age that is important, or that both 
studying and giving birth are personal decisions and individual activities. This 
consideration of reproduction through the impenetrable idea of the family 
shows how the naturalness of the family remains unquestioned, and there is the 
blindness to its internal workings and structures. The different members are not 
understood as separate individuals, or then their role is defined through the 
family.  
As Ritva Nätkin notes, family structures are becoming visible and 
their naturalness is being dismantled in sociological research (Nätkin 2003, 21-
22). I contend that it is also important to show how the concept of the family is 
used in politics. As is evident in my redescription, the selected policy proposals 
do not necessarily recognise the individualisation process that considers men 
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and women full persons with reproductive agency. Treating the family as a sin-
gle unit disguises the fact that reproductive agency is necessary in individual 
personality formation, and that decisions about reproduction also concern indi-
vidual coherence and life plans. 
 The GOV report ignores reproductive agency in its consideration of 
the family as a single unit. However, individual agency may be ignored even if 
different family members are recognised. The FF text covers men’s and women’s 
motivation for having children, but does not admit to any conflict between 
them; the reasons are connected to having a ‘better life’, and children are seen to 
bring spouses closer to each other (FF, 31). This implies harmony and a lack of 
conflict in the family, but could also indicate limitations in the range of choices 
among those who form the family unit, and the denial of contradictory views. 
Expecting family members to make similar choices is comparable to under-
standing the family as a single unit: reproductive agency is dependent on other 
people  in  that  the  spouses’  choices  are  linked.  This  reading  of  reproductive  
agency focuses on the level of individuals, but the notions of the family also have 
significance on the political level. 
Conception of the family as a single unit has implications in terms 
of the distinction between the public and the private sphere; decisions about 
reproduction are confined to the ‘black box’ of the family, to the private sphere 
that is outside of politics. This is a somewhat conflicting position. The GOV 
document focuses on increasing procreation in Finland through public policies 
that aim to influence what happens in families, while at the same time taking 
the family as a singular concept that pushes its internal workings to the private 
sphere, which is not considered a matter of politics or public policies. According 
to  the  GOV text,  the  unit  for  procreation  is  the  family  and  policies  are  under-
stood through the family. The welfare state aims to police or direct families as a 
unit, and to affect how the unit operates as a site of reproduction. It has been 
claimed that the welfare state has caused the decline of the family. For example, 
in a classic sociological work Christopher Lasch writes negatively about state 
intervention and suggests that the modern welfare state has largely replaced the 
family as a key agent of social reproduction (Zaretsky 1982, 188-192). As the 
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GOV text shows, however, the Finnish welfare state at least sees the family as a 
central institution in biological reproduction. 
Theoretical discussion on the family tends to portray it as a private 
institution that is beyond public control, and in feminist theory it has even been 
described  in  terms  of  imprisonment  for  women  who  are  subjected  to  violence  
and  isolation  out  of  sight  (see  e.g.,  Barret  &  McIntosh  1982,  56-59).  The  GOV 
document does not see the family as purely private, however. The text includes 
an interesting mix of what is understood as public and private, and what is seen 
as a target of politics and policies. Families are an object of policies and are 
therefore  a  subject  of  political  discussion,  and  it  is  entirely  legitimate  to  have  
policies that regulate family life. At the same time, the text treats the family as a 
single unit and maintains the privacy of what actually happens inside the insti-
tution, how reproductive agency is actually lived and enacted in individual peo-
ple’s lives. Children are an example of what are considered legitimate policy ob-
jects. The GOV report has an entire chapter entitled ‘Taking care of children and 
the young’, in which it states: ‘Developments in the income of families with chil-
dren must be monitored’, and notes that although parents are responsible for 
the growth and development of their children, ‘[i]t is the duty of society to sup-
port parents in their educational efforts’ (GOV, 55). The unit is the family, but 
children’s welfare is a legitimate reason for public intervention. There are two 
albeit connected approaches to how public the family is: policing it as a unit is 
self-evidently legitimate, but consideration of its members as individuals is 
avoided.  
The question of drawing the line between the public and the private 
with regard to the family is widely studied in sociology and anthropology, and is 
addressed in political theory. There are sociological studies aimed at penetrating 
the family, its private organisation, relationships and structures (for Finnish 
studies see e.g., Forsberg & Nätkin 2003). There is also acknowledgement that 
the private and public aspects are in many ways parallel in that the family can 
be understood as part of the social and political system and an object of public 
intervention, and at the same time it is a private haven and a refuge (Turnaturi 
1987).  According  to  Katja  Yesilova,  who  conducted  a  sociological  study  of  the  
meaning of the family in Finnish society, the nuclear family assumed political 
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and social relevance during the 20th century.  On the most evident level  of  this  
process the family has become a focus of public worry. Its wellbeing and prob-
lems are discussed in the media, in political statements, reports and seminars, 
for example. At the same time, there is the assumption of the natural, biological 
family, a basic unit of society that is non-political and has its own logic. Hence 
there is the paradox of what Yesilova calls the politicised non-political family. 
(Yesilova 2009, 30-31)  
My redescription also reveals the paradoxical attitude towards fam-
ily  life  in  the  GOV  text:  policies  aimed  at  helping  families  in  everyday  life  are  
considered extremely important politically and with regard to increasing the 
birth rate, but the family is also seen as something that is natural, and its struc-
ture and basic values are not to be questioned. Both of these attitudes are prob-
lematic in terms of reproductive agency. Family policies define, regulate and 
reflect  how the family is  understood and thus affect  the environment in which 
people  live  and,  by  extension,  their  abilities  to  define  their  own family  forma-
tions, whereas treating the family as a private unit makes recognition of indi-
vidual reproductive agency more difficult. Although the formation of the per-
sonality is socially, culturally and politically dependent, the formation of the 
embodied personality is an individual process and is beyond the authority of a 
family unit.  
 
4.4.2 Individual family values  
Whereas the GOV report ignores individual reproductive agency in its treatment 
of the family as a unit, the EVA text relies on a different logic. It considers fam-
ily policies suspicious, but still retains a strong notion of how the family should 
be understood, thus proposing discourses that affect the imaginary domain and 
reproductive  agency  in  a  specific  way.  Support  for  public  family  policies  is  
strong and often unquestioned in Finland, but there are some holes in this 
thinking. The EVA report is an example, criticising the fact that current family 
policies are not specifically constructed to increase fertility (EVA, 33), and im-
plying that decisions about having children are ultimately based on individuals’ 
life  goals  (ibid.,  37).  In other words,  the report  conveys a sceptical  attitude to-
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wards family policies, and suggests that individuals should be taken into ac-
count in discussions about fertility  and the birth rate.  Questioning the policies 
does  not  mean abandoning  the  concept  of  the  family,  however,  and  in  certain  
respects the report reflects traditional conservative thinking. As Michèle Barret 
and Mary McIntosh wrote in 1982:  
 
Conservative thought is often said to focus on the idea of individual-
ism: self-help, self-support, self-sufficiency, self-respect. It rejects 
dependence, ‘scrounging’, collectivism, the belief that ‘the world 
owes you a living’. Yet in practice the unit of self-support is not the 
individual but the family. (Barret & McIntosch 1982, 47) 
 
There are similarities in the logic of the EVA report: the individual 
is emphasised, but the family retains an important role as a social institution. 
The report makes no outright demand to dismantle the welfare state, even 
though it does consider family policies ineffective in terms of increasing the 
birth  rate.  It  does  demand  changes  in  personal  values,  however,  which  begin  
with individuals and should be geared towards the family. Taken to its conclu-
sion, this logic reveals a rather conservative line of thinking: the state and public 
policies are ineffective in terms of population control; individuals are responsi-
ble for their own values; a single life is considered hedonistic and individuals are 
encouraged  to  take  responsibility  for  and  value  the  family.  If  there  are  public  
policies, they should promote family values and children. People nowadays ex-
pect the state to take responsibility for the birth rate: 
 
Individuals then leave the responsibility for having children and for 
the renewal of the population to society. At the same time they36 
demand the time and the right to be single,  to study,  to be career-
building producers who concentrate only on themselves. (EVA, 37) 
 
                                                             
36 The Finnish text uses the word ‘hän’, which is the third-person singular pronoun and gender 
neutral (there are no gendered pronouns in Finnish). I have chosen to use the plural here in 
order to avoid any gendered connotations. 
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The message in the EVA report is rather contradictory: individuals 
should not expect the state to help them in everything, and should be responsi-
ble for their own values, but these values should family-oriented rather than 
individualistic. To be too involved in your career or to have ‘a single lifestyle’ is 
not good for the Finnish birth rate, and individuals should feel their responsibil-
ity and value the family more. As the report concludes: ‘Ultimately, the respon-
sibility for restoring the appreciation for children belongs to individuals’ (ibid., 
38).  The  state  has  a  limited  ability  to  affect  the  birth  rate,  and  people  should  
value family life and children. The family is thus a central element when it 
comes to population growth. 
The GOV policy proposals ignore reproductive agency in treating 
the family as a communal subject, and although the EVA report recognises indi-
viduality, it does not respect reproductive agency either. Individuality in this 
case does not mean that people should have total freedom in deciding about 
their life choices and values, it means the freedom to have family-friendly atti-
tudes and to appreciate children. Reproductive agency based on the idea of bod-
ily integrity and the imaginary domain implies the freedom to decide on and 
formulate one’s own life choices, which should not be pre-defined by an outside 
authority. Cornell notes: 
 
The imaginary domain allows us to separate what is of value in the 
doctrine of privacy from its illegitimate promotion of the heterosex-
ual nuclear family as the good family, and does so without reducing 
the value of privacy to the right to be left alone. Simply demanding 
that the state leave us alone inadequately protects what is at stake 
in the right to self-represent one’s sexuate being. (Cornell 1998, 40) 
 
The EVA report is an example of the contradictory nature of the 
concept of the family in the politics and policies targeting reproductive agency. 
The contradictions are different in the different texts, but they also have some 
things in common. The GOV text considers the family a target of policies, but it 
is also private because the way the concept is used renders the notion opaque 
and  does  not  consider  what  goes  on  inside  the  family.  As  far  as  EVA  is  con-
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cerned, individuals rather than the state should decide about their own values, 
but these values should be family-oriented. The FF Program recognises that the 
family comprises different members, but these members cannot have conflicting 
interests. All three documents consider the family an important element in poli-
cies  aimed  at  increasing  the  birth  rate,  but  none  of  them  take  reproductive  
agency and the imaginary domain seriously. Either they aim to influence how 
people think about the family or they refuse to acknowledge full personhood for 
the men and women who form it. Social norms and public policies affect defini-
tions of how the family should be understood. The chances of giving value and 
meaning to one’s procreative life similarly decrease when the decision about 
reproduction is removed from the individual to the communal unit of the fam-
ily. When policies and politics aim to influence people’s attitudes with regard to 
the family, what is it that is being promoted? How is the family understood, and 
what is a family in these discourses? 
 
4.4.3 Defining the family 
Taking the family as a self-evident starting point for reproduction begs the ques-
tions of what a family is and what kind of a unit forms it. If the imaginary do-
main is to be taken seriously, the state should not define one model of the good 
family; predefinition as a monogamous heterosexual couple with children is 
limiting. The GOV and the EVA reports do not include any explicit definitions of 
the family and that can allow different kinds of formations, but this could also 
imply that the concept is so self-evident that there is no need to discuss what it 
means.  This  is  not  to  say  that  there  is  no  inherent  understanding  of  what  the  
family is in the texts. The FF Program is the only one of the three that explicitly 
addresses the question, although no definition is included in the main body of 
the report. 
The FF text  gives a definition in the glossary,  adding that  it  varies 
somewhat depending on the statistical principles and the usage. According to 
Statistics Finland (the Finnish statistical agency), a family consists of a married 
or co-habiting couple and their unmarried children living with them, or one 
parent and his or her unmarried children living in the household. According to 
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this  definition,  a  family  includes  at  most  two  consecutive  generations.  It  is  
noted, however, that it does not take into account all forms of co-habiting that 
may be counted as family life.  (FF,  69) The definition is  a  formal one,  but it  is  
worth considering it more closely because it states some of the basic premises.  
The  definition  gives  certain  basic  limits,  but  it  does  leave  some  
questions open. Three things are worth noting. Firstly, it is common in Finland 
to have children out of wedlock, hence the inclusion of unmarried couples with 
children; being married is not an important consideration in this context. This is 
not universally self-evident, however: in the US, for example, the meaning of 
marriage plays a bigger role in how the family is understood (see e.g., Fineman 
2004). Secondly, the sex of the people forming the couple is not mentioned. In 
Finland, single women and lesbian couples are eligible for fertility treatment, 
thus according to this definition the family could be a lesbian couple with their 
own biological children. It is more rare, although not totally out of the question, 
for the definition to apply to homosexual men37. Thirdly, even this vague defini-
tion excludes all other parenting and living arrangements except those based on 
a (at least formally) monogamous, conjugal relationship. Single parents are in-
cluded, but not arrangements that involve more than two people taking care of 
the children. The model of the family is limited to a sexual relationship and kin-
ship. Even if the FF definition is not the strictest – in other words it does not 
totally exclude unmarried or same-sex couples - the emphasis is on heterosexu-
ality. There is no reference to the procreative process. Two generations are men-
tioned, which without explicit discussion about procreation incorporates the 
notion of biological reproduction and the presupposition of heterosexuality and 
kinship  relations.  The  starting  point  is  a  couple,  and  the  only  exception  men-
tioned is the single parent. Moreover, according to the definition, without a 
child or children there is no family.  
A similar understanding of the family primarily as a heterosexual 
couple with children is implicit in the other two texts being redescribed here. 
The GOV report is very consistent in referring to the family as an opaque unit, 
                                                             




but the heterosexual presupposition is visible in some places, as in the following 
excerpt: 
 
In workplaces, taking statutory family leave should be encouraged 
by providing adequate and permanent replacement arrangements. 
Fathers must also be encouraged to use their right to family leave 
and to take part in everyday activities at home. (GOV, 47) 
 
The text refers to families as a unit, but at one point to ‘fathers … 
also’. The structure clearly implies that it is a mother and a father that form the 
unit.38 The basic assumption in the EVA report is also that the family is a het-
erosexual couple comprising a mother and a father, as is clear in the section 
dealing with the weekly working hours of mothers and fathers, for example. The 
text describes the uneven development of equality between men and women in 
terms of domestic work, and how men are seen as ‘assistant mothers’ (EVA, 22). 
In its complementary use of words such as ‘mother’, ‘father’, ‘men’ and ‘women’ 
it implies unquestioned heterosexuality. The complementary use is seamless in 
that  no  explicit  explanations  are  needed.  An  example  of  this  is  the  analysis  of  
how working life and having children are combined: 
 
Parents of small children would seem to be in disadvantageous po-
sitions on the job market in that the costs of childcare are targeted 
indirectly at their employers. As long as mothers are the prime us-
ers of parental leave, their position is, of course, even more difficult 
than men’s. (ibid., 23) 
 
Assigning reproduction to heterosexual families is creating an envi-
ronment that is potentially limiting from the perspective of reproductive agency. 
The imaginary domain is not respected if the family, by default, is understood to 
be heterosexual. The freedom to develop one’s personal coherence, and repro-
duction as one element of that, implies the freedom to think about procreation 
                                                             




in  non-heterosexual  terms.  There  is  also  violation  of  the  imaginary  domain  in  
the assumption that the focal relationship in the family is sexual in nature. It is 
quite possible for the family as a community or unit to be based on intimate re-
lationships other than conjugal or sexual coupledom. 
Although  the  notion  of  the  heterosexual  family  is  present  in  all  
three documents, the GOV report is more restrictive than the other two in that it 
does not discuss the family in any other way than as a biological unit. It refers to 
parents in the context of increasing the birth rate, the rate of births referring to 
biological  children,  and  thus  connects  biology  and  family  without  taking  into  
account the various family formations that exist today. Significantly, and related 
to  the  emphasis  on  biological  connections  and  heterosexuality,  in  the  GOV re-
port in particular the family is understood as the nuclear family, which is a 
rather recent construction in historical terms. The concept was introduced as an 
ideal and as common practice during the late 19th century, but its position was 
firmly established in Finland in the 1920s and 1930s as a bourgeois family ideal 
in the name of national unity, at the same time as the public and private spheres 
started to separate39 (Nätkin 2003, 18; Häggman 1994). Katja Yesilova recently 
studied nuclear-family ‘ontology’ in Finnish social policy. According to her, the 
nuclear family functions as a condition for normalcy, having the prerequisites 
for the normal development of children. It is the nuclear family that creates the 
natural conditions for a child’s development, and is considered the basis of and 
a precondition for societal development. (Yesilova 2009, 159, 205-207)  
Although the GOV policy document does not go into great detail, 
the  idea  of  the  nuclear  family  looms  in  the  background  and  thus  also  implies  
preferences about how the family should be understood and its relations ar-
ranged. With regard to reproductive agency, the notion of the nuclear family is 
even more problematic  than the idea of  the heterosexual  couple in that  it  may 
include presuppositions – such as marriage or assumptions about women’s and 
men’s roles – that bring further constraints and thus create specific environ-
mental elements for reiteration and different forms of family life.  
 
                                                             
39 For  more  about  the  ideal  of  family  life  connected  to  the  construction  of  the  Finnish  nation  
state, see Häggman 1994. 
112 
 
4.4.4 Eroding the concept of the family 
Although  the  family  is  largely  understood  in  the  three  policy  documents  as  a  
heterosexual, nuclear unit, there are some exceptions. In terms of reproductive 
agency, expanding the notion facilitates reconsideration of the procreative proc-
ess. The EVA report acknowledges that there are different kinds of families, al-
though it does not promote extensive rethinking. It notes that families are tak-
ing different forms, and that 37 per cent of them comprise other than traditional 
married couples with children. Furthermore, quite a large proportion of those 
consisting of a married couple and children are so-called reconstituted or 
blended families that include children from previous relationships. It is also 
mentioned that a small minority of families comprise same-sex couples with 
children. (EVA, 23)  
It was acknowledged in the parliamentary debate40 on the Govern-
ment’s report on the future that families come in various forms. Reconstituted 
families  are  mentioned,  as  is  adoption  as  a  reminder  that  not  all  child-parent  
connections are biological (see e.g., Eduskunta 2004, Taiveaho, Satu, 
Eduskunta 2004, Karttunen, Marjukka (vastauspuheenvuoro [response state-
ment])). Remarks were made to the effect that single parenthood, divorce and 
new forms of families created by remarriage are common, and should not be 
forgotten. The GOV report does not properly take such changes into considera-
tion and the Parliamentary debate reflected this deficiency in failing to acknowl-
edge the transformation in family structures. Despite the recognition in the dis-
cussion that families come in various forms, and that there are gaps in the po-
litical understanding, the traditional model was also defended, as it is in parts of 
the three policy texts. Chapter 5, which concentrates on the economic perspec-
tive, examines the explicit defence of family values. This somewhat contradicts 
the economic argumentation about family policies and the role of financial cir-
cumstances in terms of having children.  
One way of broadening the concept of the family is to advocate 
adoption and to support adoptive families. The FF, for example, proposes that 
                                                             
40 I do not redescribe the parliamentary discussion in this study, but I make some observations 
as it is clearly connected to the GOV report and offers additional perspectives on the discussion 
about the family.   
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international adoption be made easier (FF, 33). Articulations on adoption ex-
pand the concept of the family to some degree, and disconnect it from biology. 
Children are still at the centre, but there are attempts to include non-biological 
children. Fertility treatment is discussed, and the need for more financial sup-
port for fertility services is highlighted (see e.g., ibid.). From the perspective of 
reproductive agency, promoting adoption and fertility services extends repro-
ductive potential to some extent, but inherent in both is strong definition in 
terms of what constitutes a family and who counts as a parent. For example, 
adoption  services  define  who  is  eligible  to  adopt.  Eligible  parents  are  further  
inspected, thus creating a definition of ‘good parents’. Similarly, sexuality is a 
factor that affects the availability of fertility services: Finland provides services 
for lesbians but limits the use of surrogate mothers, thereby limiting gay men’s 
parenthood. The definitions, which may be legal or created in the practices, then 
affect reproductive agency. 
As the EVA report shows, there are minor shifts in thinking regard-
ing families comprising same-sex couples, but on the whole this is not discussed 
in the three policy documents. Inherent in the notion of reproductive agency is 
the idea that it should be possible to rethink the concept of the family, but it 
should be borne in mind that  talk about extending it  to include same-sex cou-
ples is still talk about a family based on a sexual relationship. If the imaginary 
domain is to be taken seriously, it should be possible to imagine and form fami-
lies based on relationships that are not sexual. Breaking the connection between 
the concept of the family and the central idea of a sexual relationship between 
its adult members entails, for example, thinking about teams of guardians that 
are affiliated with each other through friendship or a biological connection other 
than being a parent. Extending the notion of the family to include reconstituted 
families, adoptive parents and same-sex partners expands the possibilities for 
reproductive agency,  but still  retains the idea of  a  couple as the basis.  The no-
tion  of  the  conjugal  couple  also  characterises  the  understanding  of  kinship  in  




4.4.5 Kinship and family 
Defining the family is not only a matter of who belongs to the unit and who does 
not, but also involves issues of kinship and biology. Nowadays when divorces 
are common and reproductive technologies complicate the notion of biological 
reproduction,  the  question  of  what  makes  a  family  is  not  just  theoretical,  but  
people have to negotiate their understanding in their everyday lives. Issues such 
as  parenthood,  motherhood  and  fatherhood,  are  not  self-evident  and  are  con-
stantly under negotiation. The negotiations are being increasingly subjected to 
analysis in studies focusing on new family forms, such as situations after a di-
vorce (see e.g., Kuronen 2003 or Robinson, Nelson & Nelson 1997) or how chil-
dren understand their family unit (Ritala-Koskinen 2003). It is curious that the 
three policy texts do not, for the most part, acknowledge that families are no 
longer self-evident and unchanging units. 
Kinship is a background factor in the three policy documents, but it 
is not dealt with directly. How kinship is understood is one thing that structures 
how the family is comprehended, and consequently also the kind of policy pro-
posals that are considered feasible. Conceptions of kinship also influence how 
reproductive agency is constructed in the texts in that it is connected to the pro-
creative  process  through  the  centrality  of  the  notion  of  the  family.  The  idea  of  
kinship that is present is what Marilyn Strathern calls Euro-American kinship41 
(Strathern 1995), which is based on a biogenetic relationship. This may seem to 
be a self-evident or natural fact in the Euro-American cultural sphere, but the 
idea of ‘blood ties’ as the basis of kinship is not universally tied to the idea of 
someone being one’s ‘own flesh and blood’. (Strathern 1995, 348-349) As 
Strathern notes:  
 
And  while  “flesh  and  blood”  might  be  a  symbol,  it  is  a  symbol  for  
what Euro-Americans take to be literally true: that those joined by 
substance are kin, and it is the act of procreation that accomplishes 
the joining (ibid., 349).  
 
                                                             
41 See also David M. Schneider’s classic study on American kinship (Schneider 1980/1968), as a 
form of Euro-American kinship. 
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The  notion  that  those  whose  substance  is  joined  in  a  child  are  kin  is  also  the  
dominant base line in the texts under examination; they take it for granted that 
biological procreation is the basis of the family. As FF notes, for example, one of 
the motivations for having children is related to the continuation of life (FF, 31) 
and this as a reason for having children is presented as a fact that needs no ex-
planation.  
Strathern considers the concept of ‘a natural fact’ as foundational in 
how Euro-Americans see the primordial basis of human relations (Strathern 
1995,  349).  Such  conceptions  also  effectively  describe  the  starting  point  of  the  
documents examined here. As the GOV text notes: 
 
Regarding the birth rate,  the objective will  be to maintain the cur-
rent level and encourage a rise in the number of births, by helping 
to create an environment in which more families can have their de-
sired number of children. (GOV, 45) 
 
A family created through biological  reproduction is  the basic  model  that  needs 
no explanation, whereas other kinds of family forms are mentioned separately. 
For example, adoptive parents are considered an exception that are mentioned 
as  being  outside  the  norm but  should  not  be  dismissed  when families  are  dis-
cussed.   
The closeness of kin relations is also symbolised by the closeness of 
biogenetic identity. The procreative act of a conjugal pair constitutes the core of 
the family, and the child’s genetic closeness to its parents endorses the nurtur-
ing closeness of the conjugal couple. Strathern notes:  
 
Though parents were not born kin to each other, the child was born 
kin  to  both  of  them.  The  child  they  produced  created  a  closeness,  
defined in the way familial and kinship relations overlapped. 
(Strathern 1995, 351)  
 
It  is  the  child  that  makes  the  family  according  to  all  of  the  three  policy  docu-
ments. A section in the FF Program, for example, analyses the reasons why men 
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and women as couples have children, noting that a network of relatives and 
generations is created through children (FF, 31). It is the child who creates the 
kin  relationship  between  parents,  who  are  not  kin  to  each  other  to  start  with.  
When the  child  is  born  both  parents  join  a  network  of  relations  of  which  they  
would not otherwise be a part.  The child is  in a central  position in the process 
that  forms  the  family.  There  cannot  be  a  family  without  a  child,  and  in  accor-
dance with the logic of Euro-American kinship, the child is a biological produc-
tion of the conjugal couple. 
All these conceptions of the family that circulate in the policy texts 
examined here are also present in the political sphere in Finland in general. On 
the legal level there have been attempts since the 1960s to separate the notion of 
the family from moral, religious and social conceptions. Of course, family law is 
not value-neutral, and is influenced by various social forces, but the legal family 
is currently not an institution, it is rather a relationship created by individuals 
with individual rights. (Pylkkänen 2008, 71-72) Although issues such as sexual-
ity restrict the substantive notion of the legal family, throughout the 20th cen-
tury the direction was away from substantive formulations in the law. Current 
law is less and less prescriptive in terms of how people should conduct their 
family lives, but this is not necessarily reflected in the political sphere. As evi-
denced in the redescriptions here, there have been attempts to define what the 
family should mean to people, and how people should live their family lives.  
It is clear that the potential for reproductive agency is limited by the 
ways in which the notion of the family is understand in the three texts. The limi-
tation is on many levels: conceptualising the family as heterosexual or mo-
nogamous, or based on a sexual relationship, or advocating individualism that is 
founded on the only life choice of procreation in the traditional family. The writ-
ers of the documents may not have meant to limit the choices in proposing how 
people think about their reproductive possibilities, but when having children is 
strictly attached to the family and the family is defined within the constraints of 
the Euro-American kinship system, it cannot have any other effect. Just as ex-
pectations  of  biological  reproduction  affect  the  space  for  imagining  things  dif-
ferently, laws and regulations about procreation affect the space for reiterating 
and living one’s life differently. As Judith Butler notes, when the state holds the 
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monopoly to grant the legal recognition of kinship relations, its refusal to grant 
recognition to certain kinds of intimate relationships – in the contexts of the 
three policy documents one could mention adoption for same-sex couples – sig-
nifies a sense derealisation and delegitimation of those relationships (Butler 
2004, 112-118). This limited understanding of the family implies a two-fold ef-
fect  on  reproductive  agency:  on  what  can  be  imagined  as  possible  and  on  the  




In conclusion of my description and redescription of the concept of the family in 
the three policy documents, I will summarise the various positions and under-
standings. First, however, I will offer a very different viewpoint on the question 
of families, children and reproduction as political issues than the notions in-
spired by Cornell. In so doing I wish to bring a totally new perspective to think-
ing about reproductive issues.  
Lee Edelman’s polemical book No Future, which was published in 
2004, deals with reproductive futurism and the figure of the Child as a political 
tool. Elaborating on Lacanian theory, Edelman, a Queer theorist, argues that the 
figure of the Child is something that is impossible to deny in politics, and that it 
shapes the logic within which the political is forced to be thought. This logic 
compels the framing of political debate in terms of reproductive futurism. The 
Child is the perpetual horizon of all political intervention and promotes repro-
ductive futurism, which privileges heteronormative procreation. Edelman’s an-
swer to reproductive futurism is queer, which he connects with the Lacanian 
concept of the death drive and which embodies future-negation, narcissism and 
resistance to meaning. (Edelman 2004, 1-31) He notes that assuming the queer 
position might make it possible to ‘undertake the impossible project of imagin-
ing an oppositional political stance exempt from the imperative to reproduce the 
politics of signification (the politics aimed at closing the gap opened up by the 
signifier itself), which can only return us, by way of the Child, to the politics of 
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reproduction’ (ibid., 27). In criticising the fetishsization of the figure of the Child 
he is proposing a different kind of political logic based on something other than 
reproductive futurism. 
My purpose here is not to examine Edelman’s argumentation more 
closely42, but to offer a glimpse into a kind of logic aimed at disrupting the con-
ventional way of thinking about politics as something that is closely connected 
to the idea of the future and future generations. Edelman’s notions of reproduc-
tive futurism and the figure of the Child are also relevant to my work. It is clear 
from my description and redescription that children and the future are unques-
tioned values in the three documents on the need for a population policy, and 
are not challenged from any viewpoint. 
The family, which requires children, is one of the elements that 
structures understandings of reproduction and population policies. The Euro-
American understanding of kinship specifies the family in an unquestioned way 
in the sense that its position in the thinking about population policies is not ex-
amined in the discourses I study. The family is primarily understood as a het-
erosexual and at least a formally monogamous relationship, which has its basis 
in  the  sexual  relationship  between  the  adults.  The  child  is  the  connecting  ele-
ment that makes the man and the woman kin to each other and thus creates the 
family unit with kinship ties and networks of relatives. There are some signs of 
relaxation of the concept, but often in terms of exceptions to the norm and not 
something that should be given the same weight and valuation as the traditional 
family. 
In  formulating  the  notion  of  reproductive  agency  I  draw  on  the  
work of Drucilla Cornell, who offers a different approach to the question of het-
eronormative privilege than Edelman. She does not attempt to deny the future, 
but rather sees it as a necessary concept in terms of personality formation. This 
does not imply that she wishes to reinforce the heteronormative and patriarchal 
structure of the family, however. On the contrary, she offers theorisation that 
aims to disrupt the traditional understanding. She notes that living out the 
sexuate being is a fundamental aspect of one’s personality, and this includes for 
                                                             
42 For criticism of Edelman’s thought see e.g., the Introduction and Chapter 5 in Muñoz 2009. 
119 
 
example  the  question  of  whether  or  not  to  marry  (Cornell  1998,  41).  Further-
more, ‘[w]hether and how one represents oneself as a mother is clearly a per-
sonality-defining  decision’  (ibid.,  42);  thus  everyone  should  have  the  right  to  
imagine their reproductive lives as freely as possible, the right to reproductive 
agency.  
According to Cornell, ‘the promotion of the integrity of heterosexual 
monogamous marriage in a politically liberal society is illegitimate because it 
violates the sanctuary of personality, the imaginary domain’ (ibid., 39). The 
question is how the idea of the imaginary domain with its refusal to give sub-
stance  or  content  to  our  imaginations  can  be  successful  in  re-thinking  and  re-
living the family. Cornell notes that imagined settings need to be translated into 
real space – she uses housing laws as an example – so that intimate relation-
ships may be actualised and represented (ibid., 43), and she offers broad guide-
lines  on  how  family  law  could  be  reformed.  However,  it  may  be  difficult  to  
broaden the idea of the family in everyday politics, where change is always 
piecemeal and based on existing systems.  
It is clear that the construction of family policies that are at the core 
of Finnish population policy has taken decades, during which time conceptions 
of the family have changed. The changes are built upon the old structures and 
are thus rather piecemeal. Some of the policies and policy proposals are formu-
lated so as to enable different kinds of family arrangements, such as the provi-
sions for paternity and family leave that allow the roles of men and women to be 
arranged differently to some degree, but they are not necessarily used. There 
have also been attempts to bring equality measures into family policies, such as 
the  redistribution  of  the  economic  and  employment-related  burden  of  having  
children, and the division of family leave between the parents, but if people’s 
attitudes and imaginaries remain in the mode of the traditional family, it is dif-
ficult to see how these policies will actually bring about change. Cornell calls for 
a deeper change, which requires giving women full recognition as persons and 
subjects of rights (see e.g. Cornell 1995, 83-91), and that involves more than just 
tinkering with individual policies. Change is, however, more difficult. Moreover, 
policies defining how family lives should be conducted, even if designed with 
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equality in mind, could be deemed unwanted from the perspective of reproduc-
tive agency because they imply there is only one way of looking at the issue. 
A basic question concerning the notion and institution of the fam-
ily, and its historicising and expansion, is whether it is possible to have popula-
tion policies without such a concept. As has become clear, family policies are at 
the core of the discussion on population policies in the documents. In the cur-
rent climate such policies refer to a wide range of public activities ranging from 
housing support to maternity leave, and are focused on the family. It thus seems 
difficult to think in terms of population policies and measures aimed at affecting 
the birth rate without the concept of the family. Despite the problems thus in-
volved in creating wide-ranging policy proposals, I believe that population poli-
cies and family policies in general are one area of politics in which understand-
ings  of  the  family  could  be  more  flexible  and  open.  Fundamental  redefinition  
requires  more  than  just  policy  change  or  governmental  action,  however.  It  
seems from the above discussion, as well as from Cornell’s attempt to formulate 
a reform of family law rather than to get rid of the entire concept of the family, 
that the family is still an important site of intimate relations. My conception of 
reproductive agency offers perspectives in terms of re-iterating, or living differ-
ently, the hegemonic understanding. We also need everyday contestations of 
restrictive representations of how the family should be acted out and lived.  
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5 Thematic description and redescription II: Eco-
nomics 
5.1 Introduction 
The second major theme in the three policy documents concerns the economic 
aspects of the population question. Demographic development is generally con-
sidered one of the elements in national economic development, and Finland is 
no exception: demographics is strongly related to the future, continuity of the 
nation and its economic success. Chapter nine in the GOV report, entitled 
‘Strengthening the potential for economic growth’ (GOV, 57), is a good example 
of the focus on economic success. My description and redescription in this chap-
ter, therefore, concentrates on the economic perspective of the population-
policy discourse in the three documents, with specific reference to how various 
conditions either enhance or prevent reproductive agency. First I recap Drucilla 
Cornell’s  ideas  about  the  prerequisites  for  the  imaginary  domain  in  order  to  
shed light on the connection with reproductive agency; what is needed to facili-
tate the process of personality development. I also examine the connection be-
tween the imaginary domain and matters of public policy. I then show how the 
economic perspective is present in the three policy documents. All the docu-
ments include economic considerations: the GOV report concentrates most 
heavily on macroeconomic questions such as employment and competitiveness, 
whereas  EVA  and  FF  focus  more  on  the  financial  situation  of  families  and  on  
family policies.  
I  redescribe  the  documents  in  the  third  section  of  the  chapter.  In  
terms of economics, one of the main areas concerns family policies, which are 
seen as an essential tool in increasing the birth rate. The documents also con-
sider macroeconomic problems connected to demographics such as employ-
ment, GDP growth and competitiveness. Although I do consider the macroeco-
nomic perspective, my redescription emphasises family policies, which are more 
significant in the light of the aim to influence the conditions of reproductive 
agency more directly. I also examine a counter-discourse to economics talk, the 
focus being on family values and the counter-approach to the view that having 
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children is primarily a financial decision. The gender aspect of the family-values 
discourse is analysed in the next chapter, but it warrants attention here, too, 
because it is presented as a counter-argument to the economic viewpoint. 
 
5.2 Expansion of the redescriptive tool: conditions for the imaginary 
domain 
Earlier I examined Drucilla Cornell’s views on the imaginary domain in terms of 
the formation of the self, and explained my use of the concept in developing the 
notion of reproductive agency. I now turn my attention to the conditions in 
which personality formation, and thus also reproductive agency, is enacted. 
Cornell writes a great deal about the need for the imaginary domain and its role 
in personality formation, but for her it is not given. The conditions in which the 
personality forms are not irrelevant, and the formation of the imaginary domain 
is dependent on the existing society and culture. The existing society, further-
more, is linked to different kinds of social arrangements, and to economic and 
policy issues. The connection between the imaginary domain – and reproductive 
agency – and a state’s economic and social arrangements is not self-evident, and 
might at first seem tenuous, but it is apparent that the kinds of economic and 
social policies that are in place and how they are realised affect the process of 
personality formation and reproductive agency. An important element in per-
sonality formation is freedom, which I formulate here in line with Drucilla Cor-
nell’s thinking.  
As noted in the second chapter, Cornell sees freedom as an essential 
element in the formation of the personality, and as closely connected to the no-
tion of the imaginary domain. I will now introduce a new, related aspect. Cornell 
writes that the freedom to struggle to become a person, to try to cohere as a self, 
is  a  chance  or  an  opportunity,  and  this  chance  is  dependent  on  a  prior  set  of  
conditions that are needed for individuation (Cornell 1995, 5). The prior set of 
conditions refers to the very basic conditions that are necessary, but not suffi-
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cient for the formation of individuality43 (ibid.,  4,  240n2).  I  elaborate  on  her  
thinking and consider these conditions from a broader perspective that takes 
into  account  not  just  the  minimum requirements,  but  also  what  might  consti-
tute a sufficient set of conditions for the open-ended process of personality for-
mation.  
Implicit in the idea that the freedom to become a person is a chance 
is the presence of certain societal elements that make freedom, or to be more 
precise  the  ideal  of  freedom,  possible.  One  element  in  the  quest  to  form one’s  
personality freely is the question of justice, and the ways in which equality and 
privacy are understood. As I see it, the notions of substantive equality, or socie-
tal and economic arrangements, are relevant here. Cornell is not proposing that 
equal protection of the imaginary domain requires control over all aspects of life 
in the name of substantive equality (Cornell 1998, 26). In general, she uses the 
notion of the imaginary domain in a way that does not make substantive claims 
about its content. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there are no repercus-
sions as to how societal or economic arrangements are considered.  
 
 Cornell writes: 
 
The problem with most theories of justice, from a feminist perspec-
tive, is that they have not adequately addressed conditions of inclu-
sion because they have failed to address the relationship between 
the ideal of the free person and the project all human beings have of 
orienting themselves as to their sexuate being. An equivalent law of 
persons would clearly demand that the scope of distributive justice 
be sufficient to ensure the right to the self-representation of each 
person’s sexuate being. (ibid.) 
 
Distributive justice is thus connected to self-representation. Cor-
nell’s notion of distributive justice refers here to the kind of material conditions 
                                                             
43 These are bodily integrity, the protection of the imaginary domain, and access to sufficient 
symbolic forms and linguistic skills that enable a person to differentiate themselves from others 
(Cornell 1995, 4).  
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and economic resources that are necessary for and influence the formation of a 
coherent personality. Certain societal conditions must be present if people are 
to be free in terms of personality formation, and these conditions can be evalu-
ated against the ideal of the imaginary domain. Although Cornell does not make 
any substantive proposals, her ideal of freedom may be used to evaluate policies 
and could affect how one thinks about society’s economic arrangements. In ad-
dition, because Cornell considers freedom and the imaginary domain ideal, i.e. 
they can never be fully realised, societal arrangements assume importance in 
any attempt to realise the ideals  
 What  does  evaluating  policies  mean  in  practice?  By  way  of  an  ex-
ample I will briefly consider Cornell’s views on abortion and related policies. 
Cornell supports free abortion44, but being able to choose abortion, which is the 
form  or  the  logic  of  current  US  legalisation,  does  not  comply  sufficiently  with  
her notion of the imaginary domain. As she notes, ‘[s]ince abortion does involve 
the need for access to some kind of medical facility, the state may not prevent 
women  from  being  able  to  live  out  their  own  self-images  by  making  it  either  
well-nigh impossible or unsafe for them to actually have abortion’ (Cornell 1995, 
67). She thus insists that the state should offer publicly funded free abortion, 
which enables all women to live out their self-images. This example of abortion 
policies illustrates how the economic conditions in which a woman lives can be 
used as justification for certain policy arrangements, not because the woman is 
entitled to benefits per se, but because these benefits are essential in the forma-
tion of the personhood to which everyone should be entitled. 
 When one views the need for state involvement in people’s lives 
from the perspective of the imaginary domain, the question that arises is 
whether a social policy or public arrangement, or a law enhances or inhibits 
one’s ability to cohere and imagine oneself as a whole. It is possible to evaluate 
whether a certain policy strengthens ability to have the imaginary domain. Poli-
cies should not be structured in a way that defines content of the imaginary do-
main; in other words, there should not be predefined notions about how people 
construct  their  identities.  Continuing  with  the  example  of  abortion  policies,  it  
                                                             
44 For more about Cornell’s views on abortion rights see e.g., Cornell 1995, Chapter 2.  
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could be said that publicly funded free abortions enable women to have an abor-
tion when they judge it to be the best for them, but they do not force anyone to 
have an abortion. Those whose sense of coherence requires them to have an 
abortion are able to have one, but those whose imaginary selves do not accept 
abortion or for whom it is not consistent with their identifications are not forced 
into it. Cornell’s thought, even though it emphasises freedom, does not auto-
matically view public policies negatively. They have an essential role in the con-
tinuing formation of the personality, and may guarantee, at least to some extent, 
that people are able to cohere into a self and to secure their imaginary domains. 
In other words, public policies can promote freedom, as Cornell understands it. 
 Public policies are connected to economics. The perspective on eco-
nomics in this study is twofold. Firstly, it is possible to examine the conditions 
guaranteeing that a person can retain a sense of imaginary coherence, or at least 
recognise the ideal as something to be aimed at. These conditions are connected 
to various policy arrangements, which in turn are connected to state and public 
financing. This first perspective concerns specific policies and discourses about 
policies,  and  the  way  they  affect  the  imaginary  domain  and  people’s  ability  to  
imagine themselves as a whole. Secondly, emanating from the notion of specific 
policies is the more macro-level perspective covering the financing of state and 
public policies and the general logic behind macroeconomics.  
Policies as conditions enabling the imaginary domain, and thus also 
reproductive agency, are not addressed directly in the debates described and 
redescribed in this study, but policies aimed at influencing the birth rate create 
conditions for reproductive agency through proposing economic and political 
solutions. I will focus briefly on the macroeconomic perspective because it is so 
salient in some of the selected policy documents. In terms of reproductive 
agency, formulations of policy arrangements that affect the economic conditions 




5.3 Thematic description II 
In this section I describe the economic discussion in the three selected docu-
ments in relation to the questions of  demography and the birth rate.  The con-
nection between economics and demographics is two-fold. First, on the macro-
economic level, there is concern about Government finances in a situation in 
which demographic development is not balanced, and the older age groups are 
becoming larger in relation to the younger, productive groups. This concerns 
public or Governmental finances, and the more comprehensive question of na-
tional economic development. Secondly, in connection with finding solutions to 
these demographic challenges, there are micro-level questions to do with family 
policies, the balance between work life and family life, and the financial circum-
stances of individuals and families in general in relation to their willingness to 
have (more) children. This perspective is related to social policy and is more 
directly connected to the financial conditions of the imaginary domain and re-
productive agency. I start my description on the macroeconomic level. 
 
5.3.1 Demographics and economic development 
The connection between demographic and economic development is stressed in 
the three selected policy documents, all of which take for granted the link be-
tween population and economic growth. There are differences in emphasis and 
approach, however. The GOV report focuses in particular on economic growth, 
public finances and competitiveness, and a growing population is considered 
vital for the future of the Finnish welfare state and the general wellbeing of the 
nation.  There  are  several  chapters  dedicated  to  economic  issues:  Chapter  9  is  
entitled ‘Strengthening the potential for economic growth’, Chapter 10 ‘Reform 
of benefit schemes’, and Chapter 11 ‘Safeguarding regional development and 
basic public services’, and all questions are related in one way or another to the 
economic perspective. There are also sections in many of the other chapters that 
touch on themes related to finance.  
Questions concerning macro-level economic development are not as 
prominent in the other two policy documents. They are mentioned, but the 
main focus is on the connection between the economic situation of families and 
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the willingness to have children. Both concentrate more on family policies, al-
though FF clearly refers to their effectiveness in a more positive light, whereas 
EVA views them and their effects on the birth rate with suspicion. I return to the 
question of family policies in the next section.  
All these economic questions, meaning the different policies on the 
practical level and macroeconomic questions such as national competitiveness 
and concern about the gross domestic product, are related. The logic of the dif-
ferent aspects can be described as circular. The starting point is the idea of eco-
nomic growth, which – especially in the GOV report – is considered essential for 
the maintenance of the welfare state. The welfare state then creates family poli-
cies aimed at affecting the birth rate in a positive way. When people have more 
children it guarantees a productive work force and a body of consumers, which 
also means that economic growth is secured. Although the macroeconomic per-
spective and concerns about family policies are intertwined, for analytical rea-
sons I will separate them as this facilitates a more detailed redescription.  
The macroeconomic aspects of population growth are dealt with in 
the three documents within distinct themes. One of the most visible is the no-
tion of the aging population, which is considered the main demographic trend 
affecting  Finnish  society  and  economics.  This  issue  incorporates  different  
strands that are obviously related to differing degrees. These strands represent 
major economic themes, such as employment and competitiveness, but since 
they are addressed in terms of the demographic challenge, i.e. the aging popula-
tion, the perspective is restricted. Accordingly, although the GOV report exam-
ines many economic themes, the problem of the aging population is usually 
there in one form or another. It is considered one of main challenges facing the 
Finnish government in the near future. Not only will there be more elderly peo-
ple, the balance between the older and the younger, productive generations will 
change. The report notes:  
  
Aging implies a change in the relative size of different age groups. 
Ageing is a phenomenon affecting the whole society, and due to its 
effects the number of children and working-age people will decrease 




Thus the ageing process will influence economic development and employment, 
and will have a considerable impact on public finances and the financing of the 
welfare  system (ibid.).  It  will  affect  how people  spend their  time,  it  will  entail  
change in the need for different services, and it will create new consumer de-
mand (ibid., 26-28).  
Chapter  1  of  the  EVA  report,  entitled  ‘Finns  are  a  decreasing  and  
ageing nation’ (EVA, 7), also deals with the aging population and the consequent 
demographic challenges. It draws attention to the ratio between productive and 
non-productive members of society, the so-called dependency ratio, and to the 
challenges  that  the  rising  number  of  dependent  citizens  will  bring  (ibid.,  7-9).  
The report also includes a brief analysis of the demographic prognoses and fac-
tors affecting the size of the population, such as the birth rate, the death rate 
and immigration (ibid., 9-16). The Family Federation’s Population Policy Pro-
gram covers population change in Chapter 3.1 (‘Population Development’) and 
3.2 (‘Age Structure’) (FF, 11). It takes a more demographic perspective, however, 
focusing more on the population structure and development and less on analys-
ing the financial ramifications. 
 The discourses on the ageing population include many concepts and 
issues that come up in all the documents, such as the dependency ratio, the fi-
nancing of pensions, competitiveness and employment rates. All these are issues 
that are affected as the age structure of the Finnish nation changes and the 
population becomes older, and the proportion of the productive population (i.e. 
people of working age) relative to the dependent population, pensioners in par-
ticular,  declines.  The problem of  the aging population is  not just  a  question of  
financing pensions, however. Other challenges include the changing structure of 
the workforce, which affects availability and regional and professional mobility; 
the increasing need for services, which also creates regional differences and thus 
affects the provision and financing of basic public services; and the slower eco-
nomic growth in general due to the smaller and older workforce, the slowing 
down  of  productivity  growth,  and  the  changing  structure  of  domestic  demand  
favouring the service sector in which productivity is lower (GOV, 26-34). 
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Although ageing is considered a problem, there are also attempts to 
see the positive sides. The Government report notes that older people have ex-
perience and wisdom, and that the new generations of retirees are wealthier and 
have more purchasing power (ibid., 28, 43-44), and thus constitute a consumer 
group with purchasing potential. The FF report remarks that aging is not a dis-
ability, and that an ageing society does not mean a society that is getting worse 
(FF, 7). Despite these positive aspects, however, it is clear that aging is seen 
mainly  as  a  challenge  that  will  create  problems  for  Finnish  society.  The  main  
demographic challenge is considered a legitimate worry for the Finnish Gov-
ernment. Through this the documents go on to analyse all sorts of economic 
problems that will arise as the proportions of pensioners and older people in-
crease. The GOV report in particular analyses the effects from many perspec-
tives ranging from regional development to the reforming of the benefit and so-
cial-security systems. All these questions are addressed in terms of demograph-
ics. An example of this is the focus on the availability of welfare services: as 
there will be fewer people there may not be enough employees in the sector, 
meaning an erosion in public funding and a growing need at the same time 
(GOV, 33).  
Another issue that is brought up in connection with the question of 
the diminishing population is immigration. I do not examine this question more 
closely here, but it is noteworthy that the EVA report is the most negative, stat-
ing that immigration is not the solution to the demographic challenges that 
Finland faces (EVA, 11-12). The GOV report and the FF Program take a some-
what more positive attitude, but they also see immigration as a limited solution, 
and emphasise that it should be work-based and controlled (GOV, 48-50, FF, 
36-39). None of the three documents see it as a solution to the problem of popu-
lation growth. It is more important to raise the birth rate among Finnish people 




5.3.2 Family policies and the economic conditions for having chil-
dren 
Concern about the economic development of the Finnish nation is strongly pre-
sent in the GOV report,  and is  also visible in the EVA report.  Both documents 
consider economic growth vital for Finland, and population growth as an impor-
tant factor in it. Population growth may be stimulated by different kinds of pol-
icy measures that could be called family policies, and this is the second focus of 
the financial preoccupations I distinguish in these documents. Family policies 
are also at the heart of the FF interest and thus constitute a theme that is pre-
sent in all three documents, although the perspectives vary. There are differing 
viewpoints on the basic question of effectiveness, for example. The FF report 
notes that the universal welfare-state model and a certain level of social security 
seem to be a precondition for keeping the birth rate near the renewal level (FF, 
28), and the GOV report also considers family policies essential in raising the 
Finnish  birth  rate.  The  EVA  report  takes  a  more  critical  stance,  emphasising  
individual responsibility. The question of whether family policies have an effect 
on the birth rate, and if so to what extent, is not relevant to my study. Whether 
they are effective or not, they are a central element in the debate on population 
issues and the need to raise the birth rate. 
Defining what policies count as family policies is tricky in that many 
public activities clearly affect the lives of families. An exact definition is not nec-
essary for my purposes, and I do not give one here - nor do the documents I ex-
amine. There are some distinctions, however. For example, it is possible to 
separate policies dealing with direct cash benefits such as child benefit (lap-
silisä), services such as childcare, and other support systems such as maternity 
and family leave. Different types of policies have different operational logics, 
and  there  are  also  differences  inside  the  groupings  in  how  and  by  what  logic  
they function. Benefits may be means-tested or universal, fees may be flat rate 
or based on income, and actions in addition to the application may or may not 
be required. For example, Finnish child benefit (lapsilisä)  is  paid  for  children  
under the age of 17, it is not dependent on income and needs only an applica-
tion. Maternity benefit (äitiysavustus) can be included in the same group of di-
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rect cash benefits: it can be taken as a lump sum of 140 euros or as a maternity 
pack containing everyday things needed for early childcare. It requires medical 
examination of the expectant mother, however. In income-based policies par-
ents’ incomes affect the fees; an example of this is the public provision of child-
care. Knowing the exact content of the policies is not relevant to my analyses, 
but it is good to be aware of the different ways in which families are supported. 
My  examination  of  the  themes  in  the  discourses  related  to  family  
policies in the documents clearly revealed that one of the main issues concerns 
the combining of work and family life. It is a multi-faceted question, but the ba-
sic assumption is that securing a high level of employment and participation in 
the work force are essential for the economic survival of the nation and for the 
survival of the welfare state. The Finnish welfare system was built on the as-
sumption that women are full-time participants in the work force (see e.g., 
Julkunen 1994), and this question is often considered in more detail in the 
documents. Women’s working is not always seen as merely positive, however, or 
as something that should be encouraged. I examine the gendered viewpoint in 
Chapter 5. 
The GOV report takes it as self-evident that both parents work: it is 
families that have children and thus it is family life and work life that have to be 
combined. The work perspective is the most prominent theme in the section of 
the report dealing with favourable conditions for having children. The combin-
ing of work with having a family is dealt with on rather a general level, although 
family leave and the problem of fixed-term work contracts are mentioned on a 
more specific level (GOV, 46-47). Of the texts examined here, the GOV report 
takes the broadest approach to the question of employment and the labour mar-
ket, which is logical given its focus on preparing for the changes in the age struc-
ture. It includes a section on reducing unemployment and increasing the labour 
supply (ibid., 57-59), which are important questions from the perspective of 
economic growth on the national level.  
The question of family policies is not as strongly concentrated on 
the  combination  of  work  life  and  parenthood in  the  FF  document.  Although it  
mentions the need for a more child-friendly work culture, one that would make 
it  easier  to  combine  the  demands  of  family  and  work  life  (FF,  32),  it  pays  the  
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least  attention  to  policy  proposals  connected  to  the  labour-market  side  of  the  
work life - family life balance. It traces the development of the labour force 
(ibid., 21-22), but with regard to policy proposals it does not recommend spe-
cific actions. The focus is more on policies that would enable parents to stay at 
home than on changes in the labour market itself. Examples of policies it pro-
motes include raising the maternity allowance and home-care subsidy (ibid., 34-
35). The focus is more on the need for parents to spend time with and care for 
their children than on the structures and practices of working life.  
The EVA report analyses the Finnish labour market from several 
perspectives: the sub-headings in the chapter ‘Why do Finns not have children?’ 
include ‘Women concentrate on work and a career’, ‘Working life does not leave 
room for  children’  and  ‘Unbearable  uncertainty  prevails  in  the  world  of  fixed-
term contracts’ (EVA). As the sub-headings suggest, these sections analyse 
women’s position on the labour market, family policies directed at combining 
work  and  family  life,  and  the  pressures  in  the  current  work  environment.  The  
take on family policies is  more sceptical  than in the other two documents,  but 
EVA also acknowledges that when people feel more pressure at work it affects 
their attitudes and plans regarding the family (EVA, 23). 
One of the major issues in the discussion on the combination of 
work  and  family  life  is  childcare,  and  all  the  texts  deal  with  this  question  to  
some extent. Even the EVA report, which questions the effectiveness of family 
policies,  admits  that  successful  childcare  arrangements  have  mitigated  the  ef-
fects of women’s participation in the work force on the birth rate (ibid., 22). 
Other examples of childcare-related issues include the FF demand to lower the 
costs of day care (FF, 35) and the GOV stress on the importance of maintaining 
various day-care options (GOV, 46). Although publicly funded childcare is seen 
as an important part of the Finnish welfare system, and is referred to in these 
texts, it is dealt with here in a surprisingly cursory manner. The discourse on the 
importance  of  combing  working  and  having  children  or  a  family  does  not  dis-
cuss childcare arrangements in a very detailed manner, the FF gives it the most 
detailed attention.  
Studying is an issue related to the larger question of combining 
work and family life. All the documents consider it important to improve the 
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position of students who have children. Studying times are long in Finland, and 
people graduate at an older age than in many other European countries. All the 
texts consider it vital to provide services that would facilitate having children 
while studying. EVA pays the least attention to students in terms of the policy 
proposals directed at them, but its report does analyse the possible causal con-
nection between the long studying times and the low birth rate. It offers possible 
solutions including raising the birth rate among students, but notes that at-
tempts to shorten studying times may result in students having even fewer chil-
dren than they do now (EVA, 24-26). The FF makes more detailed propositions 
to make it easier for students to have children, such as reinstating the child in-
crement of the study grant and making study loans flexible enough to take into 
account the family situation (FF, 34). The GOV report takes a much more gen-
eral approach, but notes that increasing financial assistance will promote a 
faster studying pace, and that it should be possible to combine childcare and 
studying (GOV, 46-47). 
All the above-mentioned policy sectors and proposals clearly con-
cern family policies. The difficulty in defining what counts as family policy or a 
policy that has effects on the birth rate is exemplified in the housing policies 
that also feature in the documents. The EVA report does not pay attention to it, 
although it mentions housing policies as one of the areas included in a wide un-
derstanding of what family policies are (EVA, 18). The GOV and FF reports, 
however, see housing as one of the areas to be taken into account when policies 
aimed at influencing the birth rate are drawn up. As the GOV report notes, ‘[t]he 
housing expenses of families with children often swallow up a large part of their 
income  and,  for  many  families,  increasing  the  burden  of  such  expenses  is  not  
possible’. There is a clear need for affordable, high-quality housing, which 
should  be  pursued  by  means  of  a  land-use  policy,  especially  in  major  cities  
(GOV, 47).  The FF also places importance on housing policies, noting how they 
can significantly affect young families and their decision to have children or not 
(FF, 34).  
The questions of economic growth, financial support for families 
and economic conditions feature strongly when population policy is discussed in 
the three documents. Not all of them deal with all economic aspects, although 
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there  are  overlapping  themes.  The  GOV  report  takes  the  broadest  perspective  
given its assumed responsibility for the economic growth of Finland. The EVA 
report,  which  shows  scepticism towards  family  policies  in  general,  takes  a  dif-
ferent approach. It analyses different economic aspects, but concludes that it is 
impossible to tell whether or not family policies are effective, and that it is more 
important to concentrate on the values that people hold (EVA, 32-36). In ques-
tioning the relevance of monetary considerations in general when people make 
decisions about having children the EVA report differs from the two other policy 
documents, both of which take it as axiomatic that the family economic situa-
tion is an important factor.  
EVA  expresses  doubts  as  to  whether  low  incomes  and  inadequate  
benefits really explain the falling birth rate, given that decades ago when bene-
fits were smaller, working weeks were longer and studying was financed by the 
family rather than study grants, the birth rate was still higher than now (ibid., 
35-36). The report draws attention to the values that people hold, and at the 
same time questions the reasonableness of public expenditure on family poli-
cies. The FF and GOV reports, in contrast, claim that financial support for fami-
lies is necessary in terms of increasing the birth rate and, consequently, main-
taining population growth. The FF report states clearly that it is a task of society 
to  maintain  conditions  that  support  the  decision  to  have  children  (FF,  8),  and  
although it attaches importance to the values people hold (ibid., 31-32), it also 
deals extensively with the financial aspects and notes, for example, that eco-
nomic uncertainty is one of the main reasons why people under 30 do not have 
children (ibid. 33-34). The GOV report stresses the positive connection between 
the birth rate and family policy, referring to the fact that countries with ad-
vanced family policies and measures that allow the combining of family and 
work life also have the highest birth rates (GOV, 46). 
As this description shows, demographics and economics are closely 
connected in the three documents. Inherent in the two different levels of argu-
mentation, the macroeconomic connection between population growth and 
economic success, and family policies as means to affect population growth, are 
certain notions of how economics and finances affect decisions related to repro-
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duction. I now turn to redescription in order to explore some of these values and 
notions. 
 
5.4 Thematic redescription II 
My  focus  in  this  redescription  is  on  family  policies.  I  consider  the  macroeco-
nomic perspective only briefly, as the notion of reproductive agency is more di-
rectly connected to the family policies and to the conditions the policies create 
for  the  formation  of  the  procreative  personality.  The  rediscription  covers  four  
perspectives. First I look briefly at the macroeconomic discourse of understand-
ing people as power, and then move on to the policy-oriented views of reproduc-
tion  normativity  and  procreation  as  a  rational  decision.  Finally  I  examine  the  
counter-discourse to the economic viewpoint, which reveals that the seemingly 
unanimously positive attitude to family policies is not the only opinion in 
Finland. 
 
5.4.1 Macroeconomics: people as power 
The idea of connecting the population and the evaluation of (economic) devel-
opment  arose  relatively  recently.  Although the  numbers  and  quality  of  inhabi-
tants  have  long  been  a  major  element  in  governance  of  a  land,  the  population  
became a specific object of governance only in the 17th century (Koivusalo 1994, 
53). There was a significant conceptual advance in the 19th century with the de-
velopment of statistics and its introduction into everyday language (Duden 
1992, 147-148), which facilitated the observation of people in quantitative terms. 
According to Barbara Duden: 
 
These new concepts made it possible to uncover general truths 
about mass phenomena even though the cause of each particular 
action was unknown and remained inaccessible. Populations were 
attributed forms of ‘behaviour’, explained now by ‘probability’. Sta-
tistics became the new ‘Latin’ of all modern sciences and the term 




The population was already the subject  of  research and policies in 
many countries in the 19th and early 20th centuries (see e.g., Lento 1948). It also 
assumed importance in debates about development in the 1950s, and became a 
very significant variable in the development calculus and the politics and poli-
cies regarding developing nations. (Duden 1992, 150-152) According to Duden, 
‘[b]y the late ’70s population appears in policy statements as a variable in the 
algorithm to which the whole immensely complicated development process had 
been  reduced’  (ibid.,  154).  On  the  political  level  the  population  has  become  a  
multifaceted problem in the 21st century, and examined from the European per-
spective there are at least two discourses that are characterised in many ways by 
hypocrisy  and  disconnection.  First  there  is  the  drop  in  European  birth  rates,  
which happened in the early twentieth century, and the policies and debates 
around that theme (see e.g., Lento 1948, 190; Ritamies 2006, 19), and secondly 
there is the discussion on overpopulation in the developing world that started in 
the  1950s.  The  global  debate  on  development  and  population  issues  differs  in  
perspective from the debate on the European level. The Finnish documents ex-
amined clearly diverge from the global view in which overpopulation is often 
considered a problem. The three policy texts are in line with the Euro-centred 
perspective, according to which the decline in the population is strictly a domes-
tic matter. 
Macroeconomic considerations and the role of the population are 
prominent in the GOV report, which focuses on the general economic develop-
ment of Finland. The continuing economic growth is connected to the popula-
tion question in that population growth, and implicitly women’s role in the 
process as the ones giving birth, is vital for the survival of the nation. Nira Yu-
val-Davis calls this kind of talk ‘people as power discourse’. She writes: 
 
In this discourse [of people as power], the future of ‘the nation’ is 
seen to depend on its continuous growth. Sometimes this growth 
can be based also on immigration. At other times, it depends almost 
exclusively in the reproductive powers of women who are called 
upon to have more children. The need for people – often primarily 
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for  men  –  can  be  for  a  variety  of  nationalistic  purposes,  civil  and  
military. They can be needed as workers, as settlers, as solders. (Yu-
val-Davis 1997, 29) 
 
Although the policy texts do not promote strong pronatalist ideas, 
they still suggest that the future of the nation is dependent on continuous eco-
nomic growth, and that economic growth requires at least a replacement-level 
birth rate. Furthermore, women’s role in matters to do with the birth rate is in-
disputably different from that of men. The gender perspective is analysed in the 
next chapter, but even at this point it can be said that, given the current cultural, 
social and political arrangements, the effects of policies that target procreation 
are stronger on women’s reproductive agency and imaginary domain. One factor 
in this relates to the current cultural and social values attached to motherhood 
and women’s role as mothers.  
The idea of people as power discourse is especially noticeable in the 
GOV text: people are considered essential for national economic development, 
i.e. as workers and consumers. The need for continual economic growth features 
very strongly. An entire chapter is dedicated to the consolidation of growth 
through  reducing  unemployment  and  increasing  the  labour  supply,  and  the  
chapter on regional development also concentrates on economics (GOV, chap-
ters 9 and 11). The consumer perspective is present, for instance, in the way 
pensioners are perceived as consumers who will create a demand for leisure 
products, travel and culture (GOV, 76). In general, the concern with national 
economics  reflects  the  growing  importance  of  economic  issues  in  current  poli-
tics. As Anu Kantola points out, the management of public finances and eco-
nomic questions have assumed major significance in Finnish political govern-
ance, especially since the Second World War (Kantola 2002, 292-293). The dis-
cussion often focuses on budgetary measures and public funding needs rather 
than value preferences or ideologies. Politicians approach issues from the per-
spective of economics, and public funding and policies, and not in terms of 
whether particular values are important. As one parliamentarian noted when 
the GOV report was discussed: ‘Money reveals the true values of society, every-
thing  else  is  just  talk  [hymistelyä]’ (Eduskunta 2004, Kasvi, Jyrki, (ryhmäpu-
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heenvuoro [group statement])). The centrality of economics in Governmental 
policy is reflected in the GOV text, which refers to people as workers who con-
tribute to economic growth with their labour input, and as consumers who en-
hance economic growth with their purchasing power.   
Economic growth requires people, and in that way population 
growth is economically important. The logic is that it is acceptable to try to in-
fluence  people’s  procreative  behaviour  in  the  name of  a  greater  good,  in  other  
words economic growth. The basic premise is that the right measures will affect 
population development, i.e. if the policies are right, people will have more chil-
dren. This is not consistent with the ideas of the imaginary domain and repro-
ductive agency, however, which demand that people have the freedom to decide 
about procreation. Taking reproductive agency seriously means giving people 
the opportunity not only to reproduce, but also to refuse to reproduce. Every-
body should be allowed to imagine their coherence as they wish, and imaginary 
coherence may mean not having children.  Drucilla  Cornell  notes that  women’s 
reproductive capacities continue to be used to override their own choices about 
whether to become or remain pregnant in the name of the greater good of future 
life (Cornell 1998, 66), and that overriding women’s own decisions violates their 
imaginary domains. Pushing for policies that promote one view of procreation 
in the name of national economic development is creating an environment that 
is not conducive to reproductive agency.  
Although the connection between economic growth and the success 
of  the  nation,  and  by  implication  the  wellbeing  of  its  citizens,  is  taken  for  
granted, there are views that cast doubt on the idea that the continuous pursuit 
of  more  wealth  guarantees  wellbeing.  As  Richard  Easterlin  notes,  the  connec-
tion between declining population growth and declining economic growth is far 
from clear, and that between economic growth and wellbeing is not straightfor-
ward: in other words, faster economic growth does not necessarily enhance the 
wellbeing of a nation (Easterlin 1996, 113-127, 131-144). Although the selected 
policy texts acknowledge that population growth in absolute numbers is not the 
answer to all problems, and that the age structure matters, they still usually end 
up emphasising growth. For example, the FF notes that the current focus is on 
the population structure more than its  size (FF,  10),  but still  the policy targets 
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concentrate on growth (see e.g., FF 50-51). The GOV report also focuses strongly 
on the aging population and how it affects Finland, and yet advocates popula-
tion  polices  aimed at  increasing  the  number  of  Finnish  people  (see  e.g.,  GOV,  
chapter 6.1). Despite the brief references to other things besides population 
growth in absolute numbers, in the final analysis the reports deal with how to 
increase the birth rate, which they connect with economic growth with a view to 
influencing people’s reproductive decisions. 
 
5.4.2 Having children as a financial decision: normativity of re-
production and rational calculations 
I begin my examination of specific policies aimed at affecting the birth rate from 
the basic  principle that  everybody would have children if  their  (economic) cir-
cumstances were just right. Economic problems are assumed to prevent families 
from having  children  at  all,  or  to  limit  the  number  of  children  they  have.  The  
three policy texts differ somewhat in how they deal with family policies and with 
the connection between procreative decisions and financial considerations. The 
GOV report and the FF text in particular concentrate on the connection between 
family finances and the birth rate. The section of the GOV report focusing on the 
favourable conditions for having children deals only with the economic side, 
referring to different elements of family policies, measures that support the 
combining of studying or working with having children, and other aspects of the 
job market (GOV, 46-47), but ignoring other issues covered in the FF and EVA 
texts such as people’s values. The concentration on economic issues was also 
evident in the Parliamentary discussion on the report; the underlying assump-
tion  was  that  everyone  wants  children,  and  that  economic  circumstances  pre-
vent families from having any (or more) (see Eduskunta 2004). 
 Although the  FF  report  takes  a  much broader  view than  the  GOV 
text on the question of why people do not have more children, it mentions eco-
nomic  reasons  as  well.  The  lowering  of  the  birth  rate  is  also  connected  to  so-
called ‘quality’ issues: parents want to guarantee their offspring a better social 
and  economic  position,  and  have  fewer  children  in  order  to  be  able  to  invest  
more in each one (FF, 27). Another example of FF linking procreation with eco-
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nomic circumstances is the notion that a certain level of social security is a pre-
requisite for keeping the birth rate even close to the replacement level, and its 
proposed measures concentrate on giving financial support to families (ibid., 
28, 33-36). It is very clear, therefore, that economic considerations are seen as 
central when decisions about having children are made. 
The logic in the texts with regard to the financial aspects of procrea-
tion is that people would have children if the economic conditions were favour-
able. Families clearly make calculations regarding whether or not they can af-
ford to have children, and they should be supported by public funds in making 
these decisions. The idea of procreation as an economic decision is an interest-
ing reversal of the logic that prevails in discussions about the population prob-
lems in the developing world. It is often stated, for example, that poor families 
in the developing world consider children to be an asset (see e.g., Säävälä 1994, 
161),  and  thus  have  (too)  many.  The  logic  is  the  opposite  in  the  three  selected  
texts:  children  are  seen  as  a  financial  burden  for  families  and  this  limits  their  
willingness to have them at all, or makes them limit the number to two at the 
most.  
The three documents promote the view that children are non-
productive members of the household in a society that has gone through the so-
called second demographic transition45 (see  Ritamies  2006,  22-23),  and  be-
cause they are a financial burden, the decision of whether or not to have them is 
of major significance to the economic situation of the family. The decision of an 
individual family not to have children, or not to have ‘enough’, is considered 
detrimental on the level of the state. The focus is on the significance of children 
for the future and for the economic survival of the Finnish nation. There is thus 
a double structure: having children is a financial burden for the individual fam-
ily but an economic necessity for society. Analysing the decision to have children 
as a financial calculation from the perspective of reproductive agency highlights 
two  issues.  First,  there  is  the  hidden  normativity  that  everyone  wants  to  have  
                                                             
45 Demographic transition theory concerns the development of human fertility and mortality. In 
its first stage a society is characterised by the equilibrium of high mortality and high fertility 
over the long term. Mortality declines in the second stage,  while fertility remains at a high so-
cially  sanctioned level.  The  equilibrium of  slow or  no  growth  is  established  in  the  third  stage:  
both fertility and mortality are at low level. (Teitelbaum & Winter 1985, 14-15) A society that has 
gone through two demographic transitions is at stage three. 
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children, and secondly there is the idea that having children is a rational deci-
sion based on financial considerations. I will examine the normativity issue first. 
In the documents I examine, having children is regarded as natural 
and as something that all families would do if the economic conditions were 
right. One effect of this thinking is to present the normative structure of ‘having 
a family’ as concern for people and their financial situations. Having children is 
considered natural, and because the documents present this as something that 
everyone essentially wants, it is important and even natural for politicians to be 
concerned about the economic situation of people with children. Family-friendly 
policies do not need to be argued for explicitly, nor is there any need to defend 
them. For example, the GOV report clearly states that people would have chil-
dren if the conditions were right. Long periods of studying, financial insecurity 
in the form of fixed-term work contracts, and difficulties in combining work and 
family life lead to the postponement of having children (GOV, 46-47), but essen-
tially people want to have them.  
Talk about the ideal number of children that Finnish people would 
have, which is higher than the number they end up with, is one way of strength-
ening the norm of having children. All three documents imply that Finns do not 
have  as  many  children  as  they  would  like  (GOV,  45-47;  FF,  30;  EVA,  17).  The  
EVA report, for example, poses the question: ‘Why are more Finnish families 
giving up on the family size they consider ideal?’ It goes on to mention that the 
ideal average number of children in Finnish families is 2.4 (EVA, 17). Reference 
to averages hides the fact that there are people who do not want to have children 
at all. The FF text also covers this group, suggesting that advocating child-
friendly attitudes and the combination of work and family life can influence self-
imposed childlessness (FF, 32). FF is explicitly stating that its aim is to change 
the attitudes of people who do not want to have children (see ibid.). The concep-
tion that self-imposed childlessness is somehow unacceptable is one of the 
clearest examples of the norm that does not take reproductive agency into ac-
count. Reproductive agency is ignored through denial of the notion that having 
a full-range of options with regard to procreation means that refusing to procre-
ate is also a legitimate choice.  
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From the perspective of reproductive agency, the logic that having 
children is primarily an economic decision, and the normativity connected to it, 
clearly places constrictions on the imaginary domain. Policies advocating that 
everyone should have children imply how people should think about and imag-
ine their reproductive capacities, and there seems to be only one option: every-
one  wants  to  procreate.  As  value  propositions  the  policy  proposals  do  not  re-
spect the freedom to imagine one’s reproductive future. In addition, the docu-
ments affect the space for performing hegemonic norms differently as they have 
effects on the choices that people see possible in their reproductive behaviour. 
The norms in the texts create the limits of bodily integrity, and of imaginary co-
herence, acting as ‘politically invested and investing performative’ (Butler 1993, 
72). 
Family  policies  can  also  be  interpreted  as  enhancing  reproductive  
agency among those who freely decide to procreate. Given the financial hard-
ship  associated  with  having  children,  family  policies  enable  people  to  live  out  
the  life  they  have  chosen  for  themselves.  With  regard  to  the  formation  of  the  
imaginary domain and thus also the possibility to exercise reproductive agency, 
some policies  are  needed  so  that  people  are  not  forced  into  a  course  of  action  
they would not choose in freer circumstances. It is a question of how the policies 
are formulated as they also place limits on how parenthood and procreation are 
understood, for example. The documents examined here consider economic in-
centives essential in population policies. This links to the second issue I wish to 
discuss: rational, economic calculations with regard to procreation. 
The FF and GOV reports consider having children, at least to some 
degree, an economic decision. What this means in terms of population policy is 
that families with children should be financially supported. According to this 
line of economic thinking, citizens are economically rational people who calcu-
late the costs of having children and then make reasoned decisions about 
whether or not to do so. From a common-sense perspective this does not seem 
very plausible, even if people (as they do) were to bring some degree of rational-
ity to their reproductive decisions.  
There are theoretical approaches covering the analysis of economic 
conditions with regard to family-related decisions, including Marxism and its 
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combination with feminism. The family has been analysed as a site of produc-
tion and reproduction, for example, meaning a site of domestic labour, of repro-
duction of the labour force, and as the basic economic unit of society 
(Humphries 1982, see e.g., Brown 1982). Moreover, feminist scholars have stud-
ied issues such as the differences between men and women with regard to family 
financial resources (see e.g., Repo 2003) and the financial aspects of marriage 
and divorce (see e.g., Prager 1982). Reproduction as an important factor in gen-
eral economics has also been investigated (Robertson 1991). However, there is a 
lack of research on financial considerations as a specific element in reproductive 
decisions.  Conversely,  the  economic  articulations  of  the  family  in  the  FF  Pro-
gram and the GOV report (and in the Parliamentary discussion about the Gov-
ernment report on the future) portray people as rational beings who base their 
decisions  about  having  a  family,  in  other  words  having  children,  primarily  on  
economic considerations. As the GOV report notes, insecurities lead to the post-
ponement of having children (GOV, 47), and here insecurities refer to economic 
issues. The FF report gives another example of the role of financial calculation 
in reproductive decisions with regard to women: it claims that many women 
would be ready to have more children if there was more support for childcare at 
home (FF, 30-31), meaning that women calculate the economic consequences of 
having children.   
From  the  perspective  of  reproductive  agency  and  the  imaginary  
domain, the association of procreation with financial calculation is somewhat 
peculiar. How people construct their personalities, what kind of identifications 
they assume and how these identifications and reproductive decisions are proc-
essed and re-processed as part of the personality are not primarily economic 
considerations. People are not transparent to themselves when they project 
imaginary selves. The idea that people make fully rational, informed choices 
about reproduction is not plausible. Even if the decisions are not entirely ra-
tional, however, it does not mean that financial conditions do not matter or that 
they,  or  other  rational  considerations,  are  not  involved;  it  is  just  that  they  are  




The idea that people make rational, economics-based choices about 
procreation is  not a  straightforward issue when viewed through the lens of  re-
productive agency. Financial support for families can be seen as enhancing re-
productive agency in that people who want to have children have more options. 
It is easier for them to make the decision to have children when they know that 
there is some kind of economic safety net. Family policies as such do not force 
or require people to procreate, although they help those who do decide to do so. 
One interpretation of this is that family policies do not push certain values, and 
the contributions of public support systems have progressive elements in terms 
of offering assistance and safety nets without expecting everyone to have chil-
dren. Elements of this thinking are to be found in Drucilla Cornell’s writing on 
the need for publicly funded childcare, for example (see Cornell 1998, 128). 
However, it must be remembered that even seemingly value-free 
welfare-state systems include certain value choices when polices are imple-
mented, and they do define how family and parenthood are understood. The 
family  is  defined  in  many  ways,  for  instance  by  the  rules  of  different  kinds  of  
maternity and paternity benefits, child benefits and leave systems. In addition, 
the above-mentioned general assumption that all people want to have children 
pervades the policy proposals and the political process. The three documents do 
not question the general idea that everyone should have children, or admit that 
refusing to have children is a legitimate choice and not something that needs to 
be changed. If the imaginary domain is to be taken seriously and reproductive 
agency is to be respected, the state should not promote one specific view of pro-
creation. Even though the economic approach may seem value-free46,  the  pro-
posals contain value choices. Not only do they promote a child-friendly attitude, 
they also advocate for those with children and not some other group of people as 
the preferred option in terms of how the limited public funds should be used. In 
addition,  the  policies  are  constructed  in  a  way  that  defines  and  shows  what  a  
family is, and therefore affect people’s reproductive choices, especially when 
reproduction is expected to take place in the family. Social policies require peo-
ple to fulfil certain criteria in order for them to qualify for benefits, and this de-
                                                             
46 See Isola 2008 for an analysis, which is based partly on the same texts as my study, and which 
considers the value-laden language in the texts invisible. 
145 
 
fines and reflects how families and the reproductive environment are under-
stood. 
When  the  family  is  defined  in  terms  of  economics  it  is  often  also  
treated as a single unit. This is problematic from a feminist perspective because, 
as Susan Okin notes, men and women tend not to have equal power in families 
(Okin  1989,  146,  159).  This  unequal  distribution  of  power  is  connected  to  the  
fact that women who work earn less, on average, than their male partners, thus: 
‘[a] cycle of power relations and decisions pervades both family and workplace, 
and the inequalities of each reinforce those that already exist in the other’ (Okin 
1989, 147). The combination of economic argumentation with the opaque notion 
of the family disguises the effect on women’s reproductive agency of the unequal 
distribution of financial resources.  
The notion that the decision to have children is based on economic 
considerations has attracted little research interest at least in feminist circles, 
but it is a logic that is strongly present in the policy documents examined here. 
From the perspective of reproductive agency this reliance on economic argu-
ments seems odd. Using the economic arguments to promote growth in the 
birth rate might help to explain why it is such a difficult political problem. Ad-
dressing such a multi-faceted issue only in terms of economics is not likely to be 
very effective given various non-financial elements related to the construction of 
the personality. The seemingly self-evident character of family policies also 
hides the fact that it is a political preference to support families with children 
rather than some other groups of people. Such a choice, when made, strength-
ens the reproductive agency of those who want to have children, and at the same 
time defines how parenthood is understood. On the other hand it creates an en-
vironment  in  which  the  reproductive  agency  of  those  who  choose  not  to  have  
children is not similarly recognised.  
I think this two-sided problem also indicates a possible weakness in 
Cornell’s theoretical thinking with regard to reproductive agency. The freedom 
to  understand  reproductive  agency  differently,  in  terms  of  choosing  to  have  
children or not to have children, limits its helpfulness as a guide in making spe-
cific political decisions or deciding about political preferences. It is not my pur-
pose in this study to present substantive policy proposals, however. I therefore 
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turn in the next section to the alternative perspective and analyse the discourse 
on family values in the policy proposals. 
 
5.4.3 A counter-discourse to economics: a return to family values 
Although the connection between having children and the economic conditions 
in which people live is a strong one, there are some disruptive elements in the 
debate.  In  this  section  I  briefly  chart  the  line  of  discourse  I  refer  to  as  family  
values. It is a discourse that contests the emphasis on financial matters, and in-
cludes the defence of values that are considered more important than economic 
factors  when it  comes  to  reproduction.  Given  that  it  is  women who give  birth,  
this line of thinking includes interesting gender aspects, to which I revert in the 
next chapter. The argumentation stressing family values is present in the EVA 
report and in the Parliamentary discussion on the GOV report on the future, and 
there are some traces of  it  in the FF report.  Although I  have not discussed the 
Parliamentary debate in detail in this study, I decided to include some elements 
from it as a reaction to the GOV report, which is studied in detail.  
The EVA report clearly states in one of its subheadings, ‘Values are 
behind everything’ (EVA, 33). It disputes the view that family policies are con-
structed in order to increase the birth rate, and also questions their effectiveness 
for  this  purpose.  However,  its  views  on  what  Finnish  people  think  about  chil-
dren and procreation are somewhat contradictory. It states on the one hand that 
children  are  no  longer  valued  for  themselves,  and  have  come to  reflect  adults’  
own life goals and situations, but on the other hand that value surveys indicate 
that Finnish people still appreciate the family and children. (ibid., 33-36) It ac-
knowledges these contradictory standpoints: ‘The contradiction between the 
responses [to the surveys about values] and the culture of disregarding children 
that gathered strength in the 1990s is evident’ (ibid., 36), so what people think 
seems to be different from the prevailing culture47.  
The Parliamentary debate on the GOV report reflected similar lines 
of thinking. Some of the parliamentarians explicitly emphasised the value of 
                                                             
47 The idea that culture and what people think are two separate things is in itself a rather com-
plex and problematic way of looking at the issue, but cannot be analysed here. 
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children and large families, and attacked the current notion that both parents 
should be active participants in working life. The statements were not specific to 
certain political parties, although there were party differences in the intensity 
and frequency of these articulations. The discourse on family values creates an 
opposition between large and small families, arguing that families with more 
than the number of children acknowledged as the norm (i.e. two) suffer in that 
‘our family policy is designed to force people who choose to add to this two-child 
norm into poverty’ (Eduskunta 2004, Särkiniemi, Seppo (vastauspuheenvuoro 
[response  statement])).  The  implication  is  that  current  family  policies  are  de-
signed for families with at most two children and two working parents. Some of 
the statements in this vein also refer to the old agrarian society when there were 
more children (Eduskunta 2004, Lahtela, Seppo), and there is some criticism of 
the current competitive society that prioritises business interests at the expense 
of families and children (Eduskunta 2004, Soini, Timo). As in the EVA report 
(see e.g., 33-36), there is a contrast between the profit-driven market economy 
and the family, which by implication is based on other kinds of values.   
Some family-value statements create an economic opposition be-
tween those with children and those without. There are claims that public funds 
should act as an income transfer from the latter to the former (see e.g., 
Eduskunta 2004, Karttunen, Marjukka (ryhmäpuheenvuoro [group state-
ment])). Usually these arguments just state that child benefit (lapsilisä) is some 
compensation for the expense of having children and thus should not be tied to 
income48 (see  e.g.,  ibid.),  but  it  is  also  explicitly  stated  that  family  policies  
should be financed by those who ‘choose not to have a family’,  i.e.  who choose 
not to have children (see e.g., Eduskunta 2004, Vistbacka, Raimo (ryhmäpu-
heenvuoro  [group  statement])).  This  line  of  thinking  is  somewhat  similar  in  
logic to the debate about the need for family policies in that they both consider 
having children from an economic perspective; the monetary situation affects 
decisions to reproduce. The family-value articulations explicitly state that fami-
lies with children should be prioritised just because they have children.  
                                                             
48 At times there have been demands for child benefit to be based on income. Currently all fami-
lies with children receive the same amounts irrespective of parental income.  
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This harking back to the traditional or nuclear family is dubious 
from a feminist perspective and in terms of reproductive agency 49. One might 
even question whether such a nuclear family ever existed. In any case, with re-
gard to reproductive agency one can justifiably criticise patriarchal family forms 
that define women’s lives solely through the family and motherhood. Even 
though Finland is relatively progressive in terms of the situation of women, 
some very gender-specific attitudes still prevail when it comes to reproduction. 
For example, the discourse on family values in the Finnish Parliament implies in 
some articulations that it should be possible to survive on one person’s wage 
(e.g.,  Eduskunta 2004, Särkiniemi,  Seppo).  It  is  also noteworthy that  in 2005,  
for example, men used less than 6 per cent of the total number of days of paren-
tal leave taken (Kela 2006, 45). In practice, therefore, efforts to make it easier 
for the family to live on one person’s wage are supporting situations in which it 
is the mother who stays at home with the children, thereby making women de-
pendent on the breadwinner, i.e. the husband, economically and in other ways. 
Preference for policies that support families with children and adversely affect 
the economic situation of people with none50 is  problematic  in terms of  repro-
ductive  agency  because  those  who  choose  not  to  procreate  are  punished.  Al-
though one should not forget the positive effects of family policies with regard to 
reproductive agency, they may create an environment that does not fully respect 
the reproductive agency of those who choose childlessness. 
It is obvious that strong value propositions are included in the dis-
course on family values. Such values promote the heterosexual, nuclear family 
in which the women’s role is primarily that of mother and wife, and clearly cre-
ate effects for the imaginary domain and reproductive agency. They advocate 
one way of organising one’s reproductive life and limit people’s imagining about 
their lives. In addition, they aim to strengthen traditional views of women as 
mothers and homemakers above all else. 
 
                                                             
49 See Young 1999 for an argumentation against the view that the nuclear family is the best pos-
sible family form. 
50 Even without income transfers from the childless to those with children, it is more expensive 





Is the historical record consistent with the view that declining 
population growth and growing dependency have retarded long-
term economic growth? To what extent, if at all, are projected 
demographic changes – rates of population growth, dependency ra-
tios, aging of the labor force, labor force education – out of line with 
historical experience? (Easterlin 1996, 125) 
 
Richard Easterlin, an economic historian and demographer, asks 
these questions in his book examining problems of economics and population 
growth from a historical perspective. He concludes that historical experience 
raises doubts about ‘the new secular stagnation thesis’ (ibid.), meaning that the 
connection between economic growth and population growth is not straightfor-
wardly positive. He also questions the connection between the welfare of people 
and  economic  growth  (see  e.g.,  ibid.  Chapter  10).  Nevertheless,  the  debate  on  
population policy conducted in the three policy documents I examine presup-
poses a positive connection between economic and population growth, and even 
between the welfare of people and economic success. Macroeconomic factors 
such as the GDP and the dependency ratio, and microeconomic concern for the 
financial situation of individual families are among the most prominent ele-
ments in the discussion on the need to raise the birth rate in Finland.  
The connection between the demographic challenge, i.e. the aging 
population, and the (economic) success of Finland as a nation is unquestioned, 
and it is the basic starting point of much of the debate about population policy 
in  the  documents.  Economic  growth  is  considered  essential  for  the  survival  of  
the Finnish nation, and because growth is assumed to be dependent on a grow-
ing population, population policies are of major significance with regard to eco-
nomic success. Population growth is then boosted by family policies, which is 
the  other  economic  viewpoint  in  the  debates  about  population  policy  in  the  
three policy texts.  
The importance assigned to the population in economic develop-
ment incorporates the macroeconomic idea of ‘people as power’, meaning that 
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people, especially those of working age, are needed not only as workers, but also 
as consumers in order to secure continuous economic growth. This logic pushes 
politics in a direction focused on boosting the birth rate. In terms of reproduc-
tive  agency,  it  is  an  attempt  to  influence  people’s  reproductive  decisions.  It  is  
difficult in liberal democracies to directly affect reproductive behaviour as en-
forced or coercive measures are out the question. Nevertheless, family policies 
can be seen as an attempt to set procreative decisions on a certain course.   
 Family policies and their promotion presuppose normative assump-
tions about reproductive decisions: everyone is assumed to be interested in hav-
ing children as long as the (economic) conditions are right. This automatically 
makes  such  polices  and  the  transfer  of  income to  families  with  children  desir-
able political goals. From the perspective of reproductive agency, however, a 
rather different picture emerges. Even though the policies can be interpreted to 
enhance reproductive agency for some people, they can also be seen restrictive 
in terms of how one is expected think about procreation. It is taken as self-
evident in the three policy proposals that everyone wants children. Family poli-
cies are therefore important for politicians, who can promote them without spe-
cific justification. The policies do not, of course, force anyone to act in a specific 
way,  but  they  do  reflect  and  create  the  culture  and  social  conditions  in  which  
procreative decisions are made.  
The  problem  with  using  the  notion  of  the  imaginary  domain  in  
reading the policy documents is that it is not specific enough with regard to how 
family policies should be conducted as many of the policies could also be seen to 
strengthen reproductive agency. Cornell has written in defence of publicly 
funded day care, for example (see Cornell 1998, 128). As a general policy it en-
hances reproductive agency, but in terms of the specifics of its organisation, 
there may be aspects that limit agency in reproductive matters. One option is to 
return to Cornell’s emphasis on ideals. If reproductive agency is thought of as an 
ideal that includes the notions of procreative freedom, it is something to be 
strived  for,  even  though  it  is  never  actually  achievable.  Accordingly,  economic  
conditions and policy arrangements are in that case considered work in progress 
aimed at coming closer to the ideal of freedom 
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6 Thematic description and redescription III: Gen-
der 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter comprises the third description and redescription of the selected 
population-policy documents, the theme of which is gender. As mentioned in 
previous chapters, gender as an issue is present in many places in the three 
texts, and in one way or another intersects with all of the larger themes exam-
ined in this study. My aim is to give a coherent view of how gender appears in 
the documents, and through redescription to identify viewpoints that are spe-
cific to its coverage in the documents.  
 First I turn to Drucilla Cornell and her thinking about gender, and 
the ways in which her views connect to reproductive agency. Her ideas on sex, 
sexuality and gender are rather complex, and I think it is necessary to reiterate 
her position in order to identify the redescriptive potential. As in previous chap-
ters, I will proceed to describe the policy documents and then redescribe them 
through  the  notion  of  reproductive  agency.  My  redescription  focuses  on  three  
points. The first is gender neutrality, to which the GOV report in particular as-
pires, although in the end it does not manage to avoid gendered perspectives; 
for example, questions related to working life are in many ways informed by 
gender. Secondly, I examine how some of the documents tackle the question of 
gender  equality.  Included  in  issues  such  as  the  distribution  of  housework  and  
the labour-market structure are elements of inequality. The documents attempt 
to find solutions, but usually maintain specific gendered structures. Finally, I 
consider how women are seen as objects of population and family policies. 
Analyses of population policies in developing countries show that population 
control is primarily targeted at women. Although the aim in the Finnish docu-
ments is not to limit population growth but to encourage it, women are still the 
primary objects of measures aimed at increasing the birth rate. I study how this 
shows up in the documents, and what it means from the perspective of repro-
ductive agency. 
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6.2 Expansion of the redescriptive tool: sex, gender and reproductive 
agency 
I begin my examination of the connections between gender and reproductive 
agency  with  Drucilla  Cornell  and  her  notions  about  sex,  gender  and,  to  some  
extent,  sexuality  and  reproduction.  Her  views  on  gender  and  sexuality  can  be  
described as mixed, and they have changed over the years. Here I present two 
somewhat different readings of her thinking, and incorporate selected elements 
of  her  approach  to  the  concept  of  reproductive  agency.  On  the  one  hand,  she  
promotes the right of women to represent themselves more freely (see e.g., Cor-
nell 1999, xxiii), and she has written about affirming the feminine within sexual 
difference  (see  e.g.,  Cornell  1993,  57).  On  the  other  hand,  she  theorises  about  
the imaginary domain and insists that people should be free to form their own 
personality, which includes gender and how the gendered identity is under-
stood.  If  such  freedom  were  taken  seriously  it  would  also  include  overcoming  
the binary designation of gender.  
Although the two viewpoints are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
I argue that there are some tensions and contradictions, which I examine in this 
section.  I  will  begin by charting Cornell’s  thinking about concepts such as sex,  
gender, sexuality and the sexate being. Psychoanalysis and Lacan have influ-
enced her ideas about sexuality and gender. I consider some of these influences, 
although I have no intention of giving an extensive account of Lacan or psycho-
analytic theory. A great deal of Cornell’s thought is accessible without specific 
knowledge of psychoanalysis, and not all of her views on gender and sexuality 
lean on Lacanian theory.  
 A good starting point is Cornell’s rejection of the separation be-
tween sex and gender: 
 
I reject this understanding of the difference between sex and gender 
because  it  fails  to  see  how  the  sexed  body  is  symbolically  con-
structed by a “space of interlocution” and an imago – a primordial 
image of how we hang together that each one of us lives out. (Cor-




In  Cornell’s  view,  given  that  people  always  experience  their  bodies  through  a  
symbolic system, the separation between sex as a biological concept and gender 
as a cultural concept is not accurate. She uses both concepts, but usually distin-
guishes between the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. She writes in her book At the 
Heart of Freedom (1998) that she uses gender to refer to our everyday under-
standing that there are two ‘kinds’ of people, men and women (Cornell 1998, 6). 
She does not avoid using the word ‘gender’, but finds the concepts of sex and the 
sexuate being more relevant when it  comes to her ideas about subjectivity and 
how people form as selves. She also notes that sex and sexuality are core issues 
with regard to people’s struggle to form their personalities (Cornell 1995, 6). 
Together with how people orient themselves sexually, sex and sexuality are 
among the essential aspects of what it means to be a human being. She notes: 
‘[a]s sexuate beings, we cannot mark out an identity without implicating who we 
are through a set of culturally encoded fantasies about what it means to be a 
creature with a “sex”‘ (ibid.). Nobody can escape the effects of cultural fantasies 
about sex and sexuality, even though what people do with these cultural influ-
ences is another thing. 
 In her book The Imaginary Domain (1995), Cornell charts four dif-
ferent  aspects  in  her  use  of  the  term  ‘sex’.  The  first  is  that  human  beings  are  
sexual creatures; this is a general notion, which means that people’s lives in-
volve pleasure and reproduction. Secondly, sex refers to activity: sexuality is not 
just identification, but also activity in which people engage. Thirdly is the aspect 
of internalised identifications, included in which is an assumption of the gender 
divide. This contrasts with the second aspect: sex is not just activity, but a part 
of our personality formation that involves different kinds of identification. 
Fourthly, Cornell mentions that each one of us has a sexual imago and a sexual 
imaginary. She refers to the psychoanalytic notion that people see themselves 
deeply  and  profoundly  from ‘inside’  as  men and  women.  Moreover,  the  sexual  
imago is part of the imaginary coherence that people strive for, the basis of an 
unconscious assumed person. (Cornell 1995, 6-7)  
Cornell’s notion of sex is multifaceted. It refers to identifications, 
bodily experiences and the formation of the personality. She also notes that in 
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using the word sex she wants ‘to highlight how straight women, gays, and lesbi-
ans are treated as things rather than persons because of the meaning society 
gives to attributes of their bodily difference (in the case of women) or because of 
society’s fantasies about their sexuality (in the case of gays, lesbians, bisexuals, 
and transgendered persons)’ (Cornell 1998, 7). The idea that societal meanings 
and values are attached to different sexes is connected to the above-mentioned 
issue that nobody can escape cultural and symbolic notions of sex and sexuality. 
As a feminist, Cornell wishes to show how some groups of people are not given 
full  personhood,  and  that  sex  has  played  an  important  part  in  this  process  of  
denial of personhood. 
 Cornell uses the term ‘the sexuate being’ ‘to represent the sexed 
body of  our human being when engaged with a framework by which we orient 
ourselves’ (ibid.). It is connected to sexual orientation in the sense that people 
have to orient, to direct, themselves sexually. She links the sexuate being with 
‘having sex and having a sex’ (ibid.), meaning that people have views about their 
preferences when it comes to sexual activities – i.e. how they have sex – and this 
intertwines  with  how  they  see  their  gender,  i.e.  how  they  have  a  sex.  She  ac-
knowledges that it is impossible to be totally transparent to oneself: assuming a 
persona always includes some notions about how one is sexed, and the idea of 
sexual orientation is relevant to the idea of a free person (ibid.).  
 Cornell considers sex and sexuality essential parts of being a hu-
man,  and  they  are  also  important  aspects  in  her  idea  of  a  free  person.  She  re-
marks  that  there  are  as  many  forms  of  the  sexuate  being  as  there  are  people:  
everyone orients and lives out their sexuality and bodily being in their own way. 
She connects sexual orientation to the ideal of freedom, insisting that everyone 
should be recognised as the legitimate source of meanings and representations 
of their sexuate being. It should be possible to explore and work through identi-
fications connected to the sexuate being as people are not ready personas, but in 
a process. The imaginary domain facilitates the process of exploring one’s iden-
tification. (ibid., 8):  
 
Since sex, gender, and sexuality are not just given to us, we need the 
space to let our imagination run wild if each of us is to have the 
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chance to find the sexual orientation that can bring us happiness. 
To even aspire to the self-representation of our sexuate being we 
need freedom to explore without fear the representations that sur-
round us. This place of free exploration of sexual representations, 
and personas, is the imaginary domain. (ibid.) 
 
 The connection between the personality as a process and the free-
dom to work through the sexuate being implies in this context that sex, gender 
and sexuality are not stable or fixed identities, but something that people proc-
ess throughout their lives. Gender, understood as the everyday experiences peo-
ple have as sexed beings, is also very personal. Everyone has their own take on 
how  they  understand  their  gender.  This  does  not,  of  course,  mean  that  it  is  a  
totally personal creation without any cultural or social influences or connec-
tions, but it does mean that everyone interprets and assumes cultural and social 
norms about gender in their  own way,  and lives out and experiences them dif-
ferently. When gender is understood this way, there is a strong implication that 
the meanings and values people attach to their sexuate being – gender, sex and 
sexuality – should be determined by the person in question and not by an out-
sider. Being free to define your sexuate being can also be a basis for overcoming 
or refusing the gender binary, and for imagining sex and gender differently and 
not just on the binary axis.  
 This very open notion of sex and gender does not cover all aspects 
of Cornell’s thought on how they can or should be understood, however. Indeed, 
there are contradictions between her ideas about sex and sexuality and her 
feminist views on the position of women. In addition to writing generally about 
gender and sex as connected to how people construct their personalities, Cornell 
also focuses on how women’s gender has been a basis for discrimination, and 
how women have not been granted full personhood legally or politically. Given 
that women have been trapped in a cultural and social representation of their 
sex  that  puts  them  in  an  oppressed  position,  there  is  a  need  for  a  re-
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representation of the feminine51. She does not equate the feminine with the ex-
periences of any specific group of women, nor does she wish to stabilise the as-
sociated meanings and values, and she notes the need for a re-representation of 
what feminine means. (Cornell 1999, xxvii)  
There has been some development in Cornell’s understanding of the 
new representations of feminine coming about. She writes about ‘affirming the 
feminine within sexual difference’ in her articles ‘The Doubly-Prized World: 
Myth, Allegory, and the Feminine’, (first published in 1990 and revised in Cor-
nell 1993) and ‘Sexual Difference, the Feminine, and Equivalency’ (first pub-
lished in 1991 and revised in Cornell 1993) (Cornell 1993, 57). She bases her ac-
count of how the feminine and, ultimately, the experiences of actual women 
could be transformed on Lacanian thinking, noting that feminism should ac-
knowledge feminine experiences in its challenging of gender hierarchies: 
 
If there is to be feminism at all, as a political movement that ade-
quately challenges the gender hierarchy which necessarily repudi-
ates the values of the feminine sexual difference, we must rely on a 
feminine voice and a feminine “reality” that can be identified as 
such  and  in  some  way  correlated  with  the  lives  of  actual  women.  
(ibid., 58) 
  
She continues suggesting that relying on a feminine voice does not 
mean that there are no differences between women, and that it is important to 
understand the metaphoric significance of the feminine within sexual differ-
ence. Metaphoric understanding does not reduce the feminine to a specific his-
torical  group of  women and their  experiences presented as universal,  but aims 
at imagining it beyond current stereotypes by re-telling myths attached to 
women and the feminine, for example (ibid., 58-59, 108-109). She uses the term 
affirming the feminine, and although she denies that it conveys any specific un-
derstanding of the feminine or of what it means to be a woman, it does retain 
                                                             
51 Cornell notes that by feminine she does not mean femininity, which carries all sorts of charac-
teristics that not only deny women their full personhood, but also include racialised representa-
tions (Cornell 1999, xxvii; 1995, 7-8). 
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the gender divide. It is difficult to see how, given her use of the term ‘feminine’, 
she is not affirming a group called women and correspondingly, in the current 
cultural and social situation, a group that is called men. Although she does not 
acknowledge a specific representation of men and women, in my view the con-
ception of affirming the feminine is in conflict with the ideals of the free person 
and the imaginary domain, which could be interpreted as a tool for rethinking 
and overcoming the gender binary. 
The  notion  of  the  imaginary  domain,  and  connected  to  that  the  
freedom to define and give values to one’s own sexuate being, are about being 
able to abandon the gender binary, or the gender divide. As Adam Thurschwell 
notes, Cornell’s feminism incorporates the idea of ‘liberation from gender’ 
(Thurschwell 2008, 44). This does not imply that it will automatically be suc-
cessful as it is dependent on things that are beyond the person who is doing the 
abandoning, but still the premise is that it is possible to think beyond the gender 
binary. The idea of affirming the feminine, however, does not get over the bi-
nary  divide  and  in  that  way  is  in  conflict  with  the  imaginary  domain.  Cornell  
uses  the  term  ‘affirm’  in  her  earlier  article  published  in  1993,  aiming  to  show  
that the feminine, which has traditionally been degraded and thought of as 
something inferior, should be valued (Cornell 1993, 72, 132). Although inherent 
in this idea is the notion that sexuality is not fixed, and that what or who women 
are is not defined, I read it as at least reiterating the binary divide, and thus to 
some degree strengthening it.  
In connection with her affirmation of the feminine and her search 
for new representations, Cornell also reflects Luce Irigaray’s thinking52, specifi-
cally wishing to bring out the utopian element by ‘playing with what remains 
beyond  intelligibility,  [to]  help  to  bring  to  the  surface  a  mark  of  the  feminine  
opening us to the future’ (Cornell 2008b, 254). The idea of affirming the femi-
nine can also be related to the Lacanian idea of sexual difference that is immu-
table, although Cornell rather takes a deconstructive approach to Lacan’s theo-
ries. She is aware of some of the problems linked to thinking about the recon-
figuration of sexual difference through the idea of affirming the feminine, and 
                                                             




modified her views somewhat after the early 1990s. She notes that her way of 
thinking could reinforce Lacan’s analysis of sexual difference: 
 
Indeed, part of the reason for my own critical engagement with my 
earlier formulation was a growing concern that any privileging of 
the feminine as the mark of difference understood here as what is 
new as well as simply Other, would inevitably downplay the signifi-
cance of ethnic, national, and linguistic difference. (Cornell 1999, 
xxiii) 
 
 Cornell is concerned that her notion of affirming the feminine 
within sexual difference does not account for identifications other than gender. I 
do not think she adequately addresses the problem of sustaining the gender di-
vide, however, which may be a consequence of how she uses the notion the 
feminine. After voicing the above-mentioned concern, she does write about re-
representing as opposed to affirming the feminine. Her intention is not to stabi-
lise representations, but she notes that she is ‘enough of a Lacanian to defend 
the idea that the masculine and the feminine are constrained by a system of rep-
resentations that holds enormous sway in our culture’ (ibid., xxvii). The system 
of representations also includes the idea that representations of the feminine 
are devalued and conceived of as undesirable human characteristics (ibid.). 
Cornell’s concerns are valid, but as noted above, she does not tackle the problem 
of strengthening the gender divide when promoting the notion of affirming or 
re-representing the feminine. 
In sum, Cornell follows two different lines of thinking with regard 
to sexual difference. On the one hand she holds on to the ideal that people 
should be free to define their sexuate being:  
 
We have to demand the widest possible space for expression, pre-
cisely because without it, we legitimate foreclosures on what can be 
said, written, or imagined, and thus undermine and reshelve the 
project of each of us representing her sexuate being in all its fluidity 




People  should  be  able  to  reject  the  gender  binary  and  define  their  gender  and  
sexuality in new ways. Although this is difficult, it is a starting point for imagin-
ing new ways of thinking about sexual difference. On the other hand, however, 
she believes in re-representing the feminine. The feminine has been devalued 
and represented as not deserving full personhood, and this needs to be changed. 
One option is to re-represent what feminine means and what kinds of values are 
connected  to  it.  The  belief  that  sexual  difference  can  be  reconfigured  by  re-
representing the feminine, however, also holds on to the differentiation between 
feminine and masculine, and related to that the difference between men and 
women. In my view the first approach mentioned above, defining and redefining 
gender and sexuality as freely as possible, opens up more possibilities for think-
ing about gender and sex differently. 
 Of  relevance  to  my  work  are  the  connections  to  reproductive  
agency. If we consider sexual difference from the perspective of procreation and 
reproductive agency, we have all the more reason to include the imaginary do-
main  in  theorising  about  sexual  difference,  as  it  seems  difficult  to  re-think  re-
production and sexual difference on the basis of re-representing the feminine. 
Although Cornell differentiates between femininity – which has traditionally 
been tied to motherhood, for example – and the feminine, which would be a ba-
sis for re-thinking how women have been represented, in holding on to the idea 
of  affirming  the  feminine  she  retains  the  connections  between  women  and  
motherhood.  This  makes  it  more  difficult  to  find  new  ways  of  thinking  about  
reproduction, and new ways of thinking are needed if reproductive agency is to 
be  taken  seriously.  Moreover,  the  need  for  re-thinking  applies  not  only  to  the  
feminine, but also to masculinity and the masculine, and in this the imaginary 
domain is more fruitful in terms of finding novel approaches to sexual differ-
ence. 
 Sexual  difference  remains  a  very  relevant  theme  in  the  context  of  
reproduction. Although reproductive technologies have brought changes to the 
biological basis of procreation, and may bring even more significant changes in 
the future, it is still the case that men and women are differently positioned in 
the process. The purpose of the concept of reproductive agency is to broaden the 
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thinking about these positions and to denaturalise assumptions that are con-
structed through the notions of biology and nature as unchangeable and rooted 
in the natural order. If the imaginary domain is to be taken seriously, defining of 
values and meanings attached to motherhood and fatherhood should not be as-
signed to some outside political or social order, but should remain with the in-
dividuals concerned. Individual valuations are affected by social, symbolic and 
cultural representations of what it means to be a woman and a man, or a mother 
and a father. The purpose of the imaginary domain is to facilitate re-imagining, 
and the idea behind reproductive agency is to give people the freedom to define 
and redefine their parenthood, and their values and attitudes about procreation. 
Sex and sexuality matter in terms of how one sees procreation, and it is crucial 
to be able to re-think the values and meanings connected to them. The notion of 
reproductive agency therefore includes a conception of sexual difference that 
draws on the imaginary domain, as something that people create and re-create 
as part of the personality process. 
     
6.3 Thematic description III 
Gender is a theme that seems inevitably to come up in the debate on population 
policies and decreasing birth rates, and it seems impossible to discuss reproduc-
tive issues without at least some reference to it. In the following I describe the 
selected policy documents in terms of the gendered use of language, especially 
in the sections concerning the birth rate and measures to affect it. I note in-
stances when gendered concepts (such as man, woman, father and mother) are 
used, and the contexts in which they are discussed. In general, the GOV report 
seems to be the most gender-neutral of the texts, measured in terms of explicit 
acknowledgement of gender or gendered structures and the use of gendered 
language in general. The EVA report and the FF Program cover both gendered 
and equality issues more explicitly. There are visible differences in the three 




6.3.1 Women and the labour market 
One of the most notable common issues in the three texts concerns the labour 
market and women’s status in it. They all acknowledge that Finnish society is 
built on the assumption that both sexes are active participants in the labour 
force. The GOV report notes in a section that charts the premises and values of 
its policy considerations that both ‘sexes participate equally in work and other 
aspects  of  life’  (GOV,  13).  It  also  refers  to  the  importance  of  reconciling  work  
and  family  life,  which  is  directly  connected  to  the  idea  that  women work.  The  
EVA report has an entire section dealing with the claim that women have fewer 
babies because they concentrate on work (see e.g., EVA, 20-22). The FF text also 
considers  women’s  participation  in  the  work  force  (see  e.g.,  FF,  26-31).  Both  
EVA and the FF have specific takes on the question of women’s working, which I 
come back to later. 
Women’s waged labour can be seen as an essential part of the Fin-
nish welfare state. As Raija Julkunen notes, the idea that the family has two 
breadwinners has been built into Finnish socio-political practices since the 
1960s, and it is the predominant ideology in Finland that both parents work53. 
Women’s participation in the labour force is facilitated through maternity bene-
fits, different kinds of leave policies and taxation. For example, individual (as 
opposed to family) taxation means that if only one parent is in paid employment 
there is no extra economic support for the partner who stays at home. (Julkunen 
1999, 90-91) The ideology of two breadwinners is also evident in the three texts 
examined here. The documents do not question women’s participation in the 
labour market,54 but consider how it has been or should be taken into account. 
Having a stable job is even seen as an incentive for a woman to have children: 
the  FF  cites  a  study  stating  that  a  stable  job  is  important  for  women  who  are  
planning their first child (FF, 30). In general, the very common worry about 
(young) women’s fixed, short-term contracts, so-called atypical employment, is 
                                                             
53 The  does  not  mean  that  all  women  work  or  that  children  are  institutionally  cared  for.  The  
majority of children under school age are cared for at home and by their parents. This is facili-
tated by different kinds of leave systems, among other things. (Julkunen 1999, 91) 
54 The parliamentary discussion on the GOV report does include explicit arguments for improv-
ing the situation of families with one breadwinner,  however,  and questions the Finnish model 
according to which both parents work (see Eduskunta 2004). 
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indicative  of  the  view  that  having  a  permanent  job  and  working  full-time  en-
hance women’s willingness to have children.  
Two issues that all the texts deal with are related to the more gen-
eral question of women’s participation in the work force. The first of these is the 
above-mentioned atypical employment or short, fixed-term contracts that are 
common in the public sector and in some other areas in which women are typi-
cally employed. Secondly, there is the question of the more equal distribution of 
housework. On the question of fixed-term contracts, the GOV report states that 
parental allowances connected to short-term employment will be raised, and 
that regularising fixed-term contracts will encourage women to have children 
(GOV, 46-47). Similarly, the FF remarks that reducing atypical employment in 
the nursing and teaching sectors, in which women predominate, would most 
likely result in a rising birth rate (FF, 52). The EVA report examines the issue in 
a short separate section entitled ‘Unbearable uncertainty prevails in the world of 
fixed-term contracts’ (Pätkätyömaailmassa vallitsee sietämätön epävarmuus”) 
(EVA, 26), describing short, fixed-term contacts for young women as a problem 
that affects their willingness to have children. The use of fixed-term contracts 
has been discussed a great deal in public forums, and it is generally acknowl-
edged to be a problem. Short-term jobs are more common among young, edu-
cated women and in the public sector, which employs a lot of women (Palanko-
Laaka 2005), and the incidence of atypical work contracts is connected in the 
policy documents to delays in having children. 
The second theme, the more equal distribution of housework, is an 
old gender-equality issue. The FF connects it directly to the willingness to have 
children in citing research indicating that  a  more equal  distribution of  work in 
the  family  is  connected  to  a  higher  birth  rate  (FF,  51).  The  EVA  report  notes  
that, despite the high participation rate of women in the work force, inequality 
remains and women still do the majority of the housework (EVA, 22). This being 
the case, they are reluctant to have children because it will tie them more tightly 
to the home and to household chores. The GOV report remarks in passing that 
fathers must be encouraged to take part in everyday activities at home (GOV, 
47), thus although it does not discuss the theme extensively, it does recognise 
the problem. The documents address an existing problem in referring to the dis-
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crepancies in the distribution of housework, and studies have shown that even 
though women often work full-time, they are still primarily responsible for the 
everyday household chores, and spend more time on them than men (Julkunen 
1999, 92). In bringing up the issue, these policy texts confirm that the unequal 
distribution of housework is a relevant and valid concern. 
 
6.3.2 From gender neutrality to gendered problems 
There are themes that all the texts consider from a gender perspective, but they 
have specific profiles in terms of dealing with gender. The GOV report appears 
to be the most gender-neutral, and in this sense is also the vaguest. Although it 
briefly mentions some aspects of gender differentiation, it does not generally 
analyse gendered viewpoints very deeply, and often uses terms such as equality 
to refer to something other than gender equality, including regional, social and 
intergenerational equality (see e.g., GOV, 42-43, 55). Moreover, it tends not to 
deal with questions that could be considered gender issues explicitly from a 
gendered perspective. The family is seen as an important element when meas-
ures to increase the birth rate are discussed, but the family perspective does not 
include a gender view. One of the few instances in which such a view is visible is 
the passing statement that fathers should be encouraged to use their right to 
family leave and to play their part in everyday activities at home (GOV, 47).  
The  EVA  report  is  much  more  specific  on  the  question  of  gender  
and  its  connection  to  the  population  question.  It  refers  to  men and  women in  
the very first paragraph of the introduction, stating that achieving an increase in 
the birth rate will require attitude changes among individuals, both men and 
women.  The  introduction  also  covers  other  gender  issues,  such  as  the  need  to  
change Finnish men’s attitudes towards the family. (EVA, 3-4) Other parts of 
the text analyse the different positions of women and men with regard to repro-
duction, most visibly in a sub-section of Chapter two. Chapter two examines 
why Finnish people do not have more children, and the sub-section considers 
the claim that women concentrate on work and a career (ibid., 17-27).  
The section starts with the general assertion that when women’s 
earnings and education level rise, they have fewer children. This logic does not 
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seem to be valid in Finland, however. Women’s participation in waged labour is 
very  high  by  international  standards,  but  the  Finnish  birth  rate  has  also  been  
relatively high. Moreover, in Finland women who earn more also have more 
children than women whose earnings are lower. The report further examines 
the connection between women’s paid labour and the birth rate with regard to 
day care, concluding that the Finnish day-care system has had a positive effect 
on the birth rate despite the high female participation rates in the labour force 
(ibid., 22). It also acknowledges that, despite such active participation, women 
are still primarily responsible for the housework. Furthermore, men do not take 
all the parental and paternity leave to which the law entitles them, although they 
are  more  involved  in  the  family  nowadays.  (ibid.,  20-22)  Social  policies  and  
family arrangements that are considered to affect the birth rate are examined 
from a perspective that takes account of gender and men’s and women’s differ-
entiated  positions.  There  are  similar  themes  in  the  GOV  report,  but  the  EVA  
report takes a more overtly gendered stance. 
The  gender  perspective  is  visible  to  some  degree  in  the  FF  docu-
ment. It is more explicit than in the GOV text, but the analyses are not as spe-
cific  as  in  the  EVA  report.  Like  the  EVA  report,  the  FF  text  also  includes  an  
analysis of how women’s education and working, the distribution of housework, 
and women’s earnings affect the number of children they have (FF, 27-28). Em-
ployment and the question of women’s participation in working life are very 
visible in all three texts, but the FF document is the only one to make a brief ref-
erence to what motivates men and women to have children. It is suggested that 
they differ somewhat in their motivations, although there is some overlap: both 
refer to the continuation of life and the experience of parenthood. Women also 
believe  that  having  children  will  give  meaning  to  their  lives,  whereas  men  are  
motivated by the idea of seeing their children grow up and develop (ibid., 31). It 
is clear from this differentiation that the FF does not consider procreation mo-
tives to be totally universal in terms of gender. 
The FF also puts forward a gendered view of the population-policy 
measures in general. One of the most interesting gendered viewpoints in its re-
port is the idea that the means of raising the birth rate should be differentiated 
based on gender. This differentiation relies on Catherine Hakim’s classification 
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of women as home-centred (about 20 per cent of women), who are highly moti-
vated to have children, work-centred (about 20 per cent), who usually are satis-
fied if they do not have children, and adaptives (about 60 per cent), who aim to 
combine work and family life. Hakim did not include men in her analysis, so in 
taking this classification as a basis for suggesting population-policy measures 
the FF restricts itself to women. (ibid., 30-31) The report notes that policies that 
treat women as a homogenous group are doomed to failure, and that different 
groups of women are motivated by different benefits. Policies should therefore 
be tailored to the different groups. A key target group in terms of increasing the 
birth rate comprises home-centred families55 with several children. (ibid., 35) In 
basing its approach on theoretical reasoning about women’s motivations the FF 
deals with the policy proposals in a very specific way. The EVA report also dis-
cusses the target group of the policies and how it is becoming more fragmented. 
Although EVA does not have a theoretically specified take on the issue, it refers 
mostly  to  women in  a  similar  vein  to  the  FF:  there  are  women who work  and  
women who stay at home and give birth, and this leads to the conclusion that 
policy measures should be tailored differently to different groups (EVA, 31). 
How such measures should be constructed and directed is one of the more gen-
dered themes in the EVA and FF texts; it would be more effective to target the 
policies on different groups of women differently. 
As this description shows, the three policy documents have some 
common  aspects  in  how  they  deal  with  gender,  but  there  are  also  differences.  
The GOV report frequently takes a gender-neutral stance, although it also 
briefly  refers  to  women’s  different  position  in  the  labour  market.  Women’s  
waged  labour,  combining  family  and  work  life,  and  questions  of  equality  con-
nected to these issues are among the most prominent gendered perspectives in 
the documents. In order to go more deeply into these aspects I will now rede-
scribe them through the notion of reproductive agency. 
 
                                                             
55 Here the text refers to families, not women. 
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6.4 Thematic redescription III 
Some of the gendered aspects of the policy documents are very explicit, but in 
order to uncover the hidden logics I will redescribe the texts from the perspec-
tive of reproductive agency. I have broken the rediscription down into three 
themes.  First  I  examine  the  few  visible  gender  aspects  in  the  GOV  report  and  
how attempts at gender neutrality can be seen in relation to reproductive 
agency.  I  then move on to more visible gendered perspectives in terms of  how 
the inequality that women face in working life or in relation to housework, for 
example, is dealt with in the EVA and FF reports, and how attempts at equality 
analysis fall short of resolving some problems related to gender. Finally, I exam-
ine how women are seen as the objects of family and population policies. This 
last  sub-section  concentrates  on  the  EVA  and  FF  texts,  and  may  at  first  seem  
unconnected with the discussion elsewhere in this chapter. Nevertheless, it is in 
many ways connected to how inequalities are dealt with. After the redescription 
I  draw  the  discussions  together,  considering  some  of  the  implications  behind  
the gendered thinking in the three documents, and suggesting how the notions 
of reproductive agency and the imaginary domain could work in terms of pro-
viding tools for rethinking. 
 
6.4.1 Gendered structures and attempts at gender neutrality 
I start the redescription with the GOV report, in which the gender perspective is 
more muted than in the two other texts. The section charting favourable condi-
tions for having children in particular uses largely gender-neutral language, pro-
jecting the concept of the family as a unified and opaque notion (see Chapter 4 
in  this  study).  Gender  neutrality  does  not  mean  that  there  are  no  gendered  
structures, and even though a gendered approach is avoided, the issues that are 
discussed, in fact, are gender-specific. Although in the main the GOV report 
does not have an overt gender perspective, it is not totally devoid of explicit ref-
erences to gender. 
There are two places in the section of the report dealing with the fa-
vourable  conditions  for  having  children  (GOV,  chapter  6.1)  in  which  gendered  
structures  are  made  visible.  The  first  is  in  the  statement  that  ‘[c]ompensation  
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for parental leave paid to the employer of the mother will also be raised’ (GOV, 
46).  This  sentence  refers  to  the  problem  that  it  is  the  mother’s  employer  who  
carries most of the costs of parental leave, and this is something that should be 
changed. The other gendered argument also relates to the need to change or im-
prove the system of parental leave so as to encourage fathers to use their rights 
and  to  take  part  in  the  housework  (ibid.,  47).  In  the  first  case  when  different  
kinds  of  leave  related  to  childcare  are  discussed,  it  is  mainly  with  respect  to  
women and how work and family life could be better combined. The second case 
strengthens the first: fathers do not take all the leave to which they are entitled, 
and men are not involved enough at  home. It  is,  of  course,  good that  men are 
encouraged  to  do  their  share  of  the  housework,  but  the  wording  implies  that  
men help or assist, and are not equal partners, nor are they responsible for the 
maintenance of the home and the care of offspring.  
Further to the idea that women have primary responsibility for the 
home and the children, the references assume heterosexuality of the couple. 
There is heteronormative complementarity in the references as it is mothers and 
fathers who take parental leave. These passing references could be taken to indi-
cate the basic constellation of the family: a heterosexual couple (a mother and a 
father),  both  with  a  job  outside  the  home,  and  with  gendered  responsibilities  
with regard to the home and the children. The heteronormative nuclear family is 
problematic from the perspective of reproductive agency in that it shuts out 
other kinds of family formations. It takes no account of other kinds of sexuali-
ties or other care arrangements. 
Inherent in the portrayal of men as assistants or helpers to mothers 
in care and housework tasks is the notion that women are still primarily respon-
sible for the home. This is the traditional view of women, which connects them 
to the private sphere of  the home, including taking care of  the children.  It  has 
been noted that the Finnish family-leave system does not destabilise the model 
according to which mothers are responsible for the care of small children (Ran-
talaiho 2003, 209). The GOV report, which incorporates the notions that 
women carry the responsibility for childcare and the maintenance of the home, 
shows traces of the thinking that defines women’s social and legal position pri-
marily through the role of the mother and the carer. Such a definition does not 
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give room for rethinking gender in the way the imaginary domain would allow, 
but reiterates sexual difference in the procreative and care processes. 
Considering men as women’s childcare assistants does not respect 
reproductive agency or the imaginary domain in that it defines men’s and 
women’s  roles  in  a  specific  way.  Men  do  paid  work,  and  even  though  women  
also work outside of the home, they are still primarily responsible for the home 
and the children. Respect for reproductive agency would imply that these deci-
sions  are  left  to  the  individual,  and  that  neither  women’s  nor  men’s  worth  
should be tied to their reproductive role in a way that makes them valuable only 
when they are fulfilling the role in the reproductive process. As Drucilla Cornell 
states: 
 
If a woman is designated by a legal or cultural definition of her sex 
to be responsible for reproduction and child rearing, her right to 
represent herself is undermined. ... Part of our struggle is to explode 
the barriers of ... enforced sexual choices. (Cornell 1998, 27) 
 
Thus the equal intrinsic value of women should be recognised, and 
women should be granted equivalent right to their personhoods as an initial 
matter (ibid., 19-23). The value of women, or of anybody, is not defined through 
their reproductive roles. People should be able freely to define and give value to 
their sexualities, and public policies that define their roles in the caring process 
in a restrictive way do not respect the imaginary domain or reproductive agency. 
Although the GOV report does not deny women’s position as participants in 
public and political life, positioning men as assistants with regard to childcare 
and housework and thereby making women responsible for them, assigns very 
traditional roles. 
Gender is rarely visible in the section of the GOV report concerning 
favourable  conditions  for  having  children,  the  primary  focus  being  the  family  
and  how  families  can  be  encouraged  to  have  more  children.  As  shown  in  the  
analysis in Chapter four, the notion of the family as a single unit is problematic, 
and hides all sorts of power structures. It ignores gendered and heteronormative 
structures  and  does  not  allow for  different  ways  of  seeing  women’s  and  men’s  
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roles in the reproductive process. In many ways the few explicit mentions of 
gender support the traditional view of the family as a heterosexual unit with 
traditionally gendered duties with regard to the care of children and the house-
work. The family imposes limits on reproductive agency with regard to gender. 
Placing the responsibility for childcare with women and not questioning the 
family structure only strengthens sexual difference. 
It is easy to think of gender neutrality as positive in that it does not 
differentiate  women as  a  special  group,  but  aims  to  treat  women and  men the  
same. It could be interpreted as a way of enabling reproductive agency, leaving 
room for the imaginary domain. According to this interpretation, people work 
through their sexual difference themselves, and the GOV text does not take an 
explicit stance on gendered roles. There are, nevertheless, problems in this way 
of thinking. If cultural and social norms are not questioned, the kind of gender 
neutrality included in the GOV report does not take the imaginary domain and 
freedom into account in an effective way. One example of such ineffectiveness is 
the  way  in  which  leave  systems  are  discussed.  The  aim is  to  find  flexible  solu-
tions that enable parents to combine family and work life (see e.g., GOV, 46). 
However, it is primarily the women who take the leaves (Lammi-Taskula, Salmi 
&  Parrukoski  2009),  and  thus  the  underlying  assumption  that  women  are  re-
sponsible for family life is not questioned when the issue of leaves is discussed 
in a gender-neutral way as a matter for families. Reproductive agency is limited 
by the existing structures and culture, which the gender-neutral approach does 
not call into question.  
One  might  ask  whether  it  is  possible  to  renegotiate  the  current  
package of maternity, paternity and family leaves without explicit critical 
evaluation of the system. The current benefits are based on the idea that the 
mother  is  the  primary  carer  (see  e.g.,  Rantalaiho  2003),  and  living  the  system 
differently may well require unusual circumstances in the woman’s job situa-
tion. The tweaking of the system by enhancing women’s position in the labour 
market or encouraging men to help with the household chores will not change 
the basic binary structures that deal with the issues in a complementary man-
ner. Reproductive agency as the possibilities to re-imagine and re-live, and thus 
overcome,  the  binary  system is  not  encouraged  in  this  setting.   Living  out  the  
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gendered roles in reproduction and care differently often demand extraordinary 
efforts or resources, which in itself could be seen to limit the imaginary domain. 
Although gender neutrality features most prominently in the GOV 
report, there are traces of it in the other two policy texts as well. For example, 
the FF lists measures to be taken by 2010 in order to increase the birth rate, and 
mentions that there should be more flexibility in working hours, more opportu-
nities for part-time work and more family-friendly working environments (FF, 
48); it does not mention that such measures mainly concern women. As in the 
treatment of the family as a single unit, this silence on the gendered structures 
of working life and housework hides the inequalities, or arrangements that do 
not support people’s ability to freely form their personality and evaluate their 
life  plans.  The  policies  are  meant  to  improve  the  position  of  working  women,  
which can be interpreted as improving women’s agency over their lives. Not 
questioning the basic structures and gendered roles does not enhance the freer 
formation of notions of gender, however. Sometimes it is important to think up 
and clearly articulate different kinds of arrangements regarding reproduction 
and the gendered roles connected to having children. Next I examine some more 
clearly  pronounced  views  of  the  differentiated  roles  of  men and  women in  the  
reproductive process, and issues connected to differentiation. 
 
6.4.2 Questions of inequality 
Not all three documents promote gender neutrality in the same sense as the 
GOV report. Both EVA and FF examine some of the issues from a gender per-
spective. In particular, the EVA report explicitly claims that women’s position in 
society affects  the birth rate.  One of  the most visible examples of  this  is  in the 
chapter dealing with the question of why Finnish people do not have more chil-
dren. One of the sections is entitled ‘Women concentrate on work and a career’, 
and it explores the claim that women’s status in society is connected to the birth 
rate, specifically that the higher a woman’s income, the fewer children she has. 
The effects of contraception and education are also briefly mentioned. The claim 
that  women  on  higher  incomes  have  fewer  children  does  not  seem  to  hold  in  
Finland,  however:  more  highly  educated  women on  higher  salaries  have  more  
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children. The report also acknowledges that men and women, mothers and fa-
thers, have different roles with regard to having children, and that fathers have 
more of a supporting role whereas women still carry the main responsibility for 
the housework. (EVA, 20-22) The gender focus related to working life in the FF 
text  includes  the  promotion  of  policies  that  would  make  young,  single  women 
less  of  a  risk  for  employers  through  the  more  equal  distribution  of  the  cost  of  
family leave and of domestic work. This would enhance young women’s position 
on the job market (FF, 52). 
 As  mentioned  in  the  previous  section,  combining  work  and  family  
life is often discussed without clear reference to gender. On the general level the 
argumentation is not explicit in terms of how it concerns women and men dif-
ferently. However, it would be difficult to discuss certain problems related to the 
job market that evidently affect the birth rate in gender-neutral terms. The 
question of so-called atypical employment (epätyypilliset työsuhteet in Finnish) 
is one example. Short-term, fixed contracts are assumed to have a negative ef-
fect  on  the  birth  rate,  and  it  is  often  explicitly  stated  that  this  affects  (young)  
women in particular (see e.g., EVA, 26). There is almost unanimous agreement 
in the three documents (and, I suggest, also more widely in Finnish politics) 
that promoting women’s employment enhances reproduction. This is connected 
to the financial aspect of having children discussed in Chapter five. The logic is 
that women’s permanent employment brings more financial security, and that 
this makes women or families more likely to have children. In many other con-
texts, women’s employment is considered a problem with regard to reproduc-
tion and the birth rate. One example of this is Catherine Hakim’s preference 
theory,  which  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  women  make  choices  between  
‘market work’ and ‘family work’; her classification of women as home-centred, 
adaptive and work-centred presupposes that prioritising paid work means that 
women have fewer children (Hakim 2003, 355-361).  
In the Finnish context, atypical employment pertains mainly to 
women, and men’s employment and its effects on the willingness to have chil-
dren are not discussed. In terms of reproductive agency, the promotion of 
women’s employment can be interpreted as positive. The idea that women 
should work signifies acceptance of their full personhood as participants in the 
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labour market, and does not portray having children and having a job as mutu-
ally  exclusive.  It  thereby  implies  more  freedom  in  pursuing  one’s  life  goals.  It  
makes women financially independent and enables them to choose their life 
paths  with  regard  to  procreation  or  anything  else.  This,  of  course,  may  be  re-
stricted by presumptions or expectations about procreation that come from dif-
ferent directions. The idea of improving (young) women’s position in the labour 
market is articulated from the instrumental perspective of promoting procrea-
tion, under the assumption that all women should have children and improve-
ments in their  position would make them more willing to procreate.  There are 
also contradictions in the idea of promoting procreation in this way in that there 
is,  at  the  same time,  not  strong  enough questioning  of  the  gendered  nature  of  
childcare and housework.  The Finnish ideology of  women in full-time employ-
ment and as primarily responsible for the home creates strong pressures on 
them in their everyday lives given the lack of critical assessment or acknowl-
edgement of sexual difference with regard to childcare and housework.  
 Women’s employment is one thing that is dealt with openly from a 
gendered perspective. Given the explicit treatment of inequality problems, stat-
ing the obvious cannot be deemed as negative, but can shed light on issues that 
are potentially open to rethinking. The EVA report states problems openly to 
some extent, but it does not dismantle the gendered structures and includes 
elements that are contradictory. It takes an individualistic approach to the ques-
tion of procreation in the sense that individuals should take more responsibility 
for it. At the same time, it criticises selfish people who concentrate on work and 
a career instead of having children (see e.g., EVA, 35, 37). This contradicts the 
idea  of  individualism,  and  the  contradictory  structure  is  also  gendered.  It  can  
thus be said that, when it comes to changing things, just stating the obvious is 
not enough. 
One of the issues that is worth closer examination and is related to 
the promotion of individualism and women’s role in relation to it is the general 
gendered nature of the claim that people are too selfish and do not want to have 
children. Although the EVA report does not state directly that women should 
stay at home and have babies, the section entitled ‘Women concentrate on work 
and a career’  gives the impressions that  women are to blame for the low birth 
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rate. It notes that highly educated Finnish women have more children, and that 
successful day-care solutions have dampened the effects of female employment 
on the birth rate, but it also suggests that female equality has brought about a 
decrease in the number of women who become mothers. The connection be-
tween equality and the birth rate thus indicates an uneven development in 
equality, and insufficient support from men in housework and caring. (EVA, 21-
22) Despite the caveats, the undertone is that women’s actions matter with re-
gard to the birth rate. Men should help, but having children remains women’s 
responsibility, and it is women who have the doubts about having children, thus 
creating problems.  
In terms of the imaginary domain and the rethinking of sexual dif-
ference, assigning responsibility for the birth rate to women is not very condu-
cive to reconsidering gender relations, and this is an approach that is also visible 
elsewhere. The EVA report notes that not all modern women can be persuaded 
to contribute to the procreation effort (lapsentekotalkoot in Finnish) (ibid., 32-
33). Some prefer to focus on a career, and thus do not fulfil their responsibility 
to have children. The idea of women shouldering the responsibility for procrea-
tion is evident in other parts of the EVA report. The section dealing with fixed-
term work contracts and the uncertainty they create, for example, focuses only 
on women of childbearing age, explicitly stating that the fixed-term work culture 
mainly affects young, academically educated women working in the public sec-
tor (ibid., 26), and it does not refer to men at all. The problems related to work-
ing life are seen very much as affecting women. Although women are not explic-
itly blamed for the structural inequality of the labour market, they are still de-
picted as the ones who do not want to have children. This does not respect their 
imaginary domain, because if they are condemned for not wanting to have chil-
dren, the implication is that it is their duty, or in their nature, to procreate. Such 
a construction ignores reproductive agency in that the choice not to have chil-
dren is not considered a legitimate option.  
The FF document similarly assigns responsibility to women in 
places. One of the FF targets is to increase the proportion of women giving birth 
to 90 per cent (it is currently 85 per cent but could, according to the FF, drop to 
80 per cent). The proportion of those who are childless of their own volition is 
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about 25-30 per cent of all childless women, and in the view of the FF, the best 
chance of changing their opinions would be to promote child-friendly attitudes 
(FF, 32). First of all, it seems somewhat unlikely that women who do not want to 
have children for various reasons would be swayed by more child-friendly atti-
tudes  in  society.  Could  it  not  just  as  easily  have  the  opposite  effect?  Secondly,  
here, too, it is assumed that women have the responsibility to reproduce, or are 
responsible for the low birth rate. Of course, the capability to give birth puts 
women in a different position than men, but such a one-sided approach that 
concentrates on women treats women and men rather differently in terms of 
reproductive agency. The underlying assumption is that women ultimately have 
the  responsibility  for  procreation,  and  it  is  legitimate  to  try  to  influence  their  
reproductive decision-making. Women’s own choices are seen as problematic 
and as something that should be changed.  
There  seems  to  be  a  curious  double  structure  in  the  documents  in  
their treatment of individualisation and women. Individualisation is something 
that should be respected in general, but when it comes to women living it out, 
the outcomes may be negative from a societal perspective. Therefore, with re-
gard to the population and family policies advocated in the documents, women’s 
reproductive agency cannot be fully respected because it may well lead to their 
having  too  few  children.  Neither  the  EVA  nor  the  FF  text  considers  women’s  
right to their personhood and their personality values something that need to be 
respected in all situations. The FF’s idea that women who are childless of their 
own volition should be persuaded to have children does not respect these 
women’s personality formation or their ability to freely make procreative deci-
sions. Being childless is not seen as a legitimate life choice. The EVA report has 
a negative attitude to state-based solutions, and encourages people to be re-
sponsible for their lives, but then it is also a bad thing if women concentrate too 
much on their jobs (see EVA, 33-34). Despite the pronouncements of individu-
alism, women are expected to give birth, and thereby their reproductive agency 
is not respected.  
The legitimacy of attempts to foster equality is not questioned in the 
discussion on women’s equality and individualism, and it is acknowledged that 
men need to take more responsibility in terms of caring for children and doing 
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housework (see e.g., EVA, 22, 38 and FF, 51). Acknowledgement of such prob-
lems could be interpreted as an attempt to rethink gendered roles in the repro-
ductive process and thus to enhance reproductive agency, but this does not nec-
essarily result in efforts to dismantle deeper gendered structures. If we are to 
take the idea of the imaginary domain seriously with regard to gender, gendered 
roles concerning who is primarily responsible for childcare should not be forced 
onto or expected of anyone. This is not just a question of defining the woman’s 
role through motherhood, but also concerns the man’s role in taking care of 
children and in reproductive decisions.  
The EVA report examines how mothers and fathers deal with par-
enthood  differently  (see  e.g.,  EVA,  22),  but  it  does  not  analyse  why.  For  EVA  
individualism is not about the freedom to make any kind of decision. EVA pro-
motes family-friendly policies in order to increase the birth rate.  Women have 
suffered from inequality, and in many cases still do, but at the same time people 
are selfish and should concentrate more on the family. If the basic structures of 
gendered divisions related to procreation and caring are not questioned, the 
emphasis on family values actually reinforces the traditional male and female 
roles. Men and women who are expected to comply with traditional roles related 
to caring and reproduction are constrained in terms of reproductive agency. The 
options in terms of living differently and overcoming binary gendered roles are 
not increased, but are limited to certain modes.  
In one sense, explicitly stating the problems but not questioning the 
underlying gendered structures echoes the challenges that so-called liberal 
feminism faces and on account of which it has been criticised. The promotion of 
social policies facilitating women’s participation in the labour force is based on 
the assumption that the worker does not have a gender, or that it is not a rele-
vant characteristic, but closer examination reveals that the human being with 
the right to work is, in fact, masculine. The aim in the various leave systems is 
not to re-think what motherhood and fatherhood might mean, but to create a 
situation  in  which  women,  despite  being  mothers,  could  be  part  of  the  waged  
labour  pool  just  as  men  are.  Women’s  employment  is  a  good  feminist  goal  in  
itself,  but  in  this  case  women  are  compared  to  men  and  men  are  used  as  the  
standard. The setting also reveals why Cornell talks about representing the 
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feminine: the goal should not be to achieve similarity in men’s and women’s 
situations, but to transfigure the general assumptions about gender altogether. 
Men have traditionally had smaller roles in childcare and housework, and if the 
aim is to position men and women similarly with regard to both the family and 
the job market, the problem is that simply promoting only women’s employ-
ment does not change the traditional setting in the family.  
Situations  in  working  life  in  which  women are  expected  to  behave  
similarly to men could constrict reproductive agency for women more than for 
men. In heterosexual relationships, men seem to have more choice than women 
in terms of taking a more or less active role in the lives of their children. As the 
three texts examined here imply, men are encouraged to help women with the 
children and the housework, but women are not given the same opportunity to 
take the assistant’s role. One might ask what it would mean if men were consid-
ered the primary carers. Would it be possible to create policies based on the as-
sumption that men clean, cook, take care of the children and take more leave 
from work than women? Moreover, would gender-neutral policies change sexual 
difference with regard to reproductive and caring processes? 
One more example of the lack of challenge to gendered structures is 
that women are still strongly seen as the object of policy measures. This is evi-
dent in the chapter in the EVA report considering ways of raising the birth rate. 
One of the subsections describes how the target group of the policy measures is 
becoming  splintered.  Most  of  the  discourse  is  about  women,  but  at  the  end  of  
the section it is acknowledged that the change is not only in women’s lives, but 
also in families. (EVA, 31-32) Men are not considered part of the target group. 
The FF report takes women to be the object of policies even more explicitly, and 
this question is examined next. 
 
6.4.3 Women as the object of policies 
Both  the  EVA  and  the  FF  reports  portray  women  as  the  object  of  measures  
aimed at affecting the birth rate, regardless of whether they are called family 
policies or population policies. The FF uses Catherine Hakim’s categorisation of 
women,  which  is  based  on  women’s  attitudes  to  having  children  and  to  family  
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life, as a theoretical tool in its assessment of the population-policy measures. 
According to Hakim, about 20 per cent of women are home-centred and are mo-
tivated to raise children, about 20 per cent are work-centred and are usually 
content not to have children, and about 60 per cent are adaptive and try to 
combine work and family life.  (FF,  30) This theory is,  of  course,  open to criti-
cism from various perspectives (see e.g., McRae 2003 and Crompton & Lyonett 
2005), but the content and the flaws are less relevant to my study; I am more 
interested in how the FF applies it. 
Hakim’s study, according to the FF, did not include men in the re-
search (ibid.), and thus in choosing the categorisation it makes women the ob-
ject of the policy measures. FF does not totally ignore men’s reasons for having 
children, but considers women’s motives more basic or related to how they see 
their lives: women have children in order to bring meaning into their lives, 
whereas  for  men  it  is  the  joy  of  seeing  the  child  grow  and  develop  (ibid.,  31).  
There  is  no  suggestion  that  men might  add  meaning  to  their  lives  through  fa-
therhood. Conversely, having children is considered very basic to a woman’s life, 
something that defines her being more deeply. Attribution of women’s motiva-
tion to procreate to the meaning of life implies a strong commitment to the idea 
of  sexual  difference;  having  children  seems  to  matter  more  to  women  than  to  
men. Reproductive agency is not valued, and an outsider is defining the mean-
ing of parenthood for both sexes. Differences in women’s and men’s attitudes to 
reproduction are also reflected in making women the object of the policies. 
Since reproduction is more important to women, they are chosen as the ones to 
whom the policies should be directed.  
The FF considers women and their attitudes the key in deciding 
population-policy measures, stating that ‘policies that treat women as a ho-
mogenous group are doomed to failure’ (ibid., 35). In order to avoid treating 
women as a uniform group FF adopts Hakim’s classification. The basis of its 
policies is that individuals and couples have the freedom to decide about having 
children (ibid., 7-8). The text does not mention women and men separately, and 
although it refers to individuals, its very formulation of population policies 
based on Hakim’s categorisation, and making women the only target, does not 
respect women’s reproductive agency the same way as it respects men’s. The 
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individual freedom to decide about having children is denied in the actual policy 
proposals. 
The EVA report also considers women the target of population poli-
cies. The section entitled ‘The target group splinters’ (Kohderyhmä pirstaloituu 
in Finnish) starts with the sentence: ‘A set of difficulties in explaining the birth 
rate  are  attributable  to  the  fact  that  the  group  in  question  -  families,  women,  
fathers - is changing and individualising at a rapid rate’ (EVA, 31). This is a very 
interesting quotation as it posits all women as instrumental in explaining the 
development of the birth rate, but it only applies to men who are fathers. Ac-
cording to this logic, the behaviour of every individual woman affects the birth 
rate, whereas in the case of men it is only after they have become fathers that 
they become a factor in the development of the birth rate, and not all men are 
part of it. This dual understanding is a clear example of the differences in per-
ception of the roles of women and men in the reproductive process: all women 
are potential mothers, whereas men as men do not feature in the birth-rate cal-
culus or policy planning.    
The paragraph goes on to posit that there is no homogenous group 
of  women and their  partners who could be the target  of  family policies (ibid.).  
The rest of the section charts how women have become diverse as a group. For 
example,  there  is  a  stronger  division  between  labour-market  producers  and  
family-based reproducers. There is reference at the end of the chapter to the fact 
that families are also becoming more diversified. (ibid., 31-32) The report ig-
nores the role of men and how they could be analysed as a relevant element in 
population and family polices and the development of the birth rate. Making 
women  the  object  of  the  policies  brushes  aside  the  role  of  men  in  population  
growth and family life. Although women as the ones giving birth are differently 
positioned in the reproductive process, the idea of trying to affect men’s behav-
iour through family policies is totally alien in the documents.  
It  is  once  again  clear  that  women’s  reproductive  agency  is  con-
structed very differently from men’s. It is considered entirely legitimate to try to 
influence women’s willingness to have children, whereas men are not discussed 
at all. All women as potential mothers are targeted in the policies, but men be-
come objects only after they have become fathers. The way the policies are for-
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mulated does not respect women’s full personhood and limits reproductive 
agency. In addition, the scope for creating an environment that would foster 
rethinking  and  living  sexual  difference  is  limited  in  this  thinking.  Although  
agency in the context of performativity is about reworking the norms, policy 
proposals assigning women the role of the mother affect the reiterative potential 
in that the space for reconfiguring are subject to constraint; the options that 
people could even consider possible are limited. 
The targeting of women in population policies is a familiar theme in 
discussions about the developing world, and double standards have been ap-
plied  with  regard  to  the  roles  of  men and  women in  population  control  in  the  
developing countries. Poor women in particular have been targets of many kinds 
of measures aimed at slowing population growth, and the measures are fre-
quently discussed separately from issues connected with the human and other 
rights  of  these  women.  (Kajesalo  &  Topo  1994:  213)  The  Finnish  context,  of  
course, bears no resemblance to the developing world: the social, cultural and 
symbolic position of women is different, and women’s reproductive agency is 
constructed differently. The positioning of women as objects of population poli-
cies in the policy documents is nevertheless a reminder that even in Finland, a 
country  that  prides  itself  on  its  gender  equality,  the  reproductive  capacities  of  
women and men are viewed very differently. Moreover, the difference still 
places women in an inferior position with regard to agency.  
When analysing policies that position men and women differently 
through the notion of reproductive agency, it is clear that they do not advance 
people’s freedom to form their personalities with regard to procreation. The goal 
of  family  policies  in  this  context  is  to  increase  the  birth  rate,  and  because  the  
gender roles are not questioned, in practice the assumption is that women give 
birth  and  stay  at  home,  and  are  the  ones  who  have  to  give  up  or  modify  their  
goals and values. The individualisation the FF refers to with reference to re-
specting individuals’ sexual rights (FF, 7-8), and which the EVA report empha-
sises (see e.g., EVA, 4) does not extend fully to women. Making women the tar-
get of policies treats women as a group who is defined by their attitude towards 





My aim in this section has been to give an overview of the gendered structures 
that are present in the selected policy documents. The texts vary in their treat-
ment of gender, from attempts at almost total neutrality to explicitly tackling 
various gendered problems. The GOV report aims at the most gender-neutral 
approach, and widely employs the notion of the family in its discourse on in-
creasing the birth rate. Gender-neutrality could be interpreted as an attempt to 
overcome sexual difference and to rethink gendered duties in connection with 
the procreative process. However, this does not mean that the gender question 
could be avoided. To some extent, attempts at gender neutrality, in a situation 
where many social structures such as childcare or housework are gendered, just 
perpetuate the gendered division of labour and care. Nevertheless, the GOV re-
port  in  places,  and  the  EVA report  and  the  FF  Program to  a  larger  extent,  ac-
knowledge the uneven distribution of housework and childcare, and they ad-
dress these issues explicitly. 
Explicitness in terms of gender usually means that the texts de-
mand a more equal distribution of housework and of the burdens that different 
leave systems place on employers. Men are encouraged to take part in the eve-
ryday maintenance of the home and in caring for the children, and to use the 
parental leave to which they are entitled. All these aims are, of course, positive, 
and  are  admissions  that  in  the  current  system  responsibilities  are  not  equally  
shared. However, they do not produce policy proposals that would change the 
bigger picture with regard to the gendered structures of reproduction and car-
ing. Women are still expected to carry the main responsibility for the home, and 
men are assigned an assistant’s role. A further implication is that it is women’s 
duty to be the primary carers. Despite the attempts at more equal arrangements, 
it seems that without a deeper rethinking of the gendered roles and assign-
ments,  and  without  more  respect  for  the  imaginary  domain,  the  changes  will  
only be piecemeal. Thus the policy documents do not fully respect women’s full 
personhood, which is frequently connected to motherhood.  
An example of how the woman’s role is still very much defined 
through the notion of motherhood and reproduction is the targeting of popula-
tion policies at women in both the EVA report and the FF Program. Women are 
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the ones who need to change their behaviour if the Finnish birth rate is to start 
to grow, and this places the responsibility on them. Even though there are no 
explicit demands for women to stay at home, for example, the implicit message 
is that they should recognise and respect their responsibility and their duty, and 
have  more  children.  Men are  merely  women’s  assistants  in  terms  of  childcare,  
and their choices are more diverse. There is thus an assumption of different du-
ties for men and women with regard to reproduction.  
As Thomas Laqueur notes, there are various perspectives on moth-
erhood and fatherhood, and some feminists go back to the idea that the category 
of mother is something that is natural, more than culture, and that fatherhood is 
just an ‘idea’ because the biological connection to the child is materially differ-
ent from that of the mother (Laqueur 1992, 157). The conception of motherhood 
as natural is also evident in the three policy documents analysed here. The pro-
posals may advocate equality, but they still hold on to the idea that motherhood 
is somehow more natural, and that fatherhood is, in the end, secondary in terms 
of caring for the child, despite the ideal that fathers should be active and present 
in their children’s lives. This is problematic with regard to reproductive agency. 
Such a precise and constrained definition of what it means to be a mother and a 
father influences people’s imaginary domains, how they think about parenthood 
and  their  own relationship  to  it.  It  also  has  effects  on  their  options  when they  
think about their own values related to procreation and the meanings they at-
tach to their reproductive capacities, be they men, women or something else.  
Furthermore, in the rare cases in which men are considered an ob-
ject of family or population policies, it is only after they have become fathers. 
Women, conversely, are objects even before they become mothers, so in terms 
of reproductive agency they are treated very differently from men. It is per-
ceived as legitimate to try to affect women’s decisions to have children in gen-
eral,  and  to  consider  all  women  as  potential  mothers.  Decisions  about  father-
hood are not an object of policy measures, and men are targeted in the policies 
not as men, only as fathers. Moreover, making women the primary object of the 
policies  does  not  enhance  the  imaginary  domain  with  regard  to  sex,  sexuality  
and how one sees one’s gender. Presenting choices as limited does not promote 
the re-thinking of sexual difference as something other than binary. 
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Reproductive agency and the notion of the imaginary domain are 
indispensable to the analysis of gender in the three documents, but would seem 
to be somewhat inadequate if the aim is to propose alternative policies to those 
examined in this study. All policy proposals offer a limited set of choices and 
aim to steer people’s behaviour in certain directions, and it is difficult to see how 
the idea that the only source of life choices is the person concerned could pro-
vide substantive content. Suggesting policy content is not the task of this study. 
The imaginary domain is an ideal and as such is a good evaluation tool. One can, 
of course, entertain the idea of re-imagining sexual difference and the reproduc-
tive process, starting, for example, with what it would mean if men were primar-
ily responsible for childcare and housework, or with defining masculinity so as 
to  incorporate  more  caring  values.  I  would  like  to  think  that  the  whole  binary  
gender system could be re-imagined differently, although as this study shows, it 





This dissertation describes and redescribes three selected documents dealing 
with population policy and the declining birth rate in 21st-century Finland from 
the perspective of reproductive agency. The aim of the redescription is to eluci-
date the values and logics supporting the texts and the discourse. The popula-
tion question has worried European governments for a long time now. It has 
been  the  subject  of  public  discussion  for  decades  in  Finland,  too,  but  concern  
about population growth has intensified in the 21st century. One sign of this is 
the publication of several reports on the population question during a relatively 
short time in 2003-2004.  
I  focused  in  my  examination  on  three  documents  that  were  pub-
lished during those years: the Government report on the future called ‘Finland 
for  people  of  all  ages:  Government  report  on  the  future:  demographic  trends,  
population policy, and preparation for changes in the age structure’ (GOV) pub-
lished in 2004, the Business and Policy Forum EVA  report, called ‘Condemned 
to Diminish? Finns and the Difficult Art of Procreation’ (Tuomitut 
vähenemään? Suomalaiset ja lisääntymisen vaikea taito) (EVA), published in 
2003, and the Family Federation’s ‘Population Policy Program’ (FF), published 
in 2004. These policy documents were published within a relatively short time, 
and reflect the renewed interest in the population question. In addition, al-
though the interests of the organisations publishing the reports are different, 
the texts deal with largely similar issues  
I have deliberately concentrated on the three particular documents 
rather than conducting an extensive analysis of population discourses in recent 
years. I have used as an analytical tool the concept of reproductive agency, 
which facilitates redescription of the texts from a specific perspective. My rede-
scription focuses on three themes that are prominent in the documents: the 
family, economics and gender. It seems that reproductive agency, which con-
cerns the freedom to form one’s personality, is insufficiently taken into account 
with regard to these three themes. The texts depict the family as monogamous 
and heterosexual, for example, and such strict definitions are problematic in 
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that they affect the possibilities to imagine reproductive processes. The notion 
of the family is also connected to my second theme, economics in that econom-
ics features strongly in family policies, which play an essential role in population 
policies and policy discourses. Family policies provide certain economic incen-
tives for having children, and economic factors feature strongly in the texts 
when the aim is to raise the birth rate. In addition, the two themes are gendered, 
which  means  that  the  roles  of  women  and  men  in  the  procreative  process  are  
seen differently. Although I do not analyse the Finnish population-policy dis-
cussions in their  entirety,  I  believe that  in employing the concept of  reproduc-
tive agency I provide information that is also relevant outside of these specific 
texts, and give further insights into the wider debate on population policy.  
The emphasis in the Finnish political debate about the population 
varies, one of the major factors being the birth rate: if the birth rate is in decline 
there are worries about the declining population, whereas when it is on the in-
crease, concern about population issues is less visible. The population question 
was not particularly evident as a political problem in the 1980s and 1990s, al-
though there were organisations such as the Family Federation that brought 
concerns about the size of the population into the public arena. The public dis-
cussion about the need for population policies was somewhat livelier in the me-
dia  and  in  political  forums during  2003-2004,  which  is  when the  three  policy  
documents on which my study is based were published. I chose the three docu-
ments because they give different perspectives on the population question. EVA 
clearly represents business interests and favours market-based solutions in so-
cial policy. The FF concentrates more on Finnish families and their wellbeing. 
The GOV document incorporates many viewpoints; Finnish governments are 
coalitions, and various worldviews have to be incorporated into the policy pro-
posals they put forward. Thus each of the reports represents specific views on 
current population questions.  
I  base  my  analytical  tool,  the  notion  of  reproductive  agency,  on  
Drucilla Cornell’s thinking, specifically on her concepts of the imaginary domain 
and bodily integrity. Behind her thinking is the idea that people are not ready 
personas,  but  are  always  working  through  who they  are  and  who they  want  to  
become. They seek the sense of a coherent personality, which also includes a 
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bodily aspect. As they aspire to achieve coherence, they need to be free to sort 
out  the  identifications  that  comprise  their  personalities,  and  in  the  process  of  
sorting through their identifications they need the imaginary domain. The 
imaginary domain is a moral and psychic space which people require in order to 
be able to process the identifications that  form their  embodied personalities.  I  
use  the  notion  of  embodied  personalities  to  reflect  the  idea  that  the  body  and  
the  mind  are  not  detached,  but  are  inseparably  linked  as  a  person  aspires  to  
bodily integrity. Bodily integrity is imaginary: it is something that is always in 
the future, but it is an essential part of personality formation. Cornell attaches 
importance to the notion of freedom in personality formation. Freedom in this 
context means that people should be the only source of the values and meanings 
connected to the identifications that comprise the personality, although they are 
also inevitably shaped by the surrounding society and culture and thus cannot 
be  free  in  the  sense  of  being  totally  autonomous  and  removed  from the  social  
and culture.  
An important aspect of the embodied personality is reproductive 
capacity. Cornell considers sex and sexuality an essential element in how people 
see themselves, and procreation is connected to this. Decisions about parent-
hood are among the most basic in terms of personality formation. It is vital that 
such decisions, and the values and meanings connected to reproductive choices, 
are constructed as freely as possible, so that the source of the values and mean-
ings  about  life  is  the  person  concerned.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that,  for  
Cornell,  freedom,  bodily  integrity  and  the  imaginary  domain  are  ideals,  which  
means  that  they  cannot  be  achieved  in  themselves,  but  are  something  to  be  
strived for. Consequently, and because the personality is a process and not 
something that is fixed and stable, the environment and the social, cultural and 
political worlds in which people live influence how they strive to reach their ide-
als. The idea of freedom as an ideal makes the environment in which the per-
sonality  is  formed  even  more  important  given  that  people  are  socially  con-
structed, and are affected by their social, political and cultural surroundings. 
I have also employed some of Judith Butler’s notions, in particular 
her concept of performativity. As identities are performatively constructed, 
there  is  no  absolute  difference  between  the  self  and  the  discourses  and  social  
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structures that form the self. Performativity implies agency in that inherent in 
the idea of the iterability of identity is the potential for change. The environment 
in which the personality forms can also be transformed when the personality is 
iterated differently. Thinking about the subject or the personality as processual 
facilitates thinking about change, both in the political and social environment, 
and also on the level of the personality. Agency can thus be understood here as 
chances to iterate the personality or the self differently.  
Combining the notion of the imaginary domain with Judith Butler’s 
idea of performativity of gender, i.e. that gender is doing, allows the re-thinking 
and the re-living of sexual difference. The imaginary domain offers an arena, a 
space or a tool for rethinking, and Butler’s notion of performativity over time 
facilitates theorising about the reiteration of sexual difference. The iteration 
does not create the gender identity once and for all, nor can the change be once 
and for all. Change is piecemeal, not necessarily something that can be directed, 
and happens over time, but it is still possible. As Moya Lloyd notes:  
 
For every reiteration of the norms and practices that produces gen-
der identity is a reiteration with a difference. Butler’s theorization 
of performativity indicates, unlike some other accounts, how the 
subject’s  constitutive practices can be the raw material  for  its  own 
transfiguration. (Lloyd 2005, 26, emphasis in the original) 
 
Performativity, and agency connected to it, can also be considered in relation to 
reproduction.  Reproductive  agency  refers  to  the  possibilities  to  live  one’s  pro-
creative life or personality with regard to procreation in different ways, espe-
cially in relation to norms and hegemonic understandings of how one should 
reproduce. It is about living one’s reproductive life as freely as possible, in the 
ideal sense of freedom, meaning assigning values and meanings to one’s repro-
ductive capacities and choices. The concept of reproductive agency also incorpo-
rates the notion that people have possibilities to live their reproductive lives in 
personal ways, hence allowing for change in the hegemonic understandings of 
what procreation means.  
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Understood as the potential for freedom in procreative personality 
formation, the notion of reproductive agency can be used as an evaluative tool 
with which to examine policies, and what specific policies offer in this context. 
Reproduction is a crucial part of being a human being, and this evaluative tool 
should therefore not be restricted to policies that explicitly address the question 
of reproductive agency; it is something that can be taken into account in differ-
ent contexts in which people’s lives and procreative options are discussed. Given 
that  family  policies  and  the  need  for  population  policies  are  very  much  about  
reproduction and influencing procreative decisions, the notion of reproductive 
agency facilitated examination of the three policy documents. It would, of 
course, be possible to analyse several things, but I chose to concentrate on three 
issues: the family, economics and gender. They are issues that are at the core of 
the  debates  covered  in  the  documents,  and  although  the  texts  deal  with  them  
differently, they are all present in all of the texts in one way or another.  
The first issue, the family, is highly visible in the three documents 
in that it is considered the primary location of procreation. Although there is 
some acknowledgement that there are different kinds of families, the basic as-
sumption  in  all  the  texts  is  that  it  is  a  heterosexual,  monogamous  unit  that  is  
based on the sexual relationship of the couple, and children are seen as the ex-
pression of conjugal love. The least defined approach in regard to the family is 
in the GOV report, which treats the family as a single, opaque unit and restricts 
reproductive  agency  to  this  unit  rather  than  to  separate  persons.  The  EVA re-
port and the FF Population Policy Program have a more open notion – the EVA 
report acknowledges that families have become different, for example – but they 
still do not question the very basic assumptions about the importance of fami-
lies  when it  comes  to  reproduction.  It  is  also  assumed that  the  family  is  auto-
matically important to people, and that everyone should, or should want to pro-
create.  
When the family question is redescribed in terms of reproductive 
agency, it is clear that the documents do not take sufficiently into account the 
possibilities of living the family differently. If the imaginary domain is to be re-
spected, there should not be one definition of the good family, or a preference 
for any one type (e.g., the biological two-parent heteronormative nuclear fam-
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ily). Although procreation is very rarely covered without reference to the family 
– thereby making it seem like a natural element in the reproductive process – it 
is worth remembering historicity and constructed nature of the family, espe-
cially the nuclear family, which currently appears so natural. In portraying pro-
creation as happening through the family, the documents affect reproductive 
agency through creating and expressing expectations about what a family 
should be like, and these expectations form the environment in which people 
construct their personalities. Family policies also include implicit notions about 
the structure and the roles of the people involved in the formation of the family.  
The second theme of my redescription is economics. The population 
is often a significant variable in different kinds of development calculations, and 
is in many cases considered essential to the economic development of a nation. 
The three policy documents treat economic development as an unannounced 
rationale that is indispensable for a nation. The population as a whole and in 
terms of numbers is then associated with continuous economic growth, and 
population growth is considered crucial for the economic development of 
Finland. Family policies foster population growth in offering economic support 
for families. There are thus two levels of economic argumentation in the three 
policy  documents.  The  first  is  the  macroeconomic  level,  which  refers  to  major  
aspects of economic growth including the GDP, dependency ratios and the em-
ployment level. Secondly there is the level of family policies, which are assumed 
to influence the reproductive decisions of individual families that make deci-
sions about procreation based on financial factors. Having children is strongly 
portrayed  through  the  lens  of  economics,  and  the  decision  whether  or  not  to  
have children is considered to be based on whether a family can afford it or not. 
The GOV report in particular does not discuss the values connected to procrea-
tion, and deals with the question from a strongly economic perspective. The 
EVA and FF reports do acknowledge that people have motives other than finan-
cial ones when they consider having children. 
Redescription through the notion of reproductive agency reveals 
that macroeconomic argumentation is rather problematic in that it fosters the 
assumption that all people should, or should want to reproduce, and that it is, in 
fact, a duty. The duty argument is often directed at women, who are positioned 
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differently in the reproductive process from men. Reproductive agency is not 
fully recognised, because understanding procreation as a duty does not leave 
much room for  people’s  own values  and  meanings.  On the  other  hand,  family  
policies may enhance reproductive agency if they provide economic support to 
people who could not afford to have children otherwise.  As Cornell  has shown 
(see e.g., Cornell 1995, 64-69), the imaginary domain and the formation of the 
personality also require certain kinds of societal and economic arrangements in 
order to enable people to exercise their freedom, and providing economic sup-
port for families is one way of making sure that those who want to have children 
are able to do so. However, family policies always contain definitions of the fam-
ily and in what kinds of life situations people are entitled to benefits. Allowing 
an outsider, such as the state, to define the family can be seen as a violation of 
the imaginary domain as it has effects on people’s ability to freely work out what 
the family is for them and how and what kinds of values they attach to it. Con-
sidered through the notion of reproductive agency, family policies have contra-
dictory functions: one the one hand they enhance reproductive agency in certain 
contexts, but on the other hand they always define the family and limit individ-
ual freedom to imagine and live different kinds of family formations. 
Connected to the economic perspective is the opposite view that 
having children should not be thought of as an economic decision. Focusing on 
other  than  economic  issues  challenges  the  more  common approach  to  popula-
tion growth, which emphasises the economic conditions for having children. 
Many of the arguments promoting non-economic values of procreation are very 
conservative as they hark back to so-called family values, i.e. to the idea of the 
traditional nuclear family. They also assume traditional gendered roles for men 
and women. Therefore, with regard to reproductive agency, calls for family val-
ues and the rejection of economic thinking are usually not very helpful either to 
men or to women. 
My third redescriptive theme is gender, which intersects with many 
of the issues the policy documents deal with. Gender is visible differently in the 
three documents. The GOV report aims at neutrality in the sense that it avoids 
using explicitly gendered language. The EVA and FF texts analyse gender and 
gender inequality explicitly with regard to the birth rate. Although the GOV re-
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port avoids explicitly gendered language, and leaves room for the imaginary 
domain, many of the issues it deals with are gendered. The problem with aiming 
at neutrality is that it leaves untouched many of the structures that position 
women and men differently and ends up repeating the same unequal and differ-
entiated practices with regard to reproduction. For example, the GOV report 
fails to point out that the various kinds of leaves related to having children are 
usually taken by women, and policies that seek to combine family and work life 
in a gender-neutral way do nothing to change this set-up. 
The EVA and FF reports project more explicitly gendered view-
points, and the EVA text in particular analyses the position and role of women 
in the development of the birth rate from various perspectives. It is good to state 
inequalities clearly in that it makes it possible to analyse and change them. The 
EVA and FF documents do not question the deep gendered structures either, 
however, so in a way their work is left half-finished. Analysing the unequal dis-
tribution of housework or young women’s problematic job-market status is, of 
course,  useful,  but  the  very  basic  constellations  of  gendered  roles  in  the  situa-
tions remain unquestioned. Women as mothers seem naturally to be in a posi-
tion that is different from men, and implicit in this is the idea that women are, 
in the end, responsible for the development of the Finnish birth rate. Men 
should help women with the housework and caring for the children, but women 
are in charge of the children and, by implication, also of the birth rate.  
Implicit in the idea of the imaginary domain and reproductive 
agency is the notion that sexual difference and the binary gender system are 
things  that  one  should  be  able  to  challenge  and  live  differently.  However,  the  
policy texts end up not creating productive discourses for reproductive agency 
with regard to gender and gendered roles. The fact that women are in a special 
position when it comes to the birth rate means that they are treated in the EVA 
report and the FF Program as objects of family and population policies aimed at 
raising the birth rate. This merely perpetuates the hegemonic view of sexual dif-
ference in that women’s reproductive agency is considered something that can 




As the redescriptions show, reproductive agency is seen very differ-
ently for men and women. Women’s role in the reproductive process is under-
stood as much more highly defined in that  their  role in the labour market,  for  
example,  is  defined  through  the  notion  of  motherhood.  Cornell  has  written  
about the importance of separating the role of a mother and what it is means to 
be a woman, as the conflation of the two means that women are treated un-
equally  if  they  are  not  given  the  right  to  define  and  process  the  meanings  and  
values  connected  to  procreation  (Cornell  1998,  chapter  4).  Making  women the  
object of policies constructs their reproductive agency differently than in the 
case of men in that it is considered legitimate to try to affect their behaviour and 
to expect all women to be mothers. Men, in contrast, are understood to have 
more freedom to decide about fatherhood, and their role in society in general is 
not defined by the role of father or by fatherhood. 
From the perspective of  reproductive agency,  it  can be said on the 
general level that there are places in the three documents in which people’s need 
to  decide  about  procreation  as  freely  as  possible  is  recognised,  but  the  policy  
proposals are based on restricted views on the working of the reproductive 
process. There is no dismantling or questioning of the basic structures of pro-
creation, which would be a starting point for a more open approach to reproduc-
tive agency. The documents assume that the family is the main place of repro-
duction,  and  that  it  is  primarily  a  biological,  two-parent,  heterosexual,  mo-
nogamous nuclear unit. There are some signs of cracks in the notion, however, 
given  that  it  is  impossible  to  deny  the  existence  of  different  kinds  of  families  
created by divorces, different kinds of sexualities and single parenthood, for ex-
ample. These alternative forms are nevertheless seen as exceptions; the norm is 
still the two-parent heterosexual nuclear family. Family policies are usually 
formulated on this basis. Policies and policy proposals are then part of the per-
formative possibilities and discourses that create the environment where repro-
ductive agency is acted out. 
Family  policies  are  one  of  the  issues  that  illustrate  how reproduc-
tion and having children are approached from the perspective of economics in 
the documents. The macroeconomic success of the Finnish nation, and the role 
of demographics in it, are considered important, but the financial conditions of 
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individual families is also a concern in that decisions about having children are 
often seen to be based on economics. All these issues involving the family and 
economics are then intertwined with certain notions of gender. The assumption 
is that women are primarily responsible for the children, although equal parent-
ing is  talked about.  In the end,  however,  men are portrayed as women’s assis-
tants in childcare and housework.  
The fact that women are considered the more important partner in 
the reproductive process fosters the idea that policies should be aimed at 
women. Their decisions about procreation are considered more important than 
men’s, and they are regarded as legitimate objects of population-policy meas-
ures. The imaginary domain is thus not fully respected when it comes to gender 
and  sexual  difference  in  the  procreative  process.  Although  women’s  biological  
capacity for bearing children and for lactation places them on a different posi-
tion  from men in  the  gestation  process,  in  the  moment  of  birth  and  in  certain  
respects after it, there are many issues related to reproduction and childcare 
that are not dependent on women’s biological capacities and could be dealt with 
differently. There is a need for re-imagining processes considered biologically 
unalterable, but this does not happen in the three documents.  
It is not the purpose of this research to analyse all the discourses on 
Finnish population policy that have been going on in recent years, and therefore 
I cannot evaluate the prevalence of my observations. However, I think it is fair 
to assume that the viewpoints represented in my study are not uncommon in 
the population policy debates. Although it is not explicitly stated that women 
should stay at home and have babies, it seems rather clear that women are con-
sidered to be in a very different position from men, even when it is nothing to do 
with their child-bearing capacity. It is also worth pointing out that defining 
women’s  role  in  a  restrictive  manner  also  limits  men’s  reproductive  agency  in  
that their role is considered complementary. 
Redescribing population policies through the concept of reproduc-
tive agency raises questions about legitimacy of population policies in general in 
that not having children should be as legitimate and as freely accepted as having 
children. The basic rationale behind population policies is that people should 
have children, which is the assumption in the policy documents examined here. 
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In  addition,  there  is  often  a  further  assumption  that  everyone  should  want  to  
have children. There are references in three texts to the fact that not everyone 
considers procreation a duty or an inevitable part of their lives, but such atti-
tudes are seen as something that should be changed. The policy proposals are 
solidly based on the view that it is natural for everyone to want to have children, 
and it is logical to introduce policies that encourage procreation. 
Redescription has turned out to be a useful tool in shedding light on 
issues that are taken for granted or considered natural. Reproduction is a case 
in point. It carries not only cultural and social assumptions, but also assump-
tions labelled as biological that are often taken as a basis for certain kinds of 
arrangements related to procreation and childcare. My purpose in bringing 
some of these assumptions to light is to provide the ingredients for reimagining 
things. Cornell notes that even in science one ‘must imagine otherwise to know 
the truth of  what is’  (Cornell  2008a,  90),  and furthermore that  imagining oth-
erwise does not automatically  bring about a new and more just  world,  for that  
requires political struggle and ethical commitment (Cornell 2008a, 90). Ques-
tioning current assumptions and things that seem natural or are understood as 
biological is one way to start the re-imagining process. 
In terms of analytical power, I suggest that redescription is a good 
tool when the material in question is limited. It would be interesting to chart the 
development of the Finnish debate on the birth rate and population policies, 
and this would reveal certain things about Finnish politics, but it would not be 
possible to go very deeply into the values and meanings behind the discussions 
and the vocabularies. The strength of redescription is just this: it makes it possi-
ble to see issues that are taken to be self-evident in a new light. It can also be a 
force in processes that promote change or the development of new concepts. 
I have redescribed the texts through my concept of reproductive 
agency, major elements of which are the notions of the imaginary domain and 
bodily integrity. Cornell’s formulation of the imaginary domain emphasises each 
individual’s freedom – or to be more precise the ideal of freedom – to form their 
personalities,  and  to  decide  on  the  values  and  meanings  they  attach  to  their  
identities, an aim being to be freed from the limitations on the current way of 
seeing themselves. Of course, one is inevitably influenced by one’s society and 
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culture, but the basic premise of the imaginary domain and the performative 
notion  of  agency  is  that  these  can  be  rethought.  Given  that  the  personality  is  
embodied, one aspect of its formation is bodily integrity, meaning that people 
imagine their bodies as whole. Bodies always have an imaginary dimension, 
which in turn means that people do not have any direct, unmediated connection 
with their bodies. Such conceptions are formed in an on-going performative 
process. Bodily coherence is thus something that people need to work on con-
tinuously, although a great deal of the processing is not conscious. The concept 
of bodily integrity is of major significance in this study on account of its close 
connection  with  reproduction  and  reproductive  decisions,  and  with  the  values  
and meanings people connect to their bodily being.  
The notion of reproductive agency is used as tool to illuminate the 
social and political conditions constituted and expressed in the three texts: the 
conditions under which decisions about reproduction are being made. As far as 
my analysis is concerned, it brings in new viewpoints that I might have missed if 
I had used some other method for examining the documents. First of all, draw-
ing from the notions of the imaginary domain and bodily integrity emphasises 
the  overcoming  of  sexual  difference.  It  provokes  new  ways  of  thinking  about  
masculinity  and  femininity,  about  the  consequences  of  overcoming  the  binary  
construction of sex. This, of course, is known from feminist and queer theorising 
and is not new as such. The way the notion of reproductive agency combines the 
political and personal levels is, however, notable. Emphasis on freedom as an 
ideal in the imaginary domain fosters thinking about sexual difference as a very 
personal issue, not as something that could be created without others, but still 
something  that  each  one  of  us  processes,  reprocesses  and  struggles  with  
throughout our lives. The processing is connected to politics, as politics for its 
part creates the conditions in which each one of us forms our personality. Poli-
tics and policies can be evaluated against the idea of the imaginary domain, and 
politics can be thought of through the notion of freedom.  
One of  the unique aspects of  my concept of  reproductive agency is  
connected to how the body is understood. Women’s right to decide about repro-
duction and about their bodies is one of the basic demands of feminists. My un-
derstanding of reproductive agency brings in a different perspective. Demands 
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for reproductive rights often rest on the assumption that bodies are something 
that  women own,  or  at  least  the  body  is  something  that  can  be  controlled  and  
women should  have  the  sole  right  to  control  their  own bodies.  As  political  de-
mands these may be effective, but the notion of bodily integrity is more widely 
relevant.  Inherent in the concept is  the specific  idea that  people are not in full  
control  of  their  bodies.  This  being  the  case,  the  social  and  political  conditions  
that affect the formation of the personality and of bodily integrity assume all the 
more importance because they should be such that they strengthen the little 
control  people  have  over  their  embodied  being.  Bodily  integrity  is  a  fragile  
achievement that has to be processed again and again, which makes the condi-
tions in which people do the processing especially important. The conditions 
also  have  to  be  developed  continuously.  Aiming  for  the  ideal  of  the  imaginary  
domain  means  that  society  is  never  ‘finished’,  and  one  should  strive  for  more  
freedom and more choice in forming the personality.  
The fact that the personality is never complete, and that bodily in-
tegrity  is  a  continuous  process,  gives  relevance  to  the  concept  of  reproductive  
agency.  The  focus  widens  to  the  creation  of  an  environment  –  social,  cultural  
and political conditions – that enhances people’s ability to form their embodied 
personalities rather than giving them specific, separate rights, although they are 
also important in promoting a more equal society. Reproductive agency is about 
the bigger picture.  Enhancing people’s  ability  to freely form the meanings and 
values they connect to their reproductive capacities calls for profound changes 
in  society  and  in  the  culture  in  which  we  live.  This  is  also  connected  to  the  
above-mentioned idea that it is just because people cannot control their bodies 
that bodily integrity, and by extension reproductive agency, matter with regard 
to different kinds of public policies.  
A significant aspect in my notion of reproductive agency is that it is 
not just about the physical being, but also includes something that is an essen-
tial part of people’s personalities and how they see themselves. The denial of or 
limitation on reproductive rights, such as controlling women’s procreation, is 
often seen in terms of the physical being, and as such overlooks the deep insult 
and psychic violation that efforts to control or influence people’s ability to de-
cide about their procreation involve. It is sometimes assumed that people are in 
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full control of their bodies, and it is enough if they are given freedom of choice. 
Reproductive agency and the imaginary domain emphasise that reproduction is 
an essential part of how people see themselves, not just something connected to 
the body understood as a mere physical entity. If the human being is thought of 
not only as a physical being, but also as an embodied personality, separate and 
piecemeal changes in laws concerning equality, for example, are not enough; 
reproduction as part of personality formation concerns wider social and political 
changes and opportunities. Reproductive agency is not only about distinct rights 
related to issues such as control of one’s body, it is also about enhancing under-
standing of how a person can sort through the identifications that form the self, 
and how the process of personality formation can be enabled and secured. 
The fact that the concept of reproductive agency stresses the indi-
vidual’s ability to give meanings and values to life implies that when I talk about 
it I am referring not only to women’s right to reproductive decisions, but also to 
everyone’s right to decide about procreation. Both men and women should have 
the freedom to form their personalities, meaning that men should also be able to 
decide about the meanings and values connected to their reproductive capaci-
ties. Men have traditionally been able to exercise more freedom in their repro-
ductive decisions, but this does not mean that there are no expectations placed 
on them. Issues of parenthood are often considered complementary, thus there 
is a need to re-think the roles of both men and women: indeed, changes in one 
often create changes in the other. The overall aim is to change the binary way of 
thinking  and  to  re-imagine  reproductive  roles  that  are  based  on  aspects  other  
than gender.  
The notion of  reproductive agency as a redescription tool  has spe-
cific advantages and brings in novel insights, thereby triggering fresh ideas 
about the policy documents. Reading the documents through this perspective 
highlights the issues I have charted in this study, which would not otherwise be 
visible. The concept of reproductive agency, and by extension the imaginary 
domain and bodily integrity, are very useful in the redescription process in fa-
cilitating the rethinking of many reproductive issues connected to the policy 
documents and beyond. One might ask what alternative policy proposals the 
concept of the imaginary domain could offer. Creating proposals or any kind of 
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policy analysis is not the purpose of this study, although it has to be said that the 
concept  of  reproductive  agency  is  limited  in  terms  of  providing  substance  for  
policies. The imaginary domain is a normative concept to some extent. It can be 
interpreted as a universal notion to be taken into account and, together with 
bodily integrity, respected in all public policies. Nevertheless, the ideal of free-
dom demands that the state or the legal system do not define the content of our 
imaginings or how we construct our personalities. All public policies, no matter 
how they have been devised, do to some degree define the parameters for living, 
meaning that the imaginary domain cannot be fully respected in any of them. In 
Chapter 1 of this study I quote Susan James: ‘it is difficult to see how the state 
can take on the obligations that amount to protecting the imaginary domain’ 
(James 2002, 192). I believe that the protection of the imaginary domain can be 
a goal and a tool in state policies, but as has become clear, it remains an ideal 
and an evaluative instrument. 
Cornell sees the imaginary domain as an ideal, as something that is 
strived for but is never actually achieved, and as such it can be helpful in exam-
ining policies and considering their effects. Every substantive policy proposition 
influences how people form their personality, and every policy has its effects on 
the imaginary domain in one way or another. This does not mean that the no-
tion is of no use in political practice, however, as ideals are always needed. Cor-
nell notes that as soon as ideals are articulated and defended, they become ex-
clusionary  at  the  very  moment  of  their  defence  (Cornell  2004,  ix).  She  also  
notes: 
 
Ideals neither emerge out of thin air nor do we simply dream them 
up.  They  are  part  of  historical  and  social  reality  and,  indeed,  they  
have been critiqued as nothing more than expressions of the inter-
ests of the most powerful. These are criticisms that can never be an-
swered once and for all. They must be taken into account as part of 
a complex and nuanced defense of ideals. (ibid.) 
 
Political  processes  are  not  simple,  and  ideals  do  not  have  to  be  reached.  They  
are something to aim at and the process is on-going. Political evaluation based 
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on ideals can be a force for change, and in this study I offer alternative and new 
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